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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation presents political participation and engagement trends in 
Thailand, seeking to explain how and why the quantity, quality, and equality of political 
participation and engagement have changed during the past decade (2001 – 2010). Data 
for its quantitative analyses are taken from two major sources. The first source is 
information collected by several government agencies such as the National Statistics 
Bureau (NSB) and the Office of Election Commission (ECT). The second source is data 
taken from several national surveys conducted in Thailand during the last decade by the 
Asian Barometer (ABS) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). 
Relying on its longitudinal analyses, this dissertation argues that political 
participation and engagement in Thailand since 2001 has changed—not only in its 
quantity (number of participants) but also in its quality and equality. In order to explain 
changes in patterns of political participation, this dissertation proposes a participatory 
model that included not only socioeconomic status but also various attitudinal and 
mobilization factors to be tested in several contexts (years). This dissertation claims that 
participatory differences among groups of Thai citizens were not solely a consequence of 
differences in socioeconomic status backgrounds. Rather, there are various psychological, 
motivational, and contextual factors affecting participatory disparities among social 
groups. Additionally, people participate in politics differently depending on types of 
political activity and on the political environment. 
iv 
 
This dissertation also finds that the attitudes toward politics between rural and 
urban Thai citizens were neither constantly negative nor positive, and were not easy to 
explain based on each group’s differences in socioeconomic status or area of living, as 
preceding scholars have suggested. Obviously much evidence shown in this dissertation 
indicates that rural Thais were not less interested in, less informed about, and politically 
less efficacious to engage in politics than their urban counterparts. 
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The nature of citizen participation and engagement in public life in Thailand has 
changed dramatically over the last decade. This change was apparent even before April 
2010 when thousands of Thailand’s Red Shirts, antigovernment protesters, occupied a 
central commercial district in Bangkok demanding that the government resign, an event 
that Time ranked tenth in its survey of top world news stories in 2010 (Tharoor, 2010). As 
a celebration of political reform under the new electoral system engineered by the 1997 
Constitution, on average, 70 percent of eligible Thai voters went to the polls in the 
elections for House Representatives in 2001, 2005, and 2007. This is the highest average 
turnout in the modern political history of Thailand, compared to about 40-50 percent 
during the period between 1958 and 1983, and around 60 percent on average from the 
mid-1980s to the 1990s. Millions of Thai citizens also join political parties and various 
civic organizations. Accompanied with the overwhelming support for democracy among 
a large number of Thai citizens,1 some scholars (e.g., Albritton, 2006; Albritton and 
                                                            
 
1Using the 2002 Asianbarometer Survey data, Albritton and Thawilwadee (2006) 
find, for instance, that 88.9 percent of Thai respondents were satisfied with the Thai state 
of democracy, with of those surveyed 54.7 percent reported “fairly satisfied,” and 34.2 
percent reported “very satisfied.” 
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Thawilwadee, 2005) view this improvement as a good sign for democratic consolidation.2 
However, in contrast, other scholars such as Amy Freedman (2006: 58) claim that those 
who conclude that democracy has been fully consolidated in Thailand have naively 
ignored other measures of democratic consolidation such as leaders playing by the rules 
of the game—not seeing themselves as above the law—and respect for civil rights.3   
 In addition, because of the wide openness of the political system and the well-
developed communication technology, individual people can also express their opinions 
on public issues faster and more conveniently than they previously did (Carthew, 2010; 
Poowin, 2010). Moreover, protest politics are more common in Thai citizens’ lives 
(Chairat, 2010; Ockey, 2009; Thitinan, 2008). Since 2006, a pattern of citizen 
involvement in Thailand has been apparent through several massive protests organized by 
two opposing groups of Thai citizens. The first group is the Yellow Shirts, the anti-
Thaksin movement that emerged as the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) in late 
May 2006. The second group is the Red Shirts or the United Front for Democracy 
Against Dictatorship (UDD) that first formed in September 2006 to oppose the military 
coup, which overthrew the government of Thaksin Shinawatra five weeks before 
                                                            
 
2Albritton (2005: 146-147) states that “stability and continuity of democracy 
demonstrated in the 2005 parliamentary elections both bode well for the consolidation of 
democratic government in Thailand.” 
 
3This argument is based on what Freedman’s (2006) criticism of Prime Minister 
Thaksin and his administrative styles. She noted, “He [Thaksin] brought up on corruption 
charges and was able to avoid punishment for what the [anti-corruption] commission 
found were violations. He seemingly tried to manipulated media outlets critical of his 
regime. He used draconian tactics to implement security policies against Muslims in the 
south, and against those involved in the illegal drug trade” (p.58).   
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scheduled elections. Both of them grew rapidly with hundreds of thousands of citizens 
joining each camp’s several demonstrations during the past five years.  
Among the Yellow Shirts’ protests, critical events include their months-long 
occupation of the Government House (August–December 2008), their blockage of the 
Parliament Building on October 7, 2008, and their weeklong shutdown of Bangkok’s two 
airports (November 25–December 3, 2008). The Red Shirts’ protests in early 2009 caused 
the cancellation of the 4th East Asian Summit4 scheduled to be held in Pattaya. The 
violent clashes with police and soldiers during the demonstrations in Bangkok in April 
2009 left hundreds of people injured. During the two month-long protests in April-May 
2010, the Red Shirts spilled hundreds of liters of their own blood at the Government 
House, in front of Prime Minister Abhisit’s private house, and in the Democrat’s 
headquarters building. Between April 3 and 9, 2010, they occupied the richest shopping 
area of Bangkok, Ratchaprasong, confronted a group of people who disagreed with their 
protests, and clashed with the armed forces, which led to nearly a hundred deaths and 
more than 1,800 injuries. One scholar views these kinds of street politics as a new 
political “culture” that make Thailand very difficult to govern (Ockey, 2009). Others see 
a growing trend of protest activism as evidence of a political awakening of the Thai rural 
masses (Chairat, 2010). 
                                                            
 
4The East Asian Summit (EAS) is a forum held annually by leaders of, initially, 
16 countries in the East Asian region, so-called ASEAN plus 6, including 10 ASEAN 
countries and other 6 countries in Asia and Australia (i.e., Australia, China, India, Japan, 
Korea and New Zealand). The main purpose of the EAS is to be a forum for dialogue on 
broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the 
aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia (see 
http://www.aseansec.org for more detail). 
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 The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to understand this change in patterns of 
political participation and engagement in Thailand since the late 1990s. Have political 
participation and engagement increased in Thailand? Has the change in patterns of citizen 
participation and engagement in Thailand during the past decade increased the number of 
participants without increasing citizens’ political interest or knowledge about politics? In 
addition, do Thai participants equally engage in the political process; or is there still an 
uneven distribution of citizen participation across gender, age, level of income, level of 
education, and geographic area? In other words, how and why have political participation 
and engagement changed among different groups in Thailand during the past decade?   
My dissertation seeks to answer these questions by using a quantitative analysis of 
political participation and engagement in Thai politics since 2001, the year of the first 
House of Representatives elections under the new electoral system engineered by the 
introduction of the 1997 Constitution of Thailand. The period since then has been 
momentous, characterized by several political changes including a celebration of political 
reform from 2001 to 2005; then the military coup in late 2006; and political conflict 
between the two opposing camps, one that supposedly supports Thaksin and the other 
that protects the interests of Bangkok elites, that emerged in late May 2006 but has 
continued even after the military government stepped aside and the civilian government 
regained control in February 2008. 
In order to avoid any confusion with “civic engagement,” a term often used in 
discussions about the decline in civil society (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, 2001: 99), I 
prefer to use two separate terms, “political participation” and “political engagement” in 
my explanations regarding citizens’ political behaviors and attitudes. It is also recognized 
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that the term political participation can be considered in a broad sense by including “any 
activity, individual or collective, devoted to influencing the collective life of the polity” 
(Macedo et al., 2005: 6). However, the attempt has been made here to distinguish sharply 
between political and civic (or nonpolitical) activity. That is, when talking about political 
participation in this dissertation, although I refer this term broadly to include both 
participation in traditional (voting and involvement in campaign activities) and 
unconventional (contacting officials and protesting) forms of political activism, I exclude 
civic activism (membership in civic organizations and taking part in voluntary civic 
activities) from my measurement of political participation, and instead it is considered as 
an explanation of changing patterns of political activity. As an explanation for political 
behavior, I also use the term “political engagement” to refer to the set of political 
attitudes that motivates people to engage in political activity (Burns, Schlozman, and 
Verba, 2001: 99-100). This means that my definition of political engagement is much 
broader than what Zukin et al. (2006) call cognitive engagement (participation by paying 
attention to politics and public affair) by including political interest, knowledge, and 
efficacy in its operationalization.  
In countries where democracy has long been established, such as the United 
States, the erosion of traditional forms of involvement, such as voting and membership in 
political parties, was accompanied by an expansion of action repertoires, the rise of 
protest politics, and more individualized forms of action (Dalton, 2000; Macedo et al., 
2005; Norris, 2007; Putnam, 2000; Zukin et al., 2006). Based on these patterns of 
political participation that have been changing during the last decades, some scholars 
claim that democracy is at risk (Macedo et al., 2005), while others argue that there is no 
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problem: citizens are just participating in a different mix of activities than in the past 
(Zukin et al., 2006). However, for many countries where democracy is new, such as 
Thailand,5 an opposite trend can be seen in several modes of political activity: more 
people go to vote and an increasing number of them join political parties and various 
civic organizations, while protest politics and individualized forms of participation are, at 
the same time, more common in Thai citizens’ lives.  
This dissertation discusses the progression of political participation and 
engagement in Thailand, and argues that evidence of such progression could be analyzed 
through its quantity, quality, and equality of citizen participation and engagement. By 
quantity of political participation and engagement, the author refers to Marcedo et al. 
(2005: 8-10), who suggest that, first, democracy is better if participation is widespread, 
more people go to vote, get involved with political parties or electoral activities, as well 
as participate more frequently in an organization or group. Second, a healthy democracy 
also needs quality of participation, both in individual and institutional terms. That is, to 
participate in public affairs, citizens should have proper participatory knowledge and 
skills, while institutions, such as elections, should provide civic environments that are 
appropriate for citizens to participate in. For example, for electoral competition to be 
meaningful, democratic regimes must allow freedom of expression, availability of 
alternative sources of information (freedom of the media), and associational autonomy 
(freedom to form parties, interest groups, and social movements) (Dahl, 1971). In 
                                                            
 
5Although democracy in Thailand has been established since 1932, nonelected 
prime ministers were approved by the constitutions until 1992 and the most recent 
military intervention occurred in 2006.   
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addition, quality civic environments should provide political activity that is increasingly 
informed, harmonized, and less polarized. Finally, democracy is better if the voices and 
interests of the people as a whole are involved. A good democracy must ensure that all 
citizens are in fact able to make use of all formal rights of political participation, 
including the right to vote, to organize, to assemble, to protest, and to lobby for their 
interests, and to influence the decision-making process (Diamond and Morlino, 2004). 
Indeed, political institutions and inequalities in political resources should not be an 
obstacle for lower-status individuals, particularly the young, the poor, the less educated, 
and many racial and ethnic minorities, to exercise their participatory rights. 
Using these dimensions of political participation and engagement, one of the main 
assumptions of this dissertation is that Thailand’s democratic politics would be healthier 
if the quantity, quality, and equality of political participation and engagement were 
greater. That is, first, if the quantity of political participation in Thailand were greater, 
participation in political activities and voluntary groups/organizations would be in a 
positive trend. Second, if the quality of political participation were increased, Thai 
citizens would be interested more in politics, would be better-informed about politics and 
elections, and would have a better sense of political efficacy. Third, if the equality of 
political participation were improved, there would be less uneven distribution of political 
participation, a smaller participatory gap among Thai citizens with different genders, 
ages, levels of income, levels of education, and areas of living. Thus, the very goals of 
this dissertation are: (1) to measure the quantity, quality, and equality of political 
participation and engagement in Thailand; (2) to explain how and why such quantity, 
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quality, and equality of political participation and engagement have changed during the 
past decade. 
 
Justification for the Research 
 With only a few notable exceptions, most previous studies of the Thai case focus 
on political participation as participation in electoral activities, especially voting and 
some campaign activities; there are few empirical studies on political contacting and 
protest. By considering political participation in a broad sense by including four key 
activities—voting, campaign activity, political contacting, and protest—this dissertation 
provides a clearer understanding than previous research of political participation in 
Thailand. This dissertation also provides answers not only to questions about the extent to 
which Thai citizens participate in a set of political activities but also questions relating to 
what particular types of political acts they engage in more often and how much.   
Moreover, while recent studies in other developing societies have moved beyond 
the so-called “standard model,” socioeconomic status and resources constraint theories of 
political participation, to the more advanced models that pay attention to variety of 
factors such as mobilized, institutional, and contextual factors (see for example Booth 
and Seligson, 2008; Bratton, 2008; Desposato and Norrander, 2009; Holzner 2010; 
Moehler, 2008), empirical studies that focus on those factors are still rare. Most previous 
studies in the Thai context have paid a great deal of attention to either a socioeconomic 
explanation or the impacts of motivated agents and/or clientelism factors on how and 
why people get (or do not get) involved in politics (e.g., Albritton and Thawilwadee, 
2005; Sombat Thamrongthanyawong, 2010; Suchit 1996). In order to fill this gap, this 
9 
 
dissertation describes and explains political participation in Thailand over the past decade 
by examining impacts of socioeconomic status factors along with other potential factors, 
especially political engagement (political interest, knowledge, and efficacy), group 
mobilization, clientelism, and political experience factors. This dissertation also pays 
attention to the impact of political contexts by addressing questions regarding changes in 
political behaviors and attitudes (e.g., knowledge and interests) across time: how and why 
political participation and engagement have changed among different groups in Thailand 
during the past decade.  
Although this dissertation focuses on a single country, the answers derived from 
the Thai case provide a clearer understanding of the relationships between individual-
level factors (particularly socioeconomic and psychological factors), motivation (group 
engagement), political contexts (as political changes and reforms have dramatically 
occurred in many new democracies during the past decades), and political participation, 
that could be applied to other developing countries as well.  
Finally, this dissertation makes an important contribution to the participatory and 
Thai politics literature because it focuses on political participation and engagement in the 
“divided” society of Thailand, where political conflicts among people with different 
political positions (or ideologies)6 and socioeconomic backgrounds7 have major effects 
on the way Thai citizens currently participate in politics, express their political views, and 
                                                            
 
6I.e., “Yellow,” royalist, and anti-Thaksin versus “Red,” liberalist, and pro-
Thaksin. 
 
7As the majority of the Red Shirts are rural residents who have less income and a 




make decisions regarding public policies and political choices. As a result, differences in 
participatory patterns between different groups in Thailand go far beyond the dominant 
explanations that claimed more active in politics of the less-resource/skill (the poor, the 
less-educated, or the rural) because they are more easily mobilized into politics by 
personal benefit than the more advantaged. This dissertation reexamines the so-called “a 
tale of two democracies” thesis that has dominated perceptions toward urban and rural 
Thais since the mid-1990s by providing more updated and clearer pictures of political 
participation and engagement for those two groups of populates.      
   
Method and Sources 
Data for the analyses were taken from two major sources. The first source is 
information collected by several government agencies such as the National Statistics 
Bureau (NSB) and the Office of Election Commission (ECT). The second source is data 
taken from several national surveys conducted in Thailand during the last decade by King 
Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI) and its partners, including the Asian Barometer (ABS), the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), and the World Values Survey (WVS). 
The respondents for these surveys were identified through a probability sampling of 
eligible Thai voters, which included all Thai citizens 18 years of age and older. 
Collecting almost the same type of responses to questions on political interest, 
knowledge, and the efficacy of Thai voters in 2001, 2005, and 2007, the CSES survey 
series was considered appropriate for use in a year-by-year longitudinal analysis of 
political engagement.  
11 
 
The ABS, the leading comparative survey of citizens’ attitudes, values, and 
political actions in Asia, allowed us to examine the changing patterns of political 
participation in Thailand between 2002 and 2006 that were not limited to participating in 
electoral activities but included various unconventional forms of civic action, such as 
being a member in voluntary groups or associations, contacting the official government, 
parties, or the media, and taking part in demonstrations, marches, or protests. Both the 
ABS and CSES survey series also provided individual-level data that could be utilized in 
both a descriptive and regression analysis to test models of political participation and 
engagement. The WVS was conducted only one time in Thailand (i.e., in 2007), but 
contained information about various forms of protest actions that can be used along with 
the 2006 ABS in explaining more clearly Thai citizens’ protest behaviors. 
These sources of quantitative data were used in the two stages of examination. 
The first stage employed tables, graphs, and bivariate tables in order to describe the 
changes in quantity, quality, and equality of political participation and engagement in 
Thailand during the past decade. In order to investigate the changes in the quantity of 
political participation, a longitudinal analysis of a year-by-year participation in four key 
political activities—voting, campaigning, political contacting, and protesting activities—
was developed. The data used in this longitudinal analysis were mixed, consisting of both 
existing statistical data taken from public organizations (e.g., ECT, NSB, and KPI) and 
survey data obtained from the ABS (2002, 2006) and CSES (2001, 2005, 2007).  
First, the official voter turnout rates in Thailand collected by the Office of 
Election Commission were employed in order to describe voting trends. Second, data for 
the examination of progress in campaign activity participation were taken from two 
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survey questions of the ABS (2002, 2006) and CSES (2001, 2005) that asked the Thai 
respondents whether they attended election meetings or rallies or had shown support for 
certain political parties or candidates in the previous election. The analysis also added 
information about these two campaign activities in 2003 and 2004 reported by King 
Prajadhipok’s Institute (2007) into a graph in order to make it more clearly a trend.  
Third, a graph of the tendencies of Thai citizens in initiating contact with public 
officials obtained from ABS (2002, 2006) and CSES (2005, 2007), was created in order 
to investigate changes in political contacting participation. While the study excluded 
contacting other public persons and organizations such as political parties, NGOs, and the 
media from the measurement of political contacting, the percentages of people contacting 
those organizations are illustrated in the graph for the purpose of comparison. Fourth, 
data for the longitudinal analysis of protest activism were taken from the ABS (2002, 
2006) and CSES (2005, 2007), using a question that asked Thai respondents whether they 
have taken part in a protests, marches, or demonstrations during the past years. Other 
forms of protest activism, including (1) refusing to pay taxes or fees to the government, 
(2) getting together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition, and (3) using force or 
violence for a political cause, obtained from the 2006 ABS, the only source that collected 
such information, were also examined but not as a trend and in a separate table. 
Political interest, political knowledge, and political efficacy as key indicators of 
political engagement were utilized in order to examine the quality of political 
participation and as an explanation of changes in political participation. Political interest 
was first measured following the CSES’s 10-point scale questions on how interested the 
respondents were in the election, asking respondents approximately two weeks before the 
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election day of 2001, 2005, and 2007 House Elections. Existing statistical data on 
attention to news media through TV, radio, and newspapers recorded by the Thai 
National Statistic Bureau were also employed to measure political interest.  
In order to evaluate respondents’ political knowledge, I employed the CSES’s 
three survey questions asking respondents to (1) name as many candidates and (2) 
political parties in their electoral district as possible, and to (3) match the candidate to the 
party that he/she belonged to. Then, the responses of those that could name at least two 
candidates, parties, and matches were compared between candidate and party. Finally, the 
CSES’s four survey questions that measure the feeling of political efficacy were used. 
These efficacy questions included both questions that reflected internal efficacy, “beliefs 
about one’s own competence to understand and to participate effectively in politics” 
(Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991: 407), and external efficacy, the perceived 
responsiveness of the political system to citizen’s participation (see Craig, Niemi, and 
Silver, 1990: 289-314; Madsen, 1987: 571-581).8  
In order to examine the equality of political participation, bivariate tables of the 
2002 and 2006 ABS data were developed. The two separate-year surveys of the ABS 
(2002, 2006) were more appropriate in the context of this study than the three separate-
year surveys of the CSES (2001, 2005, 2007) because the ABS constantly collects 
information about many political activities, including voting, campaign activities (e.g., 
                                                            
 
8Internal efficacy was measured by agreement with the statement, “If people like 
us go to vote, we can change what happens in the future,” and disagreement with the 
statement, “Sometimes I think that I just don’t understand politics.” External efficacy was 
measured by disagreement with the statement, “Government officials really do not care 
what people like you and me think,” and disagreement with the statement, “Common 
people like me don’t have any influence on what goes on in politics.”   
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attending election meetings or rallies and showing support for certain political parties or 
candidates), political contacting (e.g., contacting government officials or high-level 
officials), and protesting (i.e., taking part in demonstrations, marches, or protests) that 
allowed this study to consider political participation and its changing patterns in a broad 
sense. In contrast, CSES collected different information about political participation. In 
2001, the CSES survey asked whether the respondents had: (1) attended campaign 
meetings or rallies and (2) had shown support for parties and candidates, but did not 
collect any political contacting and protest activism information. For 2005 and 2007, 
several questions about political contacting and protest activism were added, but electoral 
activity questions were taken out; the survey in 2005 asked only the question about 
showing support for parties and candidates, while this question, and the question about 
attending campaign meetings or rallies, were both excluded from the 2007 survey.  
With the help of the survey data obtained from the ABS, an analysis of the 
variable correlations in each bivariate table was applied to see the associations between 
five demographic factors (gender, age, level of income, level of education, and area of 
living) and six political activities (voting, attending election meetings or rallies, showing 
support for certain political parties or candidates, contacting government officials, 
contacting high-level officials, and taking part in demonstrations, marches, or protests).  
The second stage of the examinations dealt intensively with three major 
questions: (1) how political participation has changed among different groups in 
Thailand; (2) how political engagement has changed among different groups; and (3) how 
political engagement can explain the patterns of political participation among groups of 
Thai citizens, especially between the rural and the urban. The first question could be 
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partly answered by the bivariate analysis of equality of political participation. However, 
to make the answer even more clear, multivariate regression models of a political 
participation index9 were analyzed. Controlling for political engagement (i.e., political 
interest10 and political efficacy11) and other psychological and mobilization factors (party 
attachment12 and group membership13), these regression models explain whether 
participatory gaps among citizens with differences in demographic backgrounds (i.e., 
gender, age, income, education, and rural-urban) actually exist. By conducting regression 
analyses for both the 2002 and 2006 data, the results obtained from the models could also 
be utilized to explain the factors that affected the changing patterns of political 
participation in Thailand between those years. 
                                                            
 
9These political participation index models used similar sets of dependent (i.e., 
sum of six political activities—voting, attending election meetings or rallies, showing 
support for certain political parties or candidates, contacting government officials, 
contacting high-level officials, and taking part in demonstrations, marches, or protests) 
and independent variables (i.e., five demographic variables) that were applied in the 
bivariate examinations of equality of political participation. 
 
10Survey questions taken from the ABS 2002 and 2006 to measure political 
interest variables included: (1) citizens’ self-reports on is the extent to which they were 
interested in politics and (2) individuals’ responses to a 5-point scale question, asking the 
respondents how often they followed news about politics and the government. 
   
11Two separate political efficacy variables were taken from the ABS questions 
asked (1) whether the respondents thought, “I think I have the ability to participate in 
politics,” and (2) whether the respondents believed, “Sometimes politics and government 
seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.” 
 
12Party Attachment variable was constructed based on two ABS questions: a 
question asking the respondents whether they thought of themselves as being close to any 
particular party; and if yes, another question asking the respondents how much close they 
felt. 
 
13Group membership variable was a dummy variable for a question asking the 
respondents: “Are you a member of any organization or formal groups?”  
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However, the explanations obtained from the political participation index models 
could not explain the changes in participatory patterns in each particular kind of political 
activity—voting, campaigns, political contacting, and protesting. The logistic regression 
models of participation in each of the four key activities for 2002 and 2006 were then 
developed in order to: (1) test the impact of socioeconomic, political engagement, and 
mobilization factors on participation in individual kind of four political acts; and (2) 
explain the changing patterns of political participation for each activity by comparing the 
results from the 2002 to the 2006 models.    
Using the 2001, 2005, and 2007 CSES data, the bivariate and multivariate 
analyses of political engagement were then developed to examine the differences in 
political engagement between rural and urban Thai populates. The CSES was appropriate 
for the examinations of political engagement because it constantly collects a variety of 
information about political attitudes that allowed this study to consider political 
engagement and its changing patterns in a broad sense by including political interest, 
knowledge, and efficacy. Conducting surveys in all three House of Representatives 
elections held in Thailand between 2001 and 2010, the CSES provides time series data 
that can be utilized to investigate changes in political engagement between rural and 
urban citizens.  
In the bivariate tables, rural-urban disparities in the three engagement factors for 
each election year were developed in order to investigate how political interest, 
knowledge, and efficacy were different between rural and urban Thai respondents and 
how such a rural-urban difference has changed over the last decade. The 2007 CSES was 
the only survey conducted in Thailand after the promulgation of the 2007 Constitution 
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and collected a rich set of information about political participation (voting, political 
contacting, and protesting activities) and political engagement (interest, knowledge, and 
efficacy). Moreover, a question that helped to categorize voters into Red and Yellow 
supporters was also available only in the 2007 CSES; that is, the question asked which 
political party represented the respondents’ views best. In terms of the political positions 
that the Red or Yellow supporters take, we can roughly define those who identified the 
PPP as best representing their view as Red-voters, those who identified the DP as 
Yellow-voters, and those who identified neither the PPP nor the DP as in-between voters. 
These voters’ identifications were used as one of the independent variables for the 2007 
multivariate models for voting, political contacting and protesting by rural and urban 
residents. These multivariate models were excellent in terms of their ability to explain 
how rural-urban differences in political interest, knowledge, and efficacy can explain 
patterns of political activism between rural and urban voters, when controlling for other 
demographic, attitudinal, mobilization, institutional, and most interestingly, Red/Yellow 
attachment factors. 
Relying on these methods of examination, this dissertation explains changes in 
patterns of political participation in Thailand over the past decade. This dissertation is 
particularly interested in uncovering areas where participatory inequalities exist and, 
importantly, in measuring how politically sophisticated Thai citizens are. This 
dissertation also revisits in a productive way the debate about how rural citizens are 
different from urban citizens. The major attempt made here is to show that rural Thais are 
not less sophisticated and so perhaps not as dependent on patron-client ties as generally 
described by the literature. Or at least, if beholden to patron-client ties, they enter these 
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relationships for strategic reasons, not as blind actors easily duped and manipulated by 
patrons. 
 
Outline of Chapters 
The next chapter (Chapter 2) outlines Thailand’s political chronology since the 
country began its democratization process in 1932 up to the period where this research 
begins its interpretation (2001-2010). The main attempt is to provide a historical 
background for the analyses of changes in political participation and engagement in this 
dissertation. It starts by drawing out the two major lines of thought—a “vicious circle” in 
Thai political development and the “tale of two democracies” thesis—that have 
dominated explanations of democracy and politics in Thailand for decades. The chapter 
argues that due to political changes in Thailand during the past ten years, those 
conventional explanations have become outdated.  
In order to develop a theory that can explain more clearly how and why political 
participation and engagement of different groups in Thailand have changed during the 
past decade, Chapter 3 reviews a number of political participation studies conducted in 
several contexts: the United States and other Western democracies, developing countries, 
and Thailand. In the first part of the chapter, two key terms—political participation and 
political engagement—are defined in a broad sense. The second part of the chapter deals 
with the factors influencing political participation (socioeconomic status, political 
engagement, mobilization, and political context factors), and proposes participatory 
models that contain a variety of those potential factors to be tested in various contexts 
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(years) as a more proper way to explain the changes in patterns of political participation 
in Thailand during the past ten years.  
Chapter 4 analyzes the changing patterns of political behaviors and attitudes in 
Thailand during the past decade. The major attempts are to examine: (1) whether political 
participation and engagement of Thai citizens have quantitatively and qualitatively 
improved; (2) if any improvement has been made, then by how much. In order to clarify 
these puzzles, the chapter develops a longitudinal analysis of year-by-year political 
participation and engagement in Thailand since 2001. If the quantity of political 
participation in Thailand during the past decade was improved, Thai citizens would 
increasingly participate in politics. If the quality of political participation was improved, 
positive trends of political interest, knowledge, and efficacy of Thai citizens would 
clearly be observed. The topics examined in this chapter are, therefore: (1) the changing 
patterns of participation in voting, campaign activities, political contacting, and 
protesting activities; (2) evolution of party membership and civic engagement; and (3) 
changing patterns of political interest, knowledge, and efficacy of Thai citizens since 
2001. Even though progress in the quantity and quality of political participation in 
Thailand during the past decade appears in ebb and flow trends rather than 
straightforward increases, evidence derived from the examination of these three topics is 
convincing enough to conclude that the quantity and quality of political participation in 
Thailand have changed in an optimistic direction. 
How has political participation changed among different groups in Thailand? 
Chapter 5 responds to this question in three aspects. The first aspect emphasizes equality 
of political participation topic, seeking to explain changes in the distribution of political 
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participation among Thai citizens of different genders, ages, levels of income, levels of 
education, and areas of living. The chapter contends that participatory gaps between 
people with different geographic and socioeconomic backgrounds still exist but are 
smaller than what prior Thai scholars have argued.  
The second aspect then focuses on the factors influencing participatory disparities 
between groups of Thai citizens: What are those factors? Have their impacts on political 
participation changed over time, if any change, then how and why? The chapter confirms 
that participatory differences between groups of Thai citizens are not a consequence of 
differences in socioeconomic backgrounds but of various psychological, motivational, 
and contextual factors. However, because we should not expect the same set of factors to 
affect different modes of political activism in the same way, the third aspect of 
examination for Chapter 5 focuses on the factors that foster each kind of the four political 
actions considered in this study—voting, campaign activities, political contacting, and 
protests. The chapter concludes that the more equal distribution of political participation 
among Thai citizens is a consequence of changes in participatory patterns among 
different groups of Thai citizens, especially of those who are female, affluent, and urban. 
Such changes are driven by several activities and fostered by various socioeconomic, 
engagement, and mobilization factors, the impact of each on participation varying 
according to the political context.  
The differential rates of participation for any subgroup deserve attention, but 
rural-urban differences are particularly worthy of attention in the case of Thailand. 
Chapter 6 investigates rural-urban differences with respect to the diverse set of 
predispositions that shape an individual’s motivation and propensity to take part in 
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politics. The chapter addresses two major questions to be examined: (1) how has political 
engagement changed between rural and urban Thai citizens in the past decade?; and (2) 
How can these changes in each group’s political engagement explain its patterns of 
political participation? In the first part, the chapter deals intensively with rural-urban 
differences in three dimensions of political engagement—political interest, knowledge, 
and efficacy—in the 2001, 2005, and 2007 elections. The chapter presents mixed patterns 
of political engagement between these two groups, with growing trends in political 
efficacy for both rural and urban electorates and ebb and flow trends in political interest 
and knowledge among these two groups. The chapter thus concludes that the attitudes 
toward politics between rural and urban Thai citizens were neither constantly negative 
nor positive, and were not easy to explain solely based on each group’s differences in 
socioeconomic status or area of residence, as preceding scholars have suggested.  
The second part of Chapter 6 then focuses on explaining how the changing 
pictures of rural-urban differences in political interest, knowledge, and efficacy can 
explain patterns of political activism (i.e., in voting, political contacting, and protesting 
activities) between the rural and urban Thai voters. The chapter suggests that the factors 
facilitating greater political participation are relatively different between rural and urban 
residents, and such differences cannot simply be explained as a result of a deeper 
engagement in the patron-client relationship of the rural than of the urban. Indeed, those 
differentiations depend on several factors and vary according to different kinds of 
political activity. 
Chapter 7 evaluates the various results of this study and discusses the implications 
of these findings for future research. 
  




A BRIEF HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND 
  




Based on knowledge about Thai politics, there are two major lines of thought 
dominating the explanations of political participation and engagement in Thailand. The 
first one, conventional wisdom, asserts that the democratization impasse in Thailand was 
caused by the endless quarrels among two political villains: the ambitious (dictatorial 
officers) and the greedy, irresponsible politicians who manipulate the dependant, ordinary 
people, the majority of whom are conceptualized as poor, ignorant, and unhealthy. Thai 
scholars who understand, examine, and seek ways to improve democracy in Thailand call 
what is going on in the Thai democracy a “vicious circle”14 in Thai political development   
                                                            
 
14Borwornsak and Burns (1998) explain that this circle starts with increasing 
public pressure on the civilian regime (normally functioning with the approval of the 
military) due to its social, political, and economic dysfunction. This dysfunction was 
typically revealed by the media reporting on the regime's overt corruption. This, in turn, 
provoked increasing political conflict between factions in the government coalition. 
Finally, in compliance with the bureaucracy, the military stepped in to restore order and 
establish a functional legislature, able to pass the laws that the bureaucracy has drafted. 
Usually an interim constitution is quickly implemented followed by a permanent 
constitution with possibly an election to create an ostensibly civilian government. Once 
the government is up and running, it is allowed a honeymoon period where everyone 
settles back to the business of state affairs. But then rumors of corruption arose yet again, 
and renewed social and political turmoil caused the governmental factions to again turn 
on one another. And the vicious cycle began yet again.    
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(Borwornsak and Burns, 1998; Likhit Dhiravegin, 2007). According to this school of 
thought, public participation in Thailand is meaningless because it has been carried out 
by nonactive citizens who have an inadequate understanding of politics (democracy). 
This line of thought seems to be out of date since the military decided to withdraw and 
disengage itself from active politics due to the uses of violence against the pro-
democracy demonstrators in the people’s uprising event of May 1992, which caused 
hundreds of campaigners to die or disappear. However, the military coup in September 
2006 suggests that military intervention cannot be overlooked or totally ignored, 
especially in a country where the military has been in power and has retained a strong 
influence in politics until the present, such as Thailand.   
The second line of thought, called “a tale of two democracies,” is first introduced 
by a famous Thai political scientist, Anek Laothamatas. Instead of explaining Thai 
politics as a vicious circle and viewing most Thai citizens as nonactive and fools, Anek 
(1995) suggests that the reason democracy failed to be firmly established over the past 
decades is to be found in the differing views and expectations of the middle class and the 
poor in the country over democracy, elections, and politicians. Anek defines the rural 
electorate as Thai populations who reside in villages (in the 1980s almost 70 percent of 
the workforce are farmers or peasants), while the Thai middle class are those socially 
situated between the wealthy property classes and the poverty-stricken peasants, farmers, 
and workers. He theorizes that rural voters are still very much part of the patron-client 
relationship whereas urban voters may be more educated and wealthier. These two 
groups appeared to desire different things from Thai democracy and this led to the 
instability and the coups. However, as we could observe through Thailand’s political 
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phenomena that occur in the past decades, the opened political-space provided by the 
1997 Constitution, the new style of political campaigns, in which practical public policy 
is the most effective strategy to attract voters through a variety uses of media and 
advertisement, utilized by PM Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai Party, and the new roles of 
high-technology media, especially those that have been used by the protest leaders (e.g., 
website and satellite TV) in combination may affect and change the characteristics of 
individual voters—their perceptions and understandings about democracy, their 
assessments on political systems and institutions, as well as their political behaviors. The 
two dominated line of thoughts are therefore old fashioned and cannot explain these 
changing in patterns of political behavior and attitude among different groups of Thai 
citizens.    
Attempting to provide the background for my discussion, this chapter presents a 
summary of Thai political history since the country began its democratization process 
seventy-seven years ago. Though several critical events have occurred during the past 
fifteen years, this chapter suggests that the period since the year 2001 is important for the 
study of changes in patterns of political participation and engagement in Thailand. 
   
Political Participation and Engagement in the 
Early Years of Thai Democracy 
In the early hours of June 24, 1932, a small group of military and civilian 
officials, calling themselves the People’s Party, seized control of the government and 
brought an end to the 800-year absolute monarchy in Siam (known as Thailand since 
1939). Thailand began its democratization process since then, particularly after King 
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Prajadhipok (King Rama VII) signed Thailand's first permanent written constitution on 
December 10, 1932. However, the effects of this change on the Thai people were not 
immediately apparent, and successive shifts in power did not greatly disturb the placid 
surface of daily life. In order to minimize internal resistance and avoid the dangers of 
foreign intervention that they thought civil discord might invite, the People’s Party 
initially stayed in the background and drew up a long-term program for political 
development (Wyatt, 2003). According to the political development program, half of the 
members of the National Assembly would be selected and appointed by the People’s 
Party. The major attempt was to ensure its control over the elected members (Suchit, 
1987). The People’s Party promised to allow a fully elected democracy only when at least 
half of the population had completed primary education or ten years had passed, 
whichever came first (Wyatt, 2003). As a result, the first National Assembly election was 
held in November 1933 through an indirect electoral system in which the voters at the 
subdistrict (Tambon) level elected local representatives who would then choose between 
candidates for the National Assembly. As the outcome of this electoral process, the first 
national assembly included numerous senior officials of the old regime, amounting to 
approximately one-third of the total membership.  
Thailand held its first direct election in November 1937, and only 40.2 percent of 
the electorate participated in choosing half of the National Assembly. The second direct 
election was held a year later in the same month, but still the National Assembly 
remained half-appointed and the voter turnout dropped to only about 35 percent.15 No 
                                                            
 
15See Thailand’s voter turnout rates over time in Chapter 4  
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new election was held until 1946 due to World War II. Prime Minister Plaek 
Pibunsongkhram (Pibun), during this period, experimented with Italian Fascism and a 
mixture of elements of the Japanese bushido code, trying to organize, discipline, and 
militarize Thai society (Lynch, 2006), which was carried out in a highly authoritarian 
manner. Thus, during the first two decades of constitutional monarchy, the concept of 
democracy remained alien to the majority of Thai people for much of that time. 
Democracy in Thailand has undergone a long process of refinement and adjustment in 
order to produce a political system specific to the needs of establishing the Thai nation 
rather than of providing the ordinary citizens with the rights to govern or at least, 
opportunities for political participation. 
Thailand then experienced a short period of democracy during the postwar era, 
when the 1946 Constitution provided for a fully elected House of Representatives and a 
Senate chosen by the House. Nevertheless, on November 8, 1947, amid internal conflict 
between parliamentarians and the political chaos that followed the mysterious death of 
King Ananda Mahidol (King Rama VIII), the military overthrew the elected government 
of Admiral Thawal Thamrongnavasawat (prime minister, 1946-1947), and restored 
power to Pibun. Thai institutions, during 1947-1958, were held in the hands of elitists 
with great support from the military. Even though the House of Representatives elections 
were held four times in January 1948, February 1952, February 1957, and December 
1957, public participation in these elections remained low with approximately 40 percent 
on average voter turnout. Moreover, the election results were criticized by the public, 
particularly middle classes in Bangkok (e.g., the press, business organizations, and 
unions), as the product of a “dirty” electoral process (Suchit, 1996: 187). Following the 
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1957 election, there was considerable public dissatisfaction and even demonstrations 
against the election results. This kind of instable event did not lead to the improvement of 
election; in contrast, it created another coup led by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, who 
abolished the parliament and the constitution, placed a ban on political parties and 
unions, and established the “Revolutionary Party” and a highly authoritarian regime. An 
external threat by Communism allowed the military government of Sarit (prime minister, 
1959-1963) and Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn (prime minister, 1963-1973) to 
develop and maintain a series of authoritarian governments for the next fourteen years 
with strong support from the US government and the World Bank. 
 
Citizens Uprisings: The Two Turning Points of 
Thai Public Participation 
The first stage of a turning point in the Thai democratization process was reached 
in October 1973, when the student-led popular uprising overthrew the corrupt and 
unpopular military government of Field Marshal Thanom. A coalition of workers, 
farmers, students, and members of the middle class began to mobilize for democracy, 
clearly demonstrating the potential for political change at the grassroots level. Legitimacy 
was withdrawn from the nation’s top military leaders, who were forced to go into exile, 
after the use of violence to attack masses of Thai citizens in the streets of Bangkok. 
Without its authoritarian leaders, Thailand’s military returned to its barracks, at least 
temporarily, permitting the expansion of democratic space in which human rights became 
more respected, the media received more freedom to criticize politicians and 
governments, and political parties had greater opportunity to form and play an extensive 
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role in Thai parliamentary politics. However, the 1973-76 period of civilian rule did not 
provide harmonious politics and widespread public participation. Rather, it was a period 
of great political conflict and competition among polarized people at the top of society 
who split into two ideological camps—left, progressive, and right, conservative.  
After the 1973 student upheaval, the 1974 Constitution was promulgated, 
applying several new electoral rules, including a rule that made membership in a political 
party a requirement for election to the House of Representatives. When the House of 
Representatives election was held in January 1975, 42 political parties and 2,199 
candidates contested for 269 seats, while 47.17 percent of eligible voters cast their 
ballots. Another house election under the 1974 Constitution was held on April 4, 1976, 
and the voter turnout dropped to 43.99 percent. Moreover, ordinary people, whose 
participation improved very little in the 1975 and 1976 House of Representatives 
elections, were mobilized and brought into the left-right conflict. The time that the 
political space was opened (Girling, 1981; Morell and Chai-Anan, 1981; and Hewison, 
1997) was short and ended in October 1976 when protesting students, who gathered to 
oppose Field Marshal Thanom’s return from his exile, were killed or imprisoned by the 
right-wing Village Scouts and the military. An inability of the government to control the 
situation provided a perfect opportunity for the military to step in again. This bloody 
restoration of authoritarianism not only brought armed forces back into power but also 
illustrated the residual strength of conservative forces (McCargo, 2002).  
However, as it had mobilized several groups of Thai people (not only residents of 
Bangkok, laborers, taxi drivers, and businessmen but also ordinary villagers, farmers, and 
provincial elites), political conflict during the 1973-1976 period indicated an imperative 
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task facing Thailand “to devise political systems that can balance participation with 
stability, change with order” (Morell and Chai-Anan, 1981: 4). Unlike the Sarit-Thanom 
strong authoritarian era, the military was now forced to share some of its absolute 
political power with the elected members of Parliament (Kobkua, 2003: 17), thereby 
proposed a new form of military’s control over the government. From late 1977 to 1988, 
there was an evolution of a constitutional and parliamentary regime under several 
governments led by former military leaders.  
In order to loosen the authoritarianism, the governments of General Kriangsak 
Chamanan (prime minister, 1977-1980) and General Prem Tinsulanonda (prime minister, 
1980-1988) allowed the expansion of the role of the parliament and political parties. 
Three consecutive House of Representatives elections produced an increase in voter 
turnout from 43.9 percent in the 1979 elections to 50.8 percent in 1983 and 61.3 percent 
in the 1986 elections. Nevertheless, during their twelve years in power, both Kriangsak 
and Prem were never once running in an election, and it soon became clear that the polity 
established under both of them was one which appealed to conservatives, as decision-
making and policy were not entrusted to popularly elected politicians but remained with 
an elite of civil and military bureaucrats and technocrats (Hewison, 1997). Many Thai 
scholars therefore labeled the form of government in this period as a “half-a-page 
democracy” (prachathipatai khreung bai) (Kobkua, 2003) or “semidemocracy” (Case, 
1996; Chai-anan, 1989; Neher, 1987) which  is basically one form of a limited/guided 
democracy. The major characteristic of the semidemocratic government of Thailand is 
that it is the form of government in which the prime minister, regardless of whether 
he/she is a member of the House of Representatives, is elected by a coalition of parties, 
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and major ministries are given to retired military figures, famous politicians, or high-level 
bureaucrats. Under this form of government, participation of many groups within the 
society is allowed but the military and top level bureaucrats continue to play the most 
important role in determining the direction of country’s politics (Neher, 1987). However, 
after the House of Representatives election on July 24, 1988, General Prem was forced by 
thousands of protesters integrated surrounding his house against the prospect of an 
unelected premier. As a result, he decided to step aside,16 permitting a full-fledged 
civilian government of elected Chatchai Choonhawan (prime minister, 1988-1991), 
leader of Chart Thai Party, to be formed in August 1988.  
The second stage of a turning point in the Thai democratization process was 
reached on February 23, 1991 when the National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC), led by 
General Sundhorn Kongsompong, the Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai Armed 
Forces, took over the administration of the country. Instead of retaining power, as had 
happened in the event of military interventions in the past, the NPKC promulgated a 
provisional constitution and, after a brief period, paved the way for a civilian interim 
government headed by Anand Panyarachun (prime minister, 1991-1992 and once again in 
                                                            
 
16It would be great to make some critical notes here that after his rejection to 
continue his position as a prime minister after the 1988 election in the late July 1988, 
General Prem was appointed by the current king (King Bhumibol Adulyadej, Rama IX) 
to be the King's Privy Council since August 23, 1988. He was later promoted to be the 
Privy Council President since September 4, 1998, and has maintained this position until 
the present (2011). During the country's political crisis of 2008-10, General Prem was 
accused by the ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his supporters of being 
mastermind of the 2006 coup (Crispin, 2008; Käng, 2011; Thanong Khanthong, 2009) as 
well as influencing in the appointment of the post-coup legislature assembly and the 
interim government of General Surayud Chulanont. However, the military junta that 
ousted the occupying Thaksin government in September 2006 denied that General Prem 
had any important political role. 
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1992), a bureaucrat turned businessman. A majority of the new cabinet was composed of 
well-respected, experienced technocrats who were known for their liberal thinking and 
belief in democracy. The interim government was entrusted with administering the 
country until a new constitution was promulgated and a general election held, scheduled 
for early 1992.  
After the general election in March 1992, five political parties (Rassadorn Party, 
Samakkee Dhamma Party, Social Action Party, Thai Citizens Party, and Chart Thai 
Party) designated General Suchinda Kraprayun (prime minister, April-May 1992), a 
leading member of the NPKC who promised that he would not seek political power after 
the election, as the prime minister (Callahan, 1998). Suchinda’s appointment as Prime 
Minister accompanied by the appointment to his cabinet of almost the same corrupt 
politicians who were ousted in the 1991 coup resulted in massive demonstrations in 
Bangkok and a few other cities in May 1992. Due to Suchinda’s use of violence against 
the demonstrators, many prodemocracy campaigners died in the uprising. “Black May” 
became a common name for the 17-20 May 1992 bloody confrontation between the 
unarmed prodemocracy demonstrators and the NPKC, backed by tanks and modern 
ammunition. In response to negative sentiments against the armed forces being used as 
political instruments, the military, since the end of the Black May event, decided to 
withdraw and disengage itself from active politics (Kobkua, 2003).  
The Black May event of 1992 contributed to the realization within government 
that calls from civil advocacy organizations to introduce genuine political reform could 
no longer be ignored (Arghiros, 2001). The pressure and desire for a new constitution 
was felt and expressed at every level of Thai society, resulting in the eventual 
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promulgation of a new constitution in 1997. This constitution is said to be different both 
in intent and in the way it was drafted. It was drafted with the specific aim of political 
reform and, unlike previous constitutions, through widespread consultation with the Thai 
people. 
The Constitution of 1997 has been known as the “people’s constitution” because 
it is the first Thai constitution in which ordinary people had an opportunity to participate 
in various stages of the drafting process. Several reasons can be applied to explain this 
notion. First, in the composition of the Constitution Drafting Assembly, seventy-three of 
ninety-nine members were provincial representatives who had been directly elected 
among citizens (who are willing to be a constitution drafter) of each province and then 
these representations were approved by the parliament. Second, during the drafting 
process, there was public consultation and debate, including a series of public hearings 
across the nation that was organized as a significant part of the Assembly’s decision-
making process. Finally, the “green flag” campaign, leading by the group of 1997 
Constitutional drafters and middle class in Bangkok, succeeded in pressuring the “old-
paradigm” parliament to vote to pass the Constitution.  
 
Participation and Engagement in the Decade of 
Democratization Attempts, 2001-2010 
Reform Celebration (2001-2005)  
The 1997 Constitution deals mainly with reform of the electoral system, 
establishment of new bodies charged with checking abuses of the political process, and 
popular rights. Under this new election system, senators are now elected instead of 
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appointed, and members of the House of Representatives are chosen through a mixed 
system—a majority and proportional system combination that involves constituent 
elections (400 members) and party list selections (100 members). A number of 
independent organizations, such as the Election Commission, the Administrative and 
Constitutional Courts, the National Counter Corruption Commission, the State Audit 
Commission, the Human Rights Commission and the Ombudsman, have been set up to 
guarantee the intention of the constitution and promote transparency and accountability. 
Decentralized government is promoted and the voting age has been lowered to eighteen.  
Under the new structure designed by the 1997 Constitution’s mandates, new 
patterns and forms of citizen participation and engagement in Thai politics can be 
observed. First, there was the almost 72 percent voter turnout, the highest rate since 
Thailand held the first general election, in the first direct senate election in Thai 
democratic history ever in March of 2000. In addition, consider the House of 
Representative elections held under the new electoral system in January 2001. Under the 
new system, political parties tend to encourage people to vote for them based on their 
policy package rather than on the reputation of individual candidates which was the 
major criterion voters, particularly in rural areas, used when casting ballots in the past 
(Suchit, 1996).17 This indicates a positive sign for party development. The interest in 
making political parties better linked to ordinary people (which is partly forced by the 
Constitution) caused a rapid growth of membership in political parties. According to the 
                                                            
 
17Suchit (1996: 196) concludes that the urban electorates tend to vote more for a 
party than for individuals. In contrast, the rural voters pay no attention to party policies 
and tend to vote for candidates who have personal ties with a constituency.       
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Office of Election Commission’s database, party membership of Thai people has 
increased from 2.8 million in 1998 to almost twenty million in 2005, or by nearly seven 
fold within only seven years. 
 
Emerging Crisis and Military Coup (2006-2007) 
 However, the landslide victory18 of the government party, Thai Rak Thai Party 
(TRT) led by the Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, in the 2005 election, the second 
election after the 1997 constitutional reform, led to many concerns about the 
development of democracy in Thailand, particularly the development that may produce 
the “single party” form of government in which one large party gets a majority and lets 
other medium or small parties have seats in the cabinet but with a little bargaining power. 
This pattern has long occurred in other Asian democracies such as Singapore and 
Malaysia19 rather than a liberal democracy, in which a contested election is one of the 
most important features.20 Antigovernment reactions then emerged, starting from various 
concerns raised by journalists, academicians, and activists about its high popularity due to 
the implementation of various “populist policies” (prachaniyom), its intervention in the 
mass media and independent organizations, and various “conflict of interest” issues. The 
                                                            
 
18The TRT gained 377 of 500 seats in the 2005 House of Representatives election. 
 
19In Malaysia, there is only one partisan-group of political party – United Malays 
National Organization or UMNO – that was elected to govern the country since its 
dependence from the United Kingdom in 1957, while Singapore’s political system can be 
categorized as a multiple-party system with single-party dominating (i.e., People's Action 
Party, PAP) since its independent from Malaysian Federation in 1965.  
 
20See a definition of democracy in this sense, for example, that defining by Joseph 
Schumpeter (1942) and Adam Przeworski et al. (2000).  
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latter provoked a public movement when Prime Minister Thaksin’s family sold 
telecommunication shares (Shin Corporation) to the Singaporean government investment 
arm Temasek for about 70,000 million baht ($2 billion at the beginning of 2006) without 
paying any taxes. Moreover, in the eyes of many people, this sale was not simply a sale 
of private property to a foreign investor but a sale of one of Thailand’s most important 
companies to a foreign power (McCargo, 2009).  
The People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), a large group of middle class 
citizens and a coalition of anti-Thaksin protesters, gathered in Bangkok, demanding that 
Thaksin resign from the Prime Minister position.21 But a counter organization occurred 
due to Thaksin’s high popularity, when a group of lower middle class and working class 
in Bangkok and rural people from North and Northeast regions gathered to support the 
Prime Minister. Thaksin responded to this crisis by dissolving parliament in February, 
and holding a new election in April 2006. However, the situation was worsened when the 
opposition parties boycotted the election. The end of the “first round” political conflict 
was neither a victory for anti-Thaksin or pro-Thaksin groups, but for the military. The 
bloodless military coup on September 19, 2006 shocked not only Thai scholars who 
never thought such an intervention could occur in the 21st century, but also those foreign 
scholars for whom consideration of democracy is their major concern. 
Military rule was short lived. Under today’s world of liberal democracy and the 
internal political environment, in which popular rights cannot be ignored, the military 
government had to transfer the regime back to democracy as quickly as possible. 
                                                            
 
21The PAD’s movement grew very fast due to a wide use of mass media such as 
newspapers, websites, and satellite TV to communicate among protesters.   
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Moreover, rather than using their superior power, the military leaders let the court and a 
number of independent organizations that were established according to the 1997 
Constitution’s mandates (e.g., the Constitution Court, the Administrative Court, and 
Election Commission) to function. They also did not terminate political parties, even 
though three parties (which include the TRT party) were dissolved by the judge of the 
Constitution Commissions in May 2007. Eventually, a new Constitution was drafted,22 
accepted by the majority of voters in the national referendum, and promulgated in late 
2007. Roughly 56.5 percent of the electorate went to the referendum voting, and the draft 
Constitution was passed with a majority vote (58 percent) to become the 18th 
Constitution of Thailand since August 20, 2007. 
One key element in the 2007 Constitution23 is a new electoral system that 
combines the switch back to the pre-1997 multiseat constituency system with the new 
provincial-groups party list one. According to the Constitution, the House of 
Representatives now consists of 480 members: 400 members are from the election on a 
constituency basis and eighty are from the election on a party-list basis (Section 93). In 
                                                            
 
22The selection of the 2007 Constitution drafters was begun by the military 
leaders requested several organizations (included public, private, and civil society 
sectors) to suggest the names of people who are suitable to be a Constitutional drafter to 
be appointed by the junta as a National Assembly member. The 1982-member junta-
appointed National Assembly then elected 200 of its members as candidates for the 
Constitution Drafting Assembly. The 100 of the 200 shortlist nominees were, finally, 
approved by the military leaders to act as constitution drafters. Based on this selection 
process, the appointed National Assembly is drawn mainly from the Bangkok elite, with 
few representatives of workers, farmers, or other political parties (Hewison, 2008).       
 





the election on a constituency basis, the eligible voters shall cast ballot for candidates that 
can be elected of each constituency. Each constituency, which shall be regarded by 
province, contains House of Representatives members ranging from one to a maximum 
of three seats based on the total population in that province (Section 94). Although this 
electoral system is questioned about providing an unequal right to vote—in particular 
between voters in large provinces who can vote for up to three candidates and those in 
smaller provinces who can vote for only two or even one candidate, the prominent claim 
that this is the proper system that can avoid Thai politics from a one-party dominant 
system.24 The party list system is retained, but reduced from one hundred to eighty seats; 
voting is no longer national, but conducted by dividing the country into eight provincial 
groups, in which each provincial group has ten seats in the House of Representatives 
(Section 95-98).  
The wholly elected 200-member Senate created by the 1997 Constitution is 
replaced by a 150-member Senate with some members elected and others appointed. 
Under Section 111 of the 2007 constitution, the 150 Senate members consist of one 
elected member per province (currently seventy-seven) and the rest that are selected by 
the Selection Committee for Senators (Section 111-112). A Selection Committee for 
Senators consists of the President of the Constitutional Court, the President of the 
Election Commission, the President of the Ombudsman, the President of the National 
Counter Corruption Commission, the President of the Office of Auditor General, the 
                                                            
 
24Based on Thailand’s experiences in using this electoral system in several House 
of Representatives elections between late 1970s and mid 1990s, a coalition form of 
government is the expected outcome. 
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President of the National Human Rights Commission, a judge of the Supreme Court of 
Justice, and a judge of the Supreme Administrative Court (Section 113). In the selection 
process, the Selection Committee for Senators would select the remaining seventy three 
Senators from a name-list received from the Election Commission. Candidates included 
in this name-list are nominated by academic organizations, governmental organizations, 
private sector, professional organizations, and other official civic groups.25 These 
nominating organizations must be established in Thailand for at least three years (Section 
114). On one hand, this process of Senate selection would bring people who are 
representatives of groups or organizations into the body; on the other, the selection by a 
panel of only seven members could be criticized as undemocratic.26 
 
On the Path Back to Democracy, Political Conflicts Return 
The military government stepped aside after the House of Representative election 
was held and approved by the Election Commission. The general election on December 
23, 2007 was a “symbol” showing that democracy was back in Thailand. However, the 
conflict continues because the People Power Party (PPP), which is Thaksin's proxy party, 
emerged as a replacement for TRT, won the election by a solid margin (233 of the 480 
seats) and formed the coalition government after five minor parties joined it (Table 2.1,  
                                                            
 
25According to the 2007 organic law on the election of members of the House of 
Representatives and Senators, the composition of these 73 selected senators shall consist 
of 14 people nominated by academic organizations, 14 representatives of governmental 
organizations, 15 nominees from the private sector, 15 from professional organizations 
and 15 from other groups. 
 
26Debates on the pros and cons of the Senates selection can be found precisely in 






Election Results, 23 December 2007 
 
 Constituency Party List Total 
 seats % vote seats % vote seats 
People Power Party (PPP)* 199 36.6 34 37.6 233
Democrat Party (DP) 131 30.3 33 37.0 164
Chart Thai Party (CT)* 30 8.9 4 3.7 34
Puea Pandin Party (FMP)* 17 9.2 7 4.9 24
Ruamjai Thai Chart Pattana Party* 8 4.7 1 2.3 9
Machima Thippathai Party* 11 5.4 0 1.4 11
Pracharaj Party* 4 2.3 1 1.2 5
Total 400 100.0 80 100.0 480
Source: The Office of Election Commission (www.ect.go.th) 









the election results). In late May 2008, a hundred thousand street protesters led by the 
PAD gathered in Bangkok, demanding that the government stop the plan to revise the 
2007 Constitution—to change Article 237 of the 2007 Constitution, which gave the 
authority to the Election Commission to recommend dissolution of political parties for 
the electoral violations of party executives. For the PAD, this revision signaled the 
reversal of the ban imposed on executives of the disbanded TRT and the possible return 
and acquittal of the self-exiled Thaksin (Askew, 2010).  
Then on August 26, 2008, approximately 30,000 protesters moved in and seized 
the Government House, extending their goal to force Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, 
who was invited by Thaksin to become a PPP leader during his exile and was elected to 
be the Prime Minister of the first government under the 2007 Constitution, to resign. 
Prime Minister Samak rejected PAD protesters’ request and tried to terminate the protest. 
He responded to the occupation of the government house by calling an emergency 
session of parliament. He also declared emergency law in Bangkok and issued arrest 
warrants for PAD leaders. However, the situation was still unresolved. The crisis was 
punctuated when Samak was judged by the Constitution Court to be disqualified, due to 
his being a private employee (receiving payment for hosting and participating in two 
television cooking shows) while holding a Prime Minister position. As a result, Samak 
had to relinquish his position, while a special House of Representatives session to elect a 
new chief executive was required. Technically, Samak was eligible to be reelected, but 
his hope for a political comeback was rejected by the coalition parties (BBC NEWS, 




Instead of Samak, the PPP nominated Somchai Wongsawat, Thaksin’s brother-in-
law, for a new prime minister (BBC NEWS, September 15, 2008). Somchai was then 
elected by a majority vote in the House of Representatives as prime minister on 
September 17, 2008, while the PAD was still in the Government House. Because of his 
close relationship to Thaksin, Prime Minister Somchai was very quickly disapproved of 
by the protesters. On October 7, 2008, PAD protesters blocked all four entries to the 
parliament building, trying to hold 320 parliamentarians hostage inside. They also cut off 
power, attempting to impede Prime Minister Somchai’s policy address to the National 
Assembly.27 Although Somchai could complete his statement (so that his government 
was approved by the Constitution), the event in which the police clashed with the 
protesters caused 452 injures and two deaths led the PAD to be more furious.  
Claiming the government’s lack of responsiveness due to the use of violence 
forcing the protesters, on November 25, 2008, the PAD protesters shut down two major 
international airports of Thailand—Don Moung International Airport and Suvarnabhumi 
International Airport, compelling Prime Minister Somchai to resign. This airport siege, as 
noted in some international media coverage (Beech, 2008), led to a Thai political crisis 
that immediately became an economic and global one: it is an economic crisis because it 
devastated Thai tourism, which is one of the most important sources of the country’s 
revenue; and it is a global crisis because shutting down the airport means closing down 
                                                            
 
27According to Section 176 of the 2007 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 
the Council of Minister which will assume the administration of the state affairs must, 
within 15 days as from the date it takes office, state its policies to the National Assembly 
and explain its administration by the directive principles of fundamental state policies. 
Thus, if PAD could make PM Somchai unsuccessful in addressing his policies to the 
parliament, he and his cabinet would be unable to function legally. 
42 
 
the gateway to the wider world. Prime Minister Somchai, finally, stepped down, not 
because he surrendered to the protesters but again and similarly to Samak, to the 
judgment of the Constitution Court. On December 2, 2008, the Constitution Court 
dissolved the three parties of the government coalition, including PPP, Chart Thai, and 
Matchima Thippatai, for accountability on electoral fraud involving party executives. 
This party disbandment caused Somchai to be disqualified from the Prime Minister 
position and banned from politics for 5 years. Consequently, the PAD declared “victory” 
and ended the protest.  
Arguably, the end of the “second round” conflict was a victory neither for the 
PAD nor the PPP government, but for the unelected courts that intervened to end the 
political impasses. As we have seen from the two previous attempts of jurisdiction power 
to solve the conflict, two Prime Ministers from PPP (Samak and Somchai) had to step 
down according to the judges of the Constitution Court. Moreover, the almost 200-day 
long protest produced a deep fragmentation in Thai society by polarizing the people more 
deeply into the “yellow-clad,” royalist anti-Thaksin, and the “red-clad,” liberalist pro-
Thaksin groups. 
 The conflict still exists, particularly after the failure in reestablishing a coalition 
government, led by Phuea Thai Party (PT), the second generation of Thaksin’s proxy 
party, emerging as a replacement for PPP. The pro-Thaksin movement reintegrated, 
forcing Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, leader of the Democrat Party, who has been a 
Prime Minister since December 15, 2008 with the support of the military and small 
parties (those that decided to defect from PT, the majority-party, after the 2008 political 
crisis), to dissolve the parliament (Bell, 2008; CNN World, December 15, 2008; Mydans, 
43 
 
2008). Current politics of Thailand occur in the midst of new political parties, which 
emerged as replacements for the decertified parties, in the House of Representatives 
(Table 2.2) and the conflict between the Red-clad and the Democrat government, whose 
administrative power is backed by the Yellow Shirts and the military (The Guardian, 
April 14, 2009). 
 
Soldiers Never Died, Democrat-led Government, and 
Red-Yellow Divided Politics 
The election of Abhisit as a new prime minister was immediately rejected by the 
pro-Thaksin movement, the Red Shirts. Outside Parliament on voting day (December 15, 
2008), about 200 red-shirted Thaksin loyalists shouted and threw bricks, showing that 
street demonstrations would now begin from the other side of the political divide. Less 
than a week after that (December 20), more than 40,000 red-shirted supporters gathered 
in downtown Bangkok to hear a video address by Thaksin (recently a fugitive from 
justice), taped in Bali, Indonesia, in which he implicitly condemned what he called 
military interference in the House’s vote for prime minister (Mydans, 2008). For the Red 
Shirts, the assembling of the Democrat-led government was illegitimate and 
undemocratic because it was established by another kind of military coup—an indirect 
coup or what the pro-Thaksin leaders called a “coup in disguise” (Bell, 2008; Käng, 
2011; Mydans and McDonald, 2009; The Nation, December 8, 2008) to explain the way 
in which the military intervened in politics by engineering the civil government instead of 





Political Parties in the House of Representatives, 6 May 2011 
Party Founded Members Seats Ideology Kinds of Supporters 
Pheu Thai Party (PT)  2007 23,778 188 Liberal North and Northeast people, poor, 
rural residents, lower-middle class 
and working class in Bangkok, the 
Red-clad (pro-Thaksin) 
 
Democrat Party (DP)   1982 2,873,960 170 Conservative (Royalist) South people, rich, urban residents, 
middle class and upper class in 
Bangkok, the Yellow-clad (anti-
Thaksin) 
 
Chart Thai Pattana Party (CP) 2008 363 24 Opportunist* People in some provinces of the 
Central 
  
Puea Pandin Party  
  









Table 2.2 (continued) 
Political Parties in the House of Representatives, 6 May 2011 
Party Founded Members Seats Ideology Kinds of Supporters 
Chart Pattana Puea Pandin 
Party (CPN)  
 
2007 10,338 9 Opportunist People in some provinces of the 
Northeast especially Nakorn 
Rachasrima province. 
 
Phumjai Thai Party (BJT) 2008 36,370 31 Opportunist/  
Royalist 
People in lower-Northeast and upper-
Central  
 
Pracharaj Party  2006 13,814 8 Opportunist People in Sakaew province (East) 
 
Social Action Party (SAP) 1982 27,237 5 Opportunist People in Khonkaen province 
(Northeast) 
 
Matubhum Party 2008 7,760 3 Opportunist People in the deep south province 
(Muslim provinces) 
 
Source: data on the year founded, numbers of membership, and seats in the House came from the Office of Election Commission (www.ect.go.th). 
Note: PT emerged as a replacement for PPP; CTP emerged as a replacement for CT; Phumjai Thai emerged as a replacement for Matchima Thippatai. 





The first biggest challenge to Prime Minister Abhisit’s government occurred in 
April 2009 when hundred thousands of the Red Shirt demonstrators28 streamed into 
Bangkok throughout the day of April 8 from Thaksin’s political strongholds in the rural 
north and northeast. The protesters gathered in front of the government house and outside 
the home of Prem Tinsulanda, a former prime minister and current Privy Council 
President, who was accused by the protesters of being the mastermind of the 2006 coup 
that ousted Thaksin while he was out of the country as well as influencing a more recent 
“coup in disguise” (Mydans and McDonald, 2009), starting a week-long protestation 
against the government of Prime Minister Abhisit.  
Some of these protesters, integrated with others from the eastern provinces, went 
to the East Asian summit, a meeting of government officials from the 10-member 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, and six other nations from Asia and 
the western Pacific, organized that year in Pattaya in order to show leaders from various 
countries that Abhisit had no legitimacy to be the prime minister of Thailand. At the 
meeting, hundreds of Red Shirts broke through a cordon of police officers on April 10, 
2009 and then blocked the main entrance to the convention center where leaders were 
gathering. Eventually, the summit meeting was canceled only a day later after the 
                                                            
 
28For the Yellow Shirts and many Bangkok-based elite, such numbers of Red 
Shirt protesters are meaningless (particularly when compared to the Yellow Shirt 
protesters) because they represent the voices of the poor and low-educated people who 
usually sell their vote to corrupt politicians or parties (such as the former TRT or PPP of 
Thaksin); as a result, these groups of people might have been paid by Thaksin to join the 
protest with a lack of understanding of what was (“exactly”) going on in politics (see the 
Yellow Shirts leaders’ perceptions toward the Red Shirts in, for example, Nophakhun 
Limsamarnphun,  2009; The Nation, May 2, 2009). 
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protesters forced their way past security forces into a convention center where leaders 
were preparing to discuss the global economic crisis (Fuller, 2009). 
The highlight of the April 2009 event then returned to Bangkok where thousands 
of Red Shirts protesters were still gathered outside the government house. The crisis 
intensified when the government announced a state of emergency in Bangkok on April 
11, 2009 and claimed it as a legal mechanism for controlling the situation. But for 
opposition protesters, they called such an announcement “a declaration of war against the 
people of Thailand” (Johnston, 2009). As a result, unrest spread in Thailand a day later, 
with clashes between antigovernment protesters and security forces in at least three 
locations in Bangkok and major highways closed in many provinces outside the city. 
Following a day of violent clashes with police and soldiers that left more than 120 people 
injured, the army hemmed in several thousand activists over night. On the morning of the 
next day, more soldiers then moved in, prompting the protest leaders to call on their 
remaining followers to go home to avoid further bloodshed (Bristow, 2009). The media 
later labeled the confrontations that took place between April, 10 and 14 2009 “Bloody 
Songkran,” bloodshed crashing during a Thai new year (Askew, 2010).  
In the early morning of April 17, 2009, three days after a tumultuous week of 
Songkran, Sondhi Limthongkul, the Yellow Shirt leader, narrowly escaped death when 
his car was riddled with automatic gunfire. Many Thais assumed that the attack was the 
work of sympathizers of the Red Shirts movement and their figurehead, exiled former 
Prime Minister Thaksin. However, because this assassination attempt was staged during 
the enforcement of the Emergency Decree in Bangkok, for many others, the mastermind 
of this operation may be no other but those who have close relations to the military.  
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While the name of the groups or persons that acted behind the attack by gunmen 
still remains a mystery, the Yellow Shirts celebrated the anniversary of their 2008 
protestations against Samak-Somchai by making an announcement that they were 
creating a new political party. The New Politics Party or the NPP was officially 
registered on June 2, 2009 as another political mechanism of the Yellow Shirts that 
would be used in electoral politics. The name PAD remains to represent the entire Yellow 
Shirt supporters but now plays a more intensive role in protest activities. One might claim 
that the Yellow Shirts just replicated the political strategy that the Red Shirts have used 
for years—having the Phue Thai Party in the parliament while organizing street politics 
under the name of the UDD. The Yellow Shirt leaders argued in contrast that they were 
totally different from the Red Shirts because the NPP was created and was under 
supervision of the Yellow supporters, but the Red Shirts were a by-product of the ex-TRT 
and were under the control of Thaksin.  
However, the establishment of the Yellow Shirts’ own political party (rather than 
acting support to other political parties, especially the Democrats) gave much concern to 
their supporters, in particular those who were close to the Democrat Party. The biggest 
concern was that Thaksin’s Puea Thai Party might gain the most benefits in future 
elections because the NPP would split voters of the Democrat Party in several areas such 
as in the South and Bangkok. Evidence asserting this concern can be observed through 
the NPP’s decisions to not nominate any candidate to the by-elections for the House of 
Representatives, which were held two times since the NPP was established—the first one 
was held in District 6 of Bangkok on June 24, 2010 and the other on October 30, 2010 in 
District 1 of Surat Thani (a province in the southern region). The first and only time that 
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NPP candidates joined the election was in the Bangkok Metropolitan Representatives 
elections (local-level election) held on August 29, 2010. Yet, none of them won any of 
the total 61 seats. 
The Democrat-led government’s victory over the Red Shirts’ movements during 
“Bloody Songkra,” did not bring the conflict to an end. The Red Shirts still existed and 
were even stronger than they were due to their experience of defeat, accompanied by the 
coalition government’s poor performance in solving the country’s problems, in 
controlling corruption, and providing equitable justice (especially between the Yellow 
and Red protesters regarding what both groups did illegally during each movement, e.g., 
the Yellow Shirts’ blockade of the airports and the Red Shirts’ clash with the security 
forces). Much criticism came not only from the government’s red-shirted opponents but 
also from the Yellow and neutral camps.  
During late 2009 and early 2010, the Red Shirts reunited in Bangkok and several 
provinces in the north, northeast, and central regions, aimed at discrediting the 
government and the elite as well as preparing their supporters for the huge demonstration 
on “judgment day,” February 26, 2010, when the court verdict was presented on 
Thaksin’s assets (Askew, 2010). This series of protest did a good job of pressuring the 
government and the judiciary agents to act in the way they expected, such as the 
judgment that forced former prime minister (and still Privy Councilor) General Surayud 
Chulanont to remove his holiday from a national park. However, there was no impact on 
Thaksin’s case. On February 26, 2010, Thailand’s Supreme Court confiscated $1.4 
billion in frozen assets from Thaksin after finding him guilty of illegally concealing his 
ownership of a family company and abusing his power to benefit the companies he 
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owned (Mydans and Fuller, 2010). Thaksin, PT, and the Red Shirts were not surprised by 
this judgment, so plans for the mass red-shirts demonstration in Bangkok for mid-March 
went ahead. 
On March 14, 2010, several hundred thousand Red Shirt protesters held the first 
big rally in an historic area of Bangkok around the Phan Fah Bridge, starting another 
month-long protest against the Democrat-led government and the elite. Many critical 
events followed this integration. On March 16, 2010, the protesters spilled hundreds of 
liters of donated blood collected from the protesters themselves at the Government 
House, in front of Abhisit’s private house, and the Democrat’s headquarters building 
(CBSNews, April 7, 2010). Weng Tojirakan, one of the Red Shirts leaders, explained that 
the blood is a symbol for the willingness of the people to give their blood for democracy, 
and for the blood already spilled by the people (Nostitz, 2010).  
On April 3, 2010 protesters occupied the shopping district of Ratchaprasong in 
the richest area of Bangkok. As a reaction, the government (again) announced a state of 
emergency three days later. With enforced authority approved by the emergency decree, 
the troops  attempted to take back control of the Phan Fah bridge protest site, but the 
mission failed. As a result of the violent clash, hundreds of people were injured and 
twenty five were killed, including Japanese Reuters cameraman Hiro Muramoto, ten 
protesters, nine civilians, and five uniformed soldiers (Reuters, April 4, 2010). The event 
came to a climax on May 14, 2010 when Thai police and army units moved in to 




On May 19, 2010, the Thai Army stormed the protesters’ camp, resulting in six 
deaths, which included Italian journalist, Fabio Polenghi (The Guardian, May 19, 2009). 
The Red Shirt leaders surrendered to police in a bid to avoid further bloodshed. The 
brutal crackdown and dispersal of the Red Shirts led to at least ninety-one deaths and 
more than 1,800 injured (Tharoor, 2010). After that the protesters went home, many Red 
Shirts leaders were put in jail, and others went into exile, but emotions were still painful. 
Signs of future actions and protests continue to exist, especially when thousands of Red 
Shirts supporters marched in Bangkok in memory of the April-May 2010 events. Now 
and then, “unusual politics becomes usual” (Chairat Charoensin-o-larn, 2010) in Thai 
politics. 
This outline of the Thai political chronology up to the period where this research 
began its interpretation shows that the trend of change patterns of political participation 
and engagement in Thailand is not a recent phenomenon. Rather, the ebb and flow of this 
trend have been a result of political struggles that have occurred in the past and have long 
dramatically developed since Thailand launched its democratization process in 1932. 
Since then, eighteen constitutions have been drafted and used to implement democracy in 
Thailand, while seventeen military-coup attempts (ten successes) occurred as a special 
mechanism provided by the privilege of the society to solve the country’s crisis and to 
maintain peace for the nation.  
The brief review of Thailand’s political history also reveals that the period 
between 2001 and 2010 was momentous, characterized by several political changes 
starting from a celebration of political reform in the first five years; then the military 
coup only a year after the 2005 election; and a transitional period from when the military 
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government stepped aside until the civilian government took control of the country in 
2008. The period since then has not been consolidated, as political conflicts among 
several groups of political leaders have continued and many concerns about the return of 
the military still exist. The future Thai democracy will be shaped by a clash between the 
“political awakening of the Thai rural masses and the ascendancy of the military in Thai 
politics” (Chairat Charoensin-o-larn, 2010: 331), at least for several years from now. 
Empirical examination of citizen activism during the past decade is therefore important. 
Before moving forward to the quantitative analysis of the political participation and 
engagement in such a crucial period of Thai democracy (2001-2010), the next chapter 






THEORETICAL CONTEXTS FOR POLITICAL 
 




Drawing on a rich set of research traditions, this chapter examines the 
perspectives on political participation and political engagement in Thailand. The major 
attempt is made to learn about what scholars of Thai politics field understand about 
citizen participation, and how they explain Thai citizen engagement in public affairs. In 
order to understand this topic more clearly, this chapter begins with a section describing 
how behavioral scholars conceptualize political involvement—participation and 
engagement, how and why it has changed over the years, and what conceptual 
frameworks have been applied by recent research. It then reviews a number of works, 
seeking to explore how previous studies have explained political participation and 
engagement in several contexts: the United States and other Western democracies, 
developing countries, and Thailand. In the concluding section, the chapter discusses what 
this dissertation has been able to do better than previous studies in explaining change 





This dissertation aims to explain both political participation (behavior) and 
engagement (attitude). In order to explain people’s involvement in politics, scholars have 
used several words or terms, such as political participation, civic engagement, political 
activism, and so on, in both specific and broad senses. In the early years of behavioral 
political science (see for example Merriam and Gosnell, 1924; Boechel, 1928; Tingsten, 
1937), political participation was defined in most studies simply as voting turnout. As 
studies became more sophisticated, the operational definition of political participation 
was then broadened to include other electoral activities such as campaigning, attending 
political meetings, giving money to a candidate or a party, running for an office, and so 
on (Milbrath and Goel, 1965; Almond and Verba, 1965; McClosky, 1968). Influenced by 
studies in the 1970s, particularly those of Sidney Verba and his colleagues (1971; 1978), 
several studies on political participation tended to add nonelectoral activities, for 
instance, involving community activities, contacting officials, protesting, and 
communicating with others, into their conceptual framework as well.  
In the classic work of Milbrath (1965), political participation was viewed 
narrowly as behavioral acts and investigated as belonging solely to electoral politics. 
Milbrath divided the patterns and procedures of political participation into 14 levels 
based on the intensity of the participation level, starting from the most fundamental form 
of participation (the one most often engaged in) to the more advanced ones (those that are 
respectively less often engaged in). These activities include (1) exposing oneself to 
political stimuli; (2) using the right to vote; (3) initiating political issues into group 
discussion; (4) attempting to persuade others to vote in the direction that one finds 
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appropriate; (5) joining in political public relations activities, such as wearing 
promotional clothes or putting campaign stickers on the car; (6) having contact with 
government officials or political leaders; (7) donating of money or materials to support 
political parties or candidates; (8) joining in or listening to electoral campaigns or 
political assembly; (9) working for candidates or political parties in electoral campaigns; 
(10) being a member of and participating in political parties’ activities; (11) joining in the 
meetings of political parties to elect representatives or to determine policy strategies; (12) 
conducting activities to raise funds for political parties; (13) being electoral candidates on 
behalf of political parties, and; (14) holding political positions and overseeing the 
operation of a political party, which is the highest level of activity.  
Although this conceptualization of political participation includes most, but not 
all, common activities that characterize the normal process of an electoral democracy, it 
was modified by the new notion that views political participation as multidimensional, 
focusing on “modes” or “styles” rather than level of political participation. The modes of 
participation were first reported in a cross-national comparative study of political 
participation under the supervision of Sidney Verba and Norman Nie (e.g., Verba, Nie, 
and Kim, 1971). This conceptualization includes both behavior in electoral politics and 
other forms of nonelectoral involvement, including community activity, protesting, and 
communicating. Verba, Nie, and Kim (1971; 1978) also argue that people do not use 
these activities interchangeably, as many early analyses assumed. Instead, people tend to 
specialize in activities that match their motivations and goals.  
Recently, political participation has been conceptualized either in a broad or 
narrow sense depending on what scholars seek to explain and what kind of data are 
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available for their analysis. For example, Sidney Verba, Henry Brady, and Kay Lehman 
Schlozman (1995) have summarized previous theories of participation and explain 
political participation in terms of what they call voluntary political activity. In this regard, 
they examine political participation by referring to it simply as “activity that has the 
intent or effect of influencing government action—either directly, by affecting the 
making or implementation of public policy, or indirectly, by influencing the selection of 
people who make those policies” (p. 38). They also focus on voluntary activity, by which 
they mean “participation that is not obligatory—no one is forced to volunteer—and that 
receives, if any pay at all, only token financial compensation” (pp. 38-39). Finally, by 
political activity they are concerned “with doing politics, rather than with being attentive 
to politics” (p. 39). However, while Verba, Brady, and Schlozman try to distinguish 
between political and nonpolitical activity (e.g., being involved in civic 
organizations/activities such as churches and other nonprofit groups), voluntary and paid 
work, and participation by doing politics and by paying attention to politics, their 
conceptualization of voluntary political participation has moved beyond the vote to 
consider a wider range of political acts. These acts include voting, working in campaigns, 
making campaign distributions, contacting public officials, taking part in protests, 
working informally with others to solve community problems, belonging to local 
governing boards, and being affiliated with political organizations.  
Unlike Verba and colleagues, Pippa Norris (2002) does not differentiate sharply 
between political and civic activism. To explain the patterns of participation in countries 
around the world, Norris uses the reinvented term “political activism” and applies it to 
include both participation through traditionally political channels such as elections 
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(electoral turnout) and parties (party membership) and engagement in civic activities 
(belonging to common types of voluntary associations, social clubs, and civic 
organizations) and protest politics.  
Macedo et al. (2005) use the term “civic engagement” to examine how political 
choices undermine citizen participation, and define it, like Norris, to include “any 
activity,” political or civic, “individual or collective, devoted to influencing the collective 
life of the polity” (p.6). However, in contrast to Norris and Verba and colleagues, 
Macedo et al. do not distinguish civic engagement precisely from the term “political 
engagement,” by which they mean “reasons and motives for political action” (p.6). That 
is, for them, civic engagement also includes the acquisition of relevant knowledge, skills, 
and a wide range of acts in both electoral and nonelectoral (civic) activities. Cliff Zukin 
et al. (2006), on the other hand, try to distinguish among four dimensions of political 
participation and engagement: civic engagement, participation aimed at achieving public 
goods through direct hands-on work in cooperation with others; political engagement, 
participation in political activities aimed at influencing government policy or affecting 
the selection of public officials; public voice, the ways in which citizens give expression 
to their views on public issues; and cognitive engagement, participation by paying 
attention to politics and public affairs.  
Inspired by Macedo et al.’s conceptualization of civic engagement, this 
dissertation focuses on both citizen participation and engagement in order to explain 
citizen political activism in Thailand. Yet following Verba, Brady, and Schlozman 
(1995), this dissertation attempts to differentiate between doing politics and being 
attentive to politics by using the term “political participation” to examine citizens’ 
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political behavior, and another term “political engagement” to explain citizens’ political 
attitudes. This dissertation defines political participation specifically as participation in 
four key political activities—electoral turnout, campaign activities, contacting officials, 
and protesting—that have direct relevance on the selection of government personnel and 
in influencing their decisions. This does not mean that participation in civic activity is 
unimportant or irrelevant to political activism, but it is considered as an explanation of 
political activity rather than part of a measure of political participation. As an explanation 
of political behavior, this study also uses the term political engagement, which simply 
refers to people’s political attitudes—political interest or partisanship—that motivate 
people to get involved in political activity (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, 2001: 99-100). 
Based on this definition, this dissertation views political engagement in a broader sense 
than what Zukin et al. (2006) call cognitive engagement (participation by paying attention 
to politics and public affairs) by including political interest, knowledge, and efficacy in 
its operationalization.  
Whether used for broad or specific purposes, for most scholars, people’s 
involvement in politics is important and necessary for a democratic polity (Almond and 
Verba, 1989; Dalton, 2006; Macedo et al., 2005; Verba, Brady, and Schlozman, 1995). 
Active public participation is required because it is through discussions, popular interest, 
and involvement in politics that societal goals should be defined and carried out (Dalton, 
2006). In order to improve democratic processes, enhancing the quantity, quality, and 
equality of participation is therefore required (Macedo et al., 2005). Further, in order to 
know what should be done to achieve this ultimate goal, I believe as Macedo et al. (2005) 
suggested that we must pay close attention to the factors that affect political participation 
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as well as the factors that affect political engagement. The next section reviews a number 
of studies, seeking to draw as many of the potential factors as possible employed in 
previous studies in several contexts—the United States and other Western democracies, 
developing countries, and Thailand—that may be useful in explaining the changing 
patterns of political participation and engagement during Thailand’s past decade. 
 
 Political Participation According to Previous Explanations  
Research on the factors that may affect people’s political participation has been 
widely conducted by American political scientists, and those studies’ models and theories 
have long been applied and modified by scholars in many other countries in order to be 
tested in various democratic contexts. Many researchers have made it clear that political 
participation in less-democratic or young democratic systems has several different 
meanings and, thus, very different demographic contours compared to what has been 
explained in well-established democracies (Schlozman, 2002). In Thailand, many 
scholars have adopted scientific theories and methodologies to examine the factors that 
could affect public participation and electoral behavior. The dominant view claims that 
females and the young, because they have lower participatory resources and skills, are 
less likely than males and older people to participate in politics. Furthermore, the rural, 
because they are poor and less-educated, are easily mobilized by influential persons and 
by personal benefit, and are thereby the most active group in electoral activities. This 
conventional premise has done a very good job in explaining how and why Thai people 
become involved in politics. However, previous explanations about how and why Thai 
citizens participate in politics cannot tell us much about how and why participation 
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among Thai citizens has changed across time and context because too much focus was 
placed on the factors of socioeconomic status and mobilization (which mostly means the 
influence of clientelism).  
This study does not totally ignore the impacts of such factors on political 
participation in Thailand but views previous explanations as incomplete. This study 
recognizes that political participation is fostered by a variety of characteristics that 
predispose an individual to becoming politically involved (Verba, Brady, and Schlozman, 
1995). These political predispositions have changed over time and might be shaped by 
political contexts (Leighley, 1995; Holzner, 2010). In this dissertation, I thus propose 
several factors that include not only socioeconomic status but also various attitudinal and 
mobilization factors to be tested in several contexts (years) as a more proper way to 
explain changes in the patterns of political participation in Thailand during the past ten 
years. In order to identify those factors, the following discussion reviews the existing 
literature that has explained political participation in American and developing 
democracies, as well as previous explanations about political behaviors and attitudes in 
Thailand.  
 
Political Participation in American Democracy 
Socioeconomic Status Factors 
Several decades of empirical research have established socioeconomic status 
(SES) as a major determinant of political participation (Leighley, 1995; Schlozman, 
2002). The central theme in the developed democracies is that higher status individuals, 
especially the better educated and people with higher incomes, are more likely to 
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participate because they have the resources (e.g., money and time) and skills (e.g., 
knowledge and ability to access political information) to manipulate their involvement in 
politics. Using individual-level data, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995, for example, 
observe that people with lower incomes are less likely than those with higher incomes to 
participate in all kinds of political activities (i.e., voting, campaign work, campaign 
contributions, contacting officials, protests, informal community activities, board 
membership, and being affiliated with political organizations). Using aggregate-level 
data, Brady (2004) asserts that income inequality across states is a factor explaining why 
some states have higher levels of participation than others. Similar patterns, and with 
even larger effect, are found in the relationship between education and participation 
(Conway, 1991; Kenny, 1992; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry, 1996; Verba, Nie, and Kim, 
1978; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995).  
Apart from the voluminous empirical evidence supporting this “standard model,” 
many studies, especially in the American context, have focused on other personal 
characteristics, such as gender, age, and demographic groups, to explain who participates 
more in politics and why. A common premise is that females,29 the young,30 and 
                                                            
 
29The most frequent finding on gender differences in political participation is that 
men are more politically active than women (Campbell et al., 1960; Christy, 1987; Burns, 
Schlozman, and Verba, 2001; Norris, 2002). For many recent studies, differences in 
resources, especially education, income, and employment patterns, explain a large part of 
this gap (Miller and J. Merrill, 1996; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, 2001). 
  
30For some scholars, a declining trend of young citizens taking part in campaign 
activities and joining political parties has appeared in many countries over the past 
decades (while remaining stable among older people) and mirrors the lesser attention that 
the new generation has paid to politics and is a bad sign for the future of democracy 
(Putnam, 2000; Niemi and Weisberg, 2001; Blais et al., 2004; Wattenberg, 2008). 
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minorities (such as Africans, Asians, and Latino-Americans) are less politically active 
than males, the older generation, and White Americans (Macedo et al., 2005). However, 
according to many recent studies, this explanation seems to be only partly true. For 
example, with women voting at higher rates than men in the developed world, many 
scholars claim that gender differences have faded or even reversed (e.g., Bean, 1991; 
Inglehart, 1990; Inglehard and Norris, 2003).  
Recent studies also indicate that while young citizens are less likely to participate 
in traditional forms of political activities, they engage heavily in many other forms of 
civic activities (Vogelgesang and Astin, 2005, Shea and Green, 2007), as well as in single 
issue movements and networks (Della Porta and Mosca, 2005; Norris, 2002). Many 
studies also show that when income and education are taken into account, participatory 
differences among Whites, Africans, and Latino-Americans disappear (Leighley and 
Verdlitz, 1999; Verba, Schlozman, and Nie, 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). 
Recent studies have tended to conclude that members of some demographic 
groups may participate in politics more, on average, than others: women are more likely 
to know female politicians than male ones and may be more likely to try to persuade 
others how to vote when there is a woman on the ballot (Hansen, 1997; Campbell and 
Wolbrecht, 2004); African Americans report voting at moderately lower levels and are 
less likely to contact a political official or to be affiliated with a political organization 
than White Americans, but they are more likely than Whites to report doing campaign 
work and participating in protests (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995); and factors such 
as English proficiency, foreign-born status, and political socialization account for much 
of the lower participation of Asian Americans (Citrin and Highton, 2002; Leighley and 
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Vedlitz, 2006; Lien, 1994). For Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (1999), the differences in 
political resources such as educational level, income, and employment patterns among 
these groups explain a large part of these participatory inequalities. Thus, it is not 
socioeconomic status, per se, that stimulates participation, but socioeconomic status as it 
relates to skills and orientations that directly influence participation (Dalton, 2006: 50). 
This does not mean that socio-demographic factors cannot or should not be use to explain 
political participation, but they should be examined along with other factors such as 
psychological, mobilization, and institutional factors. That is, we should expect that the 
effect of socioeconomic status factors on participation will diminish after controlling for 
other potential factors, in particular political engagement, mobilization, and contextual 
factors.     
 
Political Engagement Factors 
Standard explanations of political participation also pay attention to political 
engagement factors—people’s psychological orientations such as political interest, 
knowledge, and efficacy that motivate them to become involved in political activity 
(Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, 2001). Many scholars suggest political interest, the 
degree to which politics arouses a citizen’s curiosity,31 as a critical source of most 
political behaviors that define democratic citizens in general and as an important 
                                                            
 
31Political interest could be a result of a long-term (e.g. pre-adult learning and 
experiences in political events and economic circumstances) and/or contemporary 
stimulus (e.g., current social context and political campaigns). Socialization approaches 
suggest that pre-adult political learning affects future adult political participation by 




explanation of political participation in particular (Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Miller and 
Rahn, 2002; Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1978; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). Political 
interest is the “motive” for individuals to gather and retain political information (Luskin, 
1990), leading them to become more politically informed (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 
1996).  It is the strongest predictor of voting (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995), and 
plays a key role in most types of political activities (Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Verba, Nie, 
and Kim, 1978). In an exhaustive model of campaign participation in the 2000 election, 
Joanne Miller and Wendy Rahn (2002) found that interest in the campaign was a 
powerful antecedent of voter turnout, second only to habit (that is, previous turnout).  
In addition to political interest, many other studies indicate the link between 
political knowledge and political participation. That is, people who know more about 
politics are more actively engaged in it32 (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Popkin and 
Dimock, 1999; Milner, 2002). Political knowledge also enhances citizens’ civic 
capacities—the ability of individuals to see the connections between public policy and 
their own interests, as well as the ability to make voting decisions based on sophisticated 
criteria such as a candidate’s positions on issues (Kahn and Kenny, 1999; Bartels, 1996). 
In this regard, appropriate levels of political knowledge are thought to be important in 
                                                            
 
32Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) examined Americans’ political knowledge, 
what they know—and don’t know—about politics and why it matters, and found that 
many American citizens are remarkably informed about the details of politics. However, 
the greatest concern, according to their findings, was that there is an unequal knowledge-
distribution among people based on differences in social and economic status. That is, 
Whites, males, and older, financially secure citizens have substantially more knowledge 
about national politics than do Blacks, women, young adults, and financially less well-off 
citizens. This result indicates that the citizens who are the most socially and economically 
disadvantaged are least able to redress their grievances politically. 
65 
 
allowing individuals and groups to effectively participate in politics (Converse, 1964; 
Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Lua, Andersen, and Redlawsk, 2008). 
Political efficacy is another psychological factor that various studies expect to be 
positively associated with political participation: the greater the level of political efficacy, 
the more active are individuals in participating in politics (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; 
Campbell et al., 1960; Pranger, 1968). However, recent studies have tended to distinguish 
between internal efficacy, “beliefs about one’s own competence to understand and to 
participate effectively in politics” (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991: 407), and external 
efficacy, the perceived responsiveness of the political system to citizens’ participation 
(see Craig et al., 1990: 289-314; Madsen, 1987: 571-581). Many studies also have tended 
to report on the different relationship between these two separate factors and political 
participation. For example, Finkel (1985) found that while internal efficacy was a strong 
predictor of voting and campaign participation, external efficacy was relatively not and 
instead was a consequence of participation. According to this finding, people who feel 
more efficacious about their ability to understand and to participate in politics are more 
likely to participate in politics. Once they participate and have a good experience (i.e., 
perceived responsiveness of the political system) with their participation, they are more 
likely to participate again in the future. 
Studies on the impact of political partisanship show that people who are most 
likely to turn out to vote and to participate in other forms of campaign activity are those 
people who identify themselves with a political party, while those who do not so identify 
themselves are less likely to vote and otherwise participate in electoral activities (see for 
example Bartels, 2000;  Campbell et al., 1960). Many studies find evidence supporting 
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this premise, and view political partisanship as one of the most critical factors that may 
explain voter turnout trend in the United States (e.g., Abramson and Aldrich, 1982; 
Shaffer, 1981). Using data on turnout among non-Southerners in the presidential 
elections from 1960 through 1976 collected by the Survey Research Center and the 
Center of Political Studies of the University of Michigan (SRC-CPS), Shaffer (1981) 
concludes that approximately one-fourth of the decline in presidential turnout results 
from the decline of partisanship. Employing the same source of data (SRC-CPS) but 
analyzing the eight presidential election surveys conducted between 1952 and 1980 and 
the six off-year congressional surveys conducted between 1958 and 1978, Abramson and 
Aldrich (1982) confirm that the strength of partisan affiliation is strongly and positively 
related to turnout in each election. They find, in addition, that this relationship has grown 
over time, and the erosion of partisanship in the electorate can explain even more of the 
decline in participation in off-year congressional elections than of the decline in 
presidential elections.  
In short, this discussion illustrates that political interest, knowledge, efficacy, and 
partisanship matter for political participation. That is, we should expect that people (1) 
who are interested more in politics, (2) who are better-informed about politics, (3) who 
feel more efficacious about themselves in terms of participating in politics, and (4) who 
identify themselves with a political party are more likely to participate in political 
activities than people who are interested less, have lower political knowledge, feel less 
politically efficacious, and do not identify themselves with any political party.  
However, because people’s political attitudes can be influenced by experiences in 
either pre-adult (Beck and Jennings, 1982; Greenstein, 1960; Jennings and Niemi, 1968) 
67 
 
or adult institutions such as group relations (Kinder, 2003), belief systems (Bartels, 
2003), information (Kuklinski and Hurley, 1994; Lupia, 1994), and so on, which at the 
same time, are generated by the political and socioeconomic environments surrounding 
an individual’s life and early life such as political events (Sears and Valentino, 1997) and 
economic circumstances (Inglehart and Abramson, 1994), one common criticism of 
applying political engagement and attitudes to explain political activism is that it is not 
attitudes that cause participation, but experiences with politics and participation that 
create greater engagement with politics (Holzner, 2010). Thus, together with political 
engagement, individuals’ experiences with groups, regimes, and current political contexts 
are important political variables that may explain political participation among different 
groups of citizens in Thai society.  
 
Mobilization Factors 
Many studies indicate the important role of organizations and political leaders in 
mobilizing people into politics. Verba and Nie (1972) find that active memberships in 
voluntary organizations increase individuals’ overall participation level. The main reason 
is, as Verba and Nie (1972: 184) have suggested, that active engagement in voluntary 
organizations may provide individuals with an opportunity for training in participation 
within the organization that can be transferred to the political realm.33 Also, engagement 
with political organizations (i.e., organizations that have political goals or in which 
political discussions take place) is positively related to and has even stronger effects on 
                                                            
 
33Similar arguments also are addressed in many other studies such as by Putnam 
(2000), Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), Skocpol (2003). 
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individuals’ participation than memberships in voluntary organizations. This impact is 
greatest for communal activity, campaign activity, and voting.  
While Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) also claim a critical role of voluntary 
associations in mobilizing individuals to be active in politics, they pay additional 
attention to the role of political leaders. Examining both participation in electoral and 
governmental politics, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) argue that political leaders 
mobilize participation in electoral activities through a function of party contacting, 
electoral competitiveness, and social movement activity, whereas mobilization into 
governmental politics results from the direct efforts of voluntary associations or 
indirectly via television coverage of political events and issues. They claim that the 
strategic calculations of politicians, parties, interest groups, and social movements are 
crucially important for the pulse of citizen activism in American elections and 
government: there is evidence that these mobilization factors have accounted for 
approximately half of the decline in voter turnout since the 1960s, as well as the decline 
in party-related participation activity.  
This argument has been asserted by more recent studies, such as those of Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady (1995), which acknowledge the positive impact of mobilizing 
agencies such as trade unions and churches in assisting working-class communities to 
participate in politics, and the work of Rosenstone and Hanson (2003), which confirm the 
critical role of parties and interest groups in fostering participation, as well as indicate the 
important role of party workers in activating voters through local campaigns. Thus, 
scholars should not overlook the roles that political party and civic groups have played in 
encouraging citizen activism. More specifically, the more individuals are members of 
69 
 
voluntary organizations, the more likely they are active in political activities. However, 
because interactions between individual citizens and political organizations, such as 
parties and civic groups, have usually existed under opportunities and constraints 
provided by political structures (Holzner, 2010), scholars should consider group 
mobilization factors as the sources of political actions that link the political system and 
institutions.   
 
Structural Factors 
Structural factors—those that reflect the characteristics of the political system and 
institutions, including the media environment, political campaigns, political competition, 
and obstacles to enfranchisement (Macedo et al., 2005)—can influence the political 
choices that citizens make in various ways. For example, since the media have several 
benefits, especially in getting people interested in politics, an inappropriate use of 
information distribution, in contrast, might have a negative impact on political 
participation. Stephen Ansolabehere, Shanto Iyengar, Adam Simon, and Nicholas 
Valentino (1994) have developed experimental research that examines the effects of 
negative campaign advertizing on turnout, and they found that negative advertisements 
decrease intention to vote by 5 percent. Voters who watch negative advertisements come 
to lack confidence in the responsiveness of electoral institutions and public officials. As 
campaigns become more negative and cynical, citizens’ intentions to vote thus decline. 
A well-designed electoral process is another factor that may enhance citizens’ 
capacities to participate actively in electoral activities. Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978) 
adopted a cross-sectional empirical method, utilizing survey data as well as information 
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about each state’s voting laws, using the state as the unit of analysis, and they found that 
if every state made its laws easier for people to register to vote, voter turnout would 
increase about 9.1 percent for a presidential election. Using the panel method to analyze 
data at the county level (61 counties in New York and 88 counties in Ohio), 
Ansolabehere and Konisky (2006), in contrast, indicated that the target that aimed at 
increasing voter turnout by 5-10 percent, as prior research such as Rosenstone and 
Wolfinger found, was overestimated. They argue that by making registration 
requirements easier reformists should recognize that new laws can cause some confusion 
among election workers (and therefore a depressed rather than an accommodated 
turnout). For this reason, registration reform would succeed if reformists set the goal to 
increase voter turnout by only 3-5 percent.  
However, reducing the barriers to register to vote for others, such as Adam J. 
Berinsky (2005), is ineffective in terms of motivating more people to participate in an 
election, especially for those who exhibit a low level of interest in politics. Learning from 
a number of studies of electoral practices, Berinsky suggests that instead of providing 
easier processes for voter registration, helping voters to cast their ballots more 
conveniently in terms of time (through early voting), place (by allowing absentee voting), 
and procedure (via voting by Internet or voting by mail) is a better way to increase voter 
turnout.  
In short, structural factors such as the media environment and the features and 
designs of the electoral process affect political participation in various ways, both directly 
and indirectly. As the above literature pointed out, these factors impact the ways in which 
citizens participate in politics directly by shaping the incentives and choices individuals 
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have for becoming involved in public life. Structural factors may also impact political 
participation indirectly by influencing citizens’ political attitudes. In this regard, political 
participation should not be understood narrowly as an outcome of individuals’ personal 
resources and psychological motivations, but it should be considered more broadly as a 
response to contextual cues and the political environment.  
The existing studies in the American context, as discussed above, provide us with 
several potential factors—socioeconomic status, political engagement, mobilization, and 
structural factors—that could be applied to the analytical models of political participation 
in Thailand. However, without modification, adopting analytical frameworks and 
methodologies from American participatory research may be inadequate for explaining 
political behaviors and attitudes in another context, especially in the transitional societies 
of developing democracies. Before moving forward to the case of Thailand, exploring 
what previous studies have explained about political participation in other developing 
countries is thus required.  
 
Political Participation in Developing Democracies 
 “While the positive association between socioeconomic status and political 
participation seems to obtain across western democracies,34 many researchers have made 
clear that voter abstention in nondemocratic [or less-democratic or young democratic] 
systems may have a very different meaning and, thus, very different demographic 
contours” (Schlozman, 2002: 442). The evidence supporting this argument is ample. For 
                                                            
 
34Nevertheless, the criticisms of the SES model can be found in, for instance, 
Leighley (1995: 183-88) and Holzner (2010: 26-32). 
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example, seeking to explain why urban voters vote less than rural voters in South Korea, 
C.I. Eugene Kim, Young-Whan Kihl, and Doock-Kyou Chung (1973) argue that the low 
turnout rate of urban voters, apart from male and female differences, is due to the low 
turnout rate of those who are young and those who are highly educated. In addition, 
Brady and Kaplan (2001) found no relationship between education and voting in Estonia 
during the 1980s and argued that the act of voting during the Soviet era in Estonia was 
not about political choice and representation, but was a ritual from which the better 
educated may have chosen to abstain.  
Furthermore, recent studies have tended to assert that poor citizens in poor 
countries are not at all less politically active than their richer counterparts. Booth and 
Seligson (2008), for example, examined recent survey data from eight Latin American 
countries35 and found that individual wealth was not significantly associated with several 
aspects of participation, such as voting, party and campaign activism, communal and 
civic engagement, or protest participation. Only one aspect of participation that wealth 
was significantly associated with was contacting public officials, but it was negatively 
rather than positively related: the poor were more likely than others to contact officials. 
As these differences in participatory patterns among demographic groups are observed, 
we might expect to see different patterns of political attitude and mobilization, as well as 





35Those countries are Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica, Panama, and Columbia.  
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Mobilizing Agents and Clientelism  
Previous scholars of less-democratic politics have long asserted low levels of 
political engagement—interest and efficacy—among the citizens of developing countries, 
apparently those who are poor and less-educated. In their classic work regarding political 
participation in developing countries, Huntington and Nelson (1976) argued that the poor 
(both those that live in rural and urban areas) usually take little part in politics because 
participation often seems irrelevant to their primary concerns, which are urgent problems 
such as jobs, food, and medical aid—for today, tomorrow, or next week. According to 
Huntington and Nelson’s findings, “comparatively small proportions of low-income, 
poorly-educated people are interested in politics, regard politics as their concerns, or feel 
able to exert any influence on local or national authorities” (pp. 119-120). Huntington 
and Nelson (1976) called such patterns of political participation (particularly by the poor) 
in developing societies “mobilized participation,” participation in “activity that is 
designed by someone other than the actor to influence governmental decision-making” 
(p.7). For these scholars, this participatory pattern is sharply different from what they 
called “autonomous participation,” participation in “activity that is designed by the actor 
himself to influence governmental decision-making” (pp. 6-7), which is a typical pattern 
of participation for advanced (Western) democracies.  
However, as we have seen from the previous section of this chapter regarding the 
impact of mobilization factors on political activism in American context, the way in 
which Huntington and Nelson divided patterns of political activism into “mobilized” and 
“autonomous” participation and claimed a greater degree of democracy for the latter 
might be questioned by recent research. Many recent studies tend to view mobilizing 
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agents such as local leaders, civic groups, and political parties in developing societies 
positively rather than negatively, as they are seen to provide citizens with channels/ways 
to access politics. Moehler (2008: 99-100), for instance, found in the case of participation 
in Uganda’s constitution making that Ugandan citizens were more likely to participate in 
the process if they had a close relationship with the government councils, the local 
community, and civil society, as well as if they had received and accepted messages from 
the program organizers. Krishna (2008) discovered quite a similar pattern in the case of 
India, where individuals who gained access through the agency of local leaders or 
political parties felt more efficacious politically and thus were more likely to participate 
in politics at higher rates. These findings partly confirm what Verba, Nie, and Kim 
(1978) concluded in the case of India (and United States) about the critical role of 
institutions (they focus on the terms “recruitment of activists and leaders”) in fostering 
interest in elections and participation in campaign activities. In order to make democracy 
stronger and more accessible by all, Krishna therefore suggests that improving access 
through strengthening institutions is a key. 
 “Clientelism”36 is another term (or factor) that scholars have used to examine the 
ways in which citizens in developing societies and new democracies engage in politics. 
As James C. Scott (1972) indicated in the case of Southeast Asian countries, while many 
countries in this subregion have had functioning electoral systems at one time since their 
                                                            
 
36The field of clientelism is vast, and the forms of clientelistic networks are 
diverse. However, focusing on clientelism as a method of electoral mobilization, Susan 
Stokes (2007: 605) defined it simply as “the proffering of material goods in return for 
electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did 
you (will you) support me?”   
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independence, these new systems have been applied in those countries as a 
reestablishment of the redistributive mechanisms of the traditional setting—patron-client 
structures—rather than as a participatory mechanism for the establishment of democracy. 
Because it runs against the ideal model of democratic life and autonomous civil society, 
most scholars of clientelism have concluded that participation in electoral activity 
(especially by voting) in developing countries and new democracies has meanings, 
dynamics, and consequences different from those found in advanced industrial 
democracies (see for example Edie, 1991; Fox, 1994; Martz, 1997; Stokes, 1995). For 
instance, in the Philippines, patronage politics linked to “Bossism,” named to explain the 
critical role of local landowning oligarchs that function as both electoral and economic 
powerbrokers and enjoy virtually monopolistic control over entire localities, has 
dominated the Philippine political system, both at national and local levels (Sidel, 2004). 
The ways in which Filipinos engaged with and participated in politics therefore have 
been influenced by those monopolistic powers.  
In the case of Mexico, Beatriz Magaloni (2006) called the influence that political 
parties can exercise over individual voters a “hegemonic party autocracy.” In order to 
retain its monopolistic control of all levels of Mexican government for seven decades, 
Magaloni argues that the Institutional Revolution Party (PRI) relied not only on 
fraudulent and repressive practices but also long-term economic growth and its ability to 
generate widespread mass support through vote buying and the distribution of 
government transfers through what she called a “punishment regime.” A punishment 
regime is “the autocrat’s threat to exclude opposition voters and politicians from the 
party’s spoils system” (p.20). Directed most often toward the poor, a punishment regime 
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operates simply through budget circles by delivering payments to its friends and 
punishments to its enemies, and economic policies that promote state-led industrialization 
while creating a poverty trap to secure a large electoral base. Trapped in such a 
punishment regime, Mexican voters (especially those who are poor) remained 
systematically dependent on state patronage and clientelistic practices for survival. Under 
such circumstances, many resource-poor Mexicans felt less efficacious in and exit from 
the formal political arena by voting less often, attending fewer electoral rallies, disdaining 
protests, and rather pursuing their interests through community organizing, cooperative 
problem solving, and joining nongovernmental or other kinds of grassroots organizations 
(Holzner, 2010). In addition, recent voting behavior studies in Mexico indicate a lack of 
attention to politics on the part of the Mexican electorate (Camp, 2009; McCann, 1998; 
McCann and Lawson, 2003; 2006). Indeed, according to the Mexico 2006 panel study, 
approximately two-thirds of voters in 2005 expressed little or no interest in politics or in 
the presidential campaign, and 55 percent of all voters rarely or never talked about 
politics with other individuals (Camp, 2009). This low level of political engagement, for 
McCann and Lawson (2006), affects the influence that political parties can exercise over 
Mexican voters. Hence, if the roles of mobilizing agents and clientelism have altered the 
patterns and modes of political participation in recent developing societies, then we 
should find consistent evidence in the case of Thailand during the past ten years. 
 
Institutional Constraints and Political Changes  
One reason that scholars have used to explain why mobilizing agents and 
clientelism could have undemocratic effects on political participation and engagement is 
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the lack of resources and skills to manipulate involvement in politics among citizens, 
especially those that are poor and less-educated. As a result of rapid economic growth in 
many developing countries around the globe, many other scholars, particularly 
modernization theorists (e.g., Lipset, 1959; 1994) may thus expect to see a positive (more 
democratic) trend of political participation in currently-developing countries. However, 
the “incomplete democratization” of Southeast Asian countries (Hewison, 1999, Putzel, 
1997; 1999, Kelly and Reid, 1998) has shown little influence of ordinary citizens on 
political fortunes. For example, in Malaysia, while regular elections both at national and 
state levels have been held since independence in 1957, only one partisan-group political 
party—the United Malays National Organization or UMNO—has been elected to govern 
the country with only a limited role of the opposition party. The growth of 
nongovernmental organizations and associations has been permitted but cracked down on 
by the state, especially when they are linked with opposition parties. There is evidence 
showing that a number of opposition leaders in Malaysia have faced harassment, arrest, 
and imprisonment (Hewison, 1999).  
The situation seems similar, even worse, for Singapore, where the People's Action 
Party (PAP) has been in power since 1959, with only limited opposition (existing since 
1968) and rarely active civic organizations. Furthermore, while the fall of the 
authoritarian regime of President Suharto in 1998 brought tremendous democratic change 
to Indonesian politics, the residue of the patrimonial structure (patronage) and money 
politics has caused the inability to ensure the rule of law, widespread corruption, 
excessive influence on state policies by the military, and an underdeveloped civil society 
in Indonesia (Bünte and Ufen, 2009; Webber, 2006).  
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One explanation for the incomplete democratization of Southeast Asian countries 
is linked to regional political values that are collectively not conducive to the 
development of Western style liberal democracy, that is, democracy with a focus on the 
individualistic aspects of political freedom (see for example Zakaria, 1997). In Singapore 
and Malaysia, there are political values, called “Asian values”—that claim harmony, 
consensus, and unity rather than the conflictual adversarial approach characterized by 
Western political competition (Hewison, 1999; Maravall, 1995). In order to maintain 
these ideologies, these regimes practice “Asian-style” democracy, which allows 
conservative regimes to constrain opposition and to maintain limited political space for 
participation by the public (Hewison, 1999: 231). These explanations have long been 
employed by Southeast Asian scholars to explain why political participation and 
engagement in this region are limited, although economic growth and modernization 
there provide several conditions that fit the establishment of democracy, such as a 
growing number of middle class and well-educated citizens.  
Political changes since the “third wave” of democratization (Huntington 1996) are 
another factor that may raise positive expectations toward political participation and 
engagement in less-developed countries. However, many studies, such as those of Berg-
Schlosser and Kersting (2003), find that overall, political participation in Chile, Brazil, 
Kenya, and the Ivory Coast are characterized by a large group of either not active or 
voting only participants that are mostly female or those with low income. In addition, in 
these countries, participants in both conventional party-oriented and unconventional 
activities (i.e., demonstrations, strikes, payment boycotts, and squatting) more often are 
male, those with strong political interest, and those that have an optimistic view of the 
79 
 
future. These findings suggest not only that there is little improvement in political 
participation and engagement in developing democracies, but also that an unequal 
distribution of political participation among groups of citizens in such societies still 
exists.  
The discussion in this section not only reminds us that political participation in 
developing countries may be different from that in well-established democracies, but also 
indicates the important roles of the structure of political systems in shaping and 
influencing citizens’ participation and engagement.  The above findings in many 
developing democracies confirmed what we have found in the American literature—that 
individuals’ capacity and willingness to engage with and participate in politics do not rely 
solely on how adequate are the resources and skills of the citizens, but they also depend 
upon the opportunities and obstacles that the political regimes set up for them (Holzner, 
2010). Indeed, the structure of opportunities for political participation within each society 
might be shaped and influenced by institutional and contextual factors, such as the nature 
of the regime-type, overall levels of democratization, and the existence of political rights 
and civil liberties. For this reason, we could understand changes in the patterns of 
political participation among different groups of citizens more clearly if those 
institutional and contextual factors were taken into account. However, because the 
structure of political systems usually appears as an outcome of political behaviors and 
values rooted in each society, it would be useful if institutional and contextual factors 
were constructed and used with adequate knowledge about how political participation 
and engagement of citizens in such societies have been understood and explained. The 
next section discusses political participation and engagement in Thai Politics literature. 
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Political Participation and Engagement in 
Thai Politics Literature 
Like several conventional premises regarding political participation and 
engagement in developing democracies, Thai participatory research has labeled ordinary 
citizens in Thailand as ill informed, uninterested, and easily deceived. Thai citizens’ 
political participation is thus considered to be motivated and influenced under patron-
client relationships and vote buying (e.g., Askew, 2008; Ockey, 2004; Pichai Ratanadirok 
Na Phuket, 1990; Rungsan Thanapornphan, 1993). Many studies on voting behavior and 
electoral participation in Thailand indicate that political mobilization by community 
leaders (Kheangkai Chongalarn, 1993; Nopparat Tawee, 1993; Natthawuth Jinagool, 
1995; Suvat Siripokaphirom, 1997), land/local business owners (Akarawit Khankaew, 
1996), and local politicians and government officers (Dacha Jaiya, 1989; Abhichart 
Naksook, 1993; Chansak Thawil, 1991) affect the ways in which Thai citizens participate 
(or do not participate) in voting and in campaign activities.  
Political mobilization is also related to vote-buying, which is another mechanism 
that political leaders and parties use to foster Thai voters to participate in elections 
(Hewison, 1997; McCargo, 2002; Paithoon Boonwat, 1995; Rungsan Thanapornphan, 
1993). Many studies after 1997 indicate more complex forms of vote-buying that include 
not only motivation by giving money to voters when asking them to vote for a specific 
candidate or party, but also by providing voters with entertaining activities (e.g., free 
concerts, free movies, and free tours to some attractive places), and/or giving them food 
and money when participating in campaign events (Bookhoree Yeema and Narin 
Sompong, 2002; Sunee Treethanakorn, 2002; Tossapol Sompong, 2002; 2003; Tossapol 
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Sungkasup, 2003). The conventional wisdom is apparently that these mobilization 
factors—the patron-client relationship and vote-buying—have a significant impact on 
political participation among participants with fewer resources; that is, the rural, because 
they are poor and less-educated, and are easily mobilized by influential persons and for 
personal benefit and thereby are the most active group in electoral activities (Natpong 
Sukvisit, 1993; Somchai Tilangkarn, 1994; Suchit Bunbongkarn and Phonsak 
Phongphaew, 1979; 1983; Wittaya Suwanmas, 1998).  
Differential rates of participation between rural and urban residents are 
particularly worthy of attention in the case of Thailand, and almost all of the explanations 
are influenced by Anek Laothamatas’ (1995; 1996) “a tale of two democracies” thesis. 
According to this thesis, the reason why democracy has failed to be firmly established in 
Thailand over the past several decades is to be found in the differing views and 
expectations of the urban middle class and the poor in the country over democracy, 
elections, and politicians. Anek bases his arguments on a combination of quantitative 
data, national election surveys, existing statistics collected and reported by scholars and 
academic institutes, and qualitative information, mostly interviews with many politicians. 
He indicates that for the rural electorate,37 democracy is valued not as an ideal but as a 
mechanism to draw greater benefits from the political elite to themselves and their 
communities. Elections, in the view of rural voters, according to Anek, are very much 
local, not national affairs, dealing with the exchange of votes for benefits of a nonpolicy 
                                                            
 
37 Anek (1996: 203) defines the rural electorate simply as the Thai population that 




type. Rural people do not regard their voting as separate from other socio-cultural 
obligations. Instead, they feel obligated to use their votes as repayment to those who have 
been friendly, helpful, or generous in coping with daily difficulties while bringing 
progress and prosperity to their community. In this respect, the rural electorate does not 
expect abstract rewards such as laws, policies, or public interest. 
On the other hand, for the educated middle class, which he defines as those who 
are socially situated between the wealthy property classes and the poverty-stricken 
peasants, farmers, and workers, democracy is a form of legitimate rule adopted by most 
civilized nations. However, Anek argues that while middle class voters admit that 
democracy is rule by the people, they also believe that people who can rule democratic 
games should be individuals who are knowledgeable and public-regarding. For Anek, to 
be considered knowledgeable, middle class voters believe that voters must understand the 
implications of the policy positions of the candidates and use these as criteria in casting 
their ballots. To be considered pubic-regarding, voters, in the middle class’s opinion, 
should transcend personal or local interests. Voters must understand that elected 
politicians are representatives of the nation, as well as of their own constituencies. 
According to Anek, for the educated middle class, elections are mechanisms of recruiting 
honest and capable persons to serve as lawmakers and political executives rather than a 
process through which voters get parochial and personal benefits. Voting decisions 
should be made independently of social, cultural, and especially financial obligations.  
For Anek, these conflicting perceptions of elections have existed in Thai society 
and have led to instability regarding democracy in Thailand, in which the rural majority 
votes to set up a government, while the fewer-in-number but louder-in-voice middle class 
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criticize and weaken the poor-performing and corrupt cabinet, ending with their own 
internal conflicts or with an external military coup. Basing their arguments on Anek’s a 
tale of two democracies thesis, the connecting thread among studies related to political 
participation and engagement in Thailand seems to be the clash between rural and urban 
Thai voters. 
In addition to studies on impact of socio-demographic and attitudinal factors, 
there are many other studies in Thailand, especially those conducted since the 1990s, that 
mainly focus on the impact of structural factors (e.g., media environment and the effects 
of laws and regulation changing) on political engagement and public participation. Many 
studies regarding the media effects on electoral participation, for instance by Naruepon 
Sethsuwan (1990), Jittipon Ponpriksa (1993) and Chittra Pomchutima (1998), claim that 
eligible voters receive political information most frequently from television, and that 
media exposure to politics affects voters’ political knowledge (Charinya Charoensuksai, 
1996 and Nilubol Chai-onnom, 2000). In addition, Juthathip Chayangkura (1998) found 
that campaign advertisements have a moderate effect on people’s consideration of 
candidates, while public opinion polls, according to Pitha Thawornkul (1994), have a 
weak effect on changing people’s attitude toward elections.  
Studies on the impact of changed laws and regulations on citizens’ participation, 
on the other hand, were conducted, especially after the 1997 Constitution promulgation, 
to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the new electoral system—both its procedure 
and the performance of the Election Commission. King Prajadhipok’s Institute (2001) 
evaluated the lessons learned from the 2000 senate election, and discovered many 
procedural problems that caused voting inconvenience, made voters miss important 
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information about elections, and produced bad attitudes toward electoral officers. Paying 
attention to the performance of the Election Commission, Patcharodom Limpisatien 
(2000) and Chatree Pinengam (2001) indicated that there are some procedures, such as 
investigation and judging processes, that need to be improved in order to develop the 
Election Commission’s mission in providing free and fair elections. For these studies, 
problems in the electoral process and the poor performance of the Election Commission 
are the reasons for many Thai citizens disengaging from electoral activities and not 
voting in elections. We have learned from previous studies regarding the impacts of 
structural factors on public participation in Thailand that accurate information widely 
provided through political campaigns and news media, as well as well-designed electoral 
processes, help to enhance citizens’ ability to participate actively in political activities. 
These findings are well-confirmed by many theories suggested by American scholars. 
Nevertheless, the impact of these structural factors is relatively weaker than mobilization 
factors such as patron-client relations and vote-buying. 
According to prior literature investigating in the Thai context, it can be concluded 
that the participatory disparities among different groups in Thailand have existed because 
the Thai citizens have different attitudes toward politics and democracy. These politically 
attitudinal differences can mostly be explained by differences in the socioeconomic 
backgrounds among groups, in particular the poor and less-educated rural and the higher-
socioeconomic status urban. The rough picture is that the former group is more likely 
than the latter to participate in political activity because they are mobilized to engage in 
politics by non-democratic actors or mechanisms (i.e., patron-client relations and vote-
buying). However, the focus of this dissertation on citizen participation and engagement 
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is in sharp contrast with this conventional approach because many changes have occurred 
in Thai politics in the past decade. These changes, for example: the opened political-
space provided by the 1997 Constitution; the new style of political campaigns, in which 
practical public policy is the most effective strategy by which to attract voters through a 
variety of uses of media and advertisement, utilized by PM Thaksin and his Thai Rak 
Thai Party; and the new roles of high-technology media, especially those that have been 
used by the protest leaders (e.g., websites and satellite TV), in combination, may affect 
and change the characteristics of individual voters—their perceptions and understanding 
of democracy, their assessments of political systems and institutions, as well as their 
political behaviors.   
It is time, therefore, to subject the conventional wisdom regarding political 
participation and engagement in Thailand to systematic empirical testing. This does not 
mean that the conventional wisdom which based their arguments mostly on socio-
demographic factors such as gender, age, income, education, and area of living do not 
matter for political action among Thai voters, but these factors should be considered 
along with other factors such as psychological, mobilization, and institutional factors. 
More precisely, we should expect that the effect of socioeconomic status factors on 
participation among groups of Thai citizens will diminish after controlling for other 
potential factors, in particular political engagement, mobilization, and contextual factors. 
Moreover, if political engagement, mobilization, and contextual factors mattered, 
then one would expect to find systematic differences in average levels of political 
participation between different groups of citizens. That is, people with more positive 
attitudes toward politics (being more interested in politics, knowing better about politics, 
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and feeling more efficacious about engaging in politics) should be more politically active 
in various democratic activities than those with more negative attitudes. Further, 
individuals who have close relationships with specific groups/parties should be more 
likely to participate in political activities than those who have fewer such relationships or 
none. The levels of political participation of individuals who have had a positive 
experience with political institutions should be systematically greater than those of 
individuals who have had worse experiences.  
Last and foremost, using time-series data with several controls and considering 
the impacts of many potential factors on various modes of political actions, this study 
expected to see that socioeconomic status, attitudinal, mobilization, and structural factors, 
should affect political participation depending on the groups of citizens, types of action, 
and across time.  
In the next chapter, parts of these hypotheses are tested with a longitudinal 
analysis regarding the quantity and quality of political participation. The chapter presents 
a variety of quantitative evidence indicating that political participation and engagement in 
Thailand during the past decade have changed and exhibit a progressive trend—not only 
in terms of their quantity (number of participants) but also in relation to their quality 






PROGRESS IN QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
 




 This chapter focuses on the change patterns of political behaviors and attitudes in 
Thailand during the past decade. The major attempts are to examine: (1) whether political 
participation and engagement of Thai citizens have quantitatively and qualitatively 
improved; (2) if any improvement has been made, then by how much. The chapter is 
divided into two main sections based on the two premises stated in the first chapter: (1) if 
the quantity of political participation in Thailand during the past decade was improved, 
Thai citizens would increasingly participate in politics; (2) if the quality of political 
participation was improved, positive trends of political interest, knowledge, and efficacy 
of Thai citizens would clearly be observed. Obviously, these enquiries entail sub-
questions such as: What does this chapter mean by “quantity and quality of political 
participation”? How does this chapter explain the changes involved? 
In order to examine the quantity of political participation and its change patterns 
in Thailand, the first section discusses how Thai citizens since the 2001 general election 
in particular have gotten involved in several types of political actions. As with the 
88 
 
distinction between political and nonpolitical (civic) activities mentioned in Chapter 3, 
the progress of political participation is observed through the evolution of four major 
political acts: voting, joining campaign activities, contacting officials, and protesting. 
However, because the vibrancy of political activity may also be understood as the 
vibrancy of civic engagement and other ways of political involvement (Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Putnam, 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen, 2002; Macedo et 
al., 2005), the evolution of party membership and civic engagement are also traced as a 
brief explanation of changing patterns of political activity. The second section then 
devotes considerable attention to change patterns of political engagement (e.g., political 
interest, knowledge, and efficacy) among Thai citizens by examining how much Thai 
citizens are interested in what is going on in their polity, how much they are informed 
about government and politics, how much they are confident in their own political 
abilities, and how these political attitudes have changed during the past decade. 
This chapter develops a year-by-year longitudinal analysis of political 
participation and engagement in Thailand since 2001, in order to explain changes in these 
behaviors and attitudes. As described in Chapter 1, the data used in this longitudinal 
analysis are mixed, consisting of both existing statistical data taken from public 
organizations (e.g., ECT, NSB, and KPI) and survey data obtained from ABS (2002, 
2006) and CSES (2001, 2005, 2007). The analysis can reveal whether Thai citizens have 
increasingly participated in political activity in the past decade; whether they, at the same 
time, have increasingly engaged in civic activity and other forms of political involvement 
that may motivate them to do political activity; whether they have become increasingly 
89 
 
interested in politics; learned more about politics and elections; and had a great sense of 
political efficacy.  
 
Quantity of Political Participation 
My investigation into the change patterns of political behaviors begins by 
describing a clear picture of an improvement in quantity of political participation in 
Thailand since 2001. Firstly, the discussion focuses on the change patterns of 
participation in four key political activities: (1) voting, the most common form of 
political participation seen in democratic polity, (2) campaign activities, (3) political 
contacting, and (4) protesting. Secondly, in order to better understand these changes, the 
discussion then also considers the evolution of party membership and civic engagement.   
  
Voting 
Voter turnout in national elections in Thailand has dramatically increased during 
the past decade, especially since the 2001 election. Figure 4.1 presents voter participation 
rate over time, starting from the first National Assembly voting that took place in a 
subsequent year (1933) since Thailand began its democratization process in 1932. The 
data indicate that the turnout rate in Thailand has continued to rise from about 40 percent 
(or lower) recorded before 1957 to about 40-50 percent during the period between 1958 
and 1983. Since 1986, the voter turnouts were on average around 60 percent. After the 
1997 Constitution went into force, two House elections were held. On January 6, 2001, 
69.8 percent of eligible Thais went to the polls, and on February 6, 2005, that percentage 




Source: The Office of Election Commission (http://www.ect.go.th)  
Note: The right to vote was granted to all adult Thai citizens (i.e., 20 years of age and 
older for House of Representatives elections between 1933 and 1988, and 18 years of age 
and older from the 1992 House of Representatives election to present), without any 
restrictions such as gender, level of education, property ownership, or payment of tax, 
since Thailand changed its political system from an absolute monarchy to a western 
democratic system in June 1932. 
 












taking place in September, 2006 was a setback to democracy in Thailand, the voter 
turnout did increase to almost 75 percent in the election held on December 23, 2007, 
which was the first House election after a 13-month long military government and the 
first election under the 2007 Constitution. 
The turnout rates of around 70 percent in the three latest elections were 
considered satisfactory when compared to that of neighboring countries like Malaysia 
and the Philippines and industrialized countries like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and 
were even higher than an old democracy like India. The rates were also higher than the 
average rate of the entire Asian region and closer to that of liberal democratic countries in 




Electoral activities can take several forms, depending on the context of the 
electioneering in the country (Dalton, 2006). The ABS (2002; 2006) and CSES (2001; 
2005) have selected some electoral activities to be regularly included in their survey 
conducted in Thailand that can be utilized in the present longitudinal analysis, such as 
persuading others to vote for certain political parties or candidates, attending election 
                                                            
 
38The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(www.idea.int) reports the voter turnout rate over time of Asian countries as follows: 
Malaysia, 70.2 percent; the Philippines, 80.9 percent; Japan, 69.5 percent; South Korea, 
72.9 percent; Taiwan, 70.4 percent; and India, 59.4 percent. The average voter turnout 
rate over time by regions is also available: Western Europe, 77 percent; Oceania, 72 
percent; Eastern Europe, 69 percent; Asia, 62 percent; North America, 61 percent; Africa, 
55 percent; and South America, 54 percent.   
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meetings or rallies, and showing support for certain political parties or candidates. 
However, there has been debate in the participation field as to whether “persuading others 
to vote” is a form of political activity,39 particularly in the case of developing countries. 
In this dissertation, therefore, the progress of Thai citizens participating in campaign 
activities by paying attention only to “attending election meetings or rallies” and 
“showing support for certain political parties or candidates” was examined. In order to 
make the evaluation more clearly, information about these two campaign activities in 
2003 and 2004, was added, as collected by using similar questions in the surveys and 
reported by King Prajadhipok’s Institute (2007), as seen in Figure 4.2.  
Beyond voting, a large number of Thai citizens in the past decade have tended to 
participate in campaign activities. Yet few of them have shown support for certain 
political parties or candidates. Figure 4.2 indicates that the proportion of participants in 
campaign meetings or rallies has increased, from lower than 40 percent in 2001 to over 
50 percent in 2002, and to almost 60 percent in 2003 and 2004. At the same time, the 
propensity of Thai citizens showing support for certain parties or candidates has 
increased from less than 3 percent on average during 2002-2004 to almost 10 percent in 
2005. However, as a result of the 2006 political crisis in which the House of 
Representatives election was scheduled but all major opposition parties boycotted, Thai 
citizens’ participation in 2006 for both campaign activities dropped by about half 
compared to the past year’s results. This indicates that the electoral atmospheres, 
characterized by particular events and specific circumstances surrounding political and  
                                                            
 





Source:  ABS (2002; 2006); CSES (2001; 2005); King Prajadhipok’s Institute (2007).  
Figure 4.2: Percentage of Thai Citizens Participating in 















the degree of political competition, are critical factors that influence citizens’ willingness 
to participate in politics.  
 
Political Contacting 
Apart from political activities that have direct relevance to the selection of 
government personnel (e.g., voting and being involved in electoral activities), political 
contacting is another mode of political action that on the other hand aims at influencing 
the decisions of government personnel. Based on this concept, the changing patterns of 
political contacting are examined by focusing mainly on the tendency of Thai citizens to 
initiate any contact with public officials, including elected representatives and 
government officers. Although there are many other public persons and organizations, 
such as political parties, NGO, and the media, who may have some influence on 
government personnel’s decisions, this study excluded those organizations from the 
measurement of political contacting because they did not hold decision-making authority. 
However, in order to investigate whether the percentages of political contacting were 
high, other organizations (i.e., political parties, mass media, and NGOs), those that may 
assist citizens in transferring their requests or concerns to the government personnel were 
considered for a comparison purpose. Considering the propensity of citizens to contact 
those organizations also provides us with a clearer picture of whether the change patterns 
of contacting a public official relates to the change patterns of contacting political parties, 
the mass media, and NGOs.     
When they are asked whether they have contacted any public persons or 




Source: ABS 2002, 2006; CSES 2005, 2007 
Figure 4.3: Percentage of Thai Respondents Who Have Engaged in 













government officials quite a bit more often—than other persons or organizations. Figure 
4.3 shows that among five activities, contacting government officials was the most 
frequent activity that Thai citizens engaged in the past decade. More interestingly, the 
percentages of citizens using this channel to make their opinions and requests heard 
dramatically increased—from 36.4 percent in 2002 to almost 60 percent in 2006, before 
dropping by 5 percent a year later. In addition, these percentages were higher than those 
of contacted elected representatives, although the citizens expressed their opinions 
through both of these channels more frequently than through political parties, the mass 
media, or NGOs.  
Approximately 8 percent of Thai citizens in 2002 reported they had contacted 
elected representatives concerning political problems or issues. This proportion increased 
to more than 12 percent in 2005. As with the propensity to contact government officials, 
however, this decreased by almost 2 percent in 2007. The patterns of citizens contacting 
political parties, NGOs, and the mass media were quite similar to the up-and-down trend 
of contacted politicians and government officials, although only a very few reported 
using these two channels. 
 
Protest Activism 
Not only paying attention to political contacting, recent studies have tended to add 
protest activism to their measurement of political participation (see e.g., Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, 2001; Norris, 2002; Zukin, 
2006; Holzner, 2010). Several survey questions have been used by scholars as a 
measurement of protest activism, such as signing petition, joining in boycotts, attending 
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lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories 
(see for example World Value Survey, WVS). However, survey data collected from a 
variety types of protest activism in the case of Thailand are rare,40 and almost all of them 
are unavailable for developing a longitudinal analysis. Given these limitations, included 
in this study’s longitudinal analysis of protest activism is only one question asked of the 
Thai respondents, whether they had taken part in a protests, marches, or demonstrations 
during the past years. Other forms of protest activism, including (1) refusing to pay taxes 
or fees to the government; (2) joining in boycotts; (3) getting together with others to raise 
an issue or sign a petition; and (4) using force or violence for a political cause obtained 
from the 2006 ABS and the 2007 WVS, the only two sources that collected such 
information, were also examined but in a separate table. I do not claim this table a 
longitudinal analysis because these two surveys used fairly different question-words 
when asking the respondents.41   
The first issue for analysis is whether Thai citizens in the past decade have 
increasingly engaged in protest politics. Surprisingly, while critical events such as the 
Yellow Shirts’ anti-Thaksin movements in 2006 and 2008, the anti-military government 
                                                            
 
40The CSES did not include any questions regarding protest activism in the 2001 
survey, while in 2005 and 2007 they added a question, taking part in a protest, march, or 
demonstration, asked of the respondents. 
   
41While the 2006 ABS asked Thai respondents, whether they, personally, have 
never, once, or more than once done any of these things during the past three years—(1) 
refusing to pay taxes or fees to the government, (2) getting together with others to raise 
an issue or sign a petition, and (3) using force or violence for a political cause, the 2007 
WVS asked whether the Thai respondents have actually done any of these things, 
whether they might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it—(1) signing 
petition, (2) joining in boycotts, (3) attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations. 
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movements in 2006, and the Red Shirts’ protestations against the government of Abhisit 
in 2009 and 2010 have been clearly observed in Thailand throughout the second half of 
the last decade, not very high numbers of Thai citizens have reported that they actually 
have participated in protest activities. Figure 4.4 shows that less than 6 percent of Thai 
respondents in 2002 said they have taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration. This 
proportion decreased by slightly more than 3 percent to around 2.4 percent in 2005, but 
steadily increased to 3.2 percent and 4.1 percent in 2006 and 2007, respectively. The 
highest proportion appearing in 2002 can be understood as an explosion of 
demonstrations, protests, marches, and new civic organizations by people of various ways 
of life that emerged since 1990 (Pasuk Phongpaichit et al., 2002). Praphat Pintoptaeng 
(1998: 34-39) has recorded the numbers of demonstrations, marches, and protests in 
Thailand between the 1970s and 1990s and found that there were 42 demonstrations, 
marches, and protests in 1978, 170 in 1990, and 988 in 1994.  
This outburst of protest activism in Thailand, for many scholars, is a result of the 
combined impact of democratization, the rise of the market-oriented economy, and new 
forms of global power (hegemonic states and dominant multinationals) that on the one 
hand, have caused conflicts over resources, dislocation of communities, and erosion of 
ways of life, and on the other, have opened up political opportunities and given 
legitimacy to social movements (Hirsch and Warren, 1998; Missingham, 2000; Pasuk et 
al., 2002, Praphat, 1998). In contrast, a sharply decreased trend of protest activism 
between 2002 and 2005, the year in which the TRT won the election by landslide 




Source: ABS 2002, 2006; CSES 2005, 2007 
Figure 4.4: Percentage of Thai Respondents Who Have Taken Part in  
















reform under the 1997 Constitution (Suchit, 1999; Bowornsak, 2003) and Thaksin’s 
administrative strategies, which were able to make the voice of the less well-off people 
heard through traditional ways of political expression, such as by going to the polls or 
contacting politicians /government officials about problems or concerns. 
A growing trend of protest activism since then can be simply understood as a 
consequence of the political crisis that occurred since the integration of the Yellow Shirts 
in early 2006. Yet many questions have remained, for example, why the proportions of 
Thai citizens that participated in demonstrations, marches, and protests in 2006 and 2007 
were still low, and how many of these people could be observed if data for the years 
2008-2010 were available.  
Because none of the national survey data about protest activism has been released 
since 2008, this dissertation can clarify only some parts of these puzzle by considering 
participation in other forms of political activism—refusing to pay taxes or fees to the 
government, joining in boycotts, getting together with others to raise an issue or sign a 
petition, and using force or violence for a political cause—collected in 2006 by the ABS 
and in 2007 by the WVS. Though this represents evidence from only two years, the 
frequency of these protest behaviors provides a broader picture in terms of the protest 
activities that Thai citizens have engaged in. In other words, such frequency can be 
applied to examining whether Thai citizens have used various forms of protest actions, 
and to what extent those proportions of involvement in protest activities can explain the 
overall level of Thai citizens’ involvement in protest politics in 2006-2007. Moreover, 
since the year 2006 and 2007 are critical, when the Yellow Shirts became integrated and 
organized their month-long movement in early 2006 while at the same time, the pro-
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Thaksin movement emerged firstly as a group of people supporting for Thaksin 
government and then became the Red Shirts after the 2006 coup, another issue for 
analysis is whether the respondents’ protest behavior is related to what was going on in 
those events.   
Conducted between 2006 and 2007,42 information about protest activism derived 
from the 2006 ABS and the 2007 WVS can tell only half of the story about Thailand’s 
protest politics since those years. However, many interesting points from this information 
can be adopted to explain more clearly the nature of citizen involvement in protest 
politics in Thailand in particular, and in other societies in general. Table 4.1 illustrates 
that among four protest actions, the most popular protest activity for Thai citizens in 2006 
was refusing to pay taxes or fees to the government (7.7 percent), while the least popular 
protest activity was using force or violence for a political cause (1.9 percent). Getting 
together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition (4.4 percent) and attending a 
demonstration, protest, or march (3.2 percent) were the second and the third most popular 
activities in 2006, respectively. Only three protest actions were included in the 2007 
WVS. Among those activities, the most popular protest activity for Thai citizens in 2007 
was signing a petition (8.4 percent). The second and the third most popular were joining 





42 The 2006 ABS conducted in Thailand before the Military Coup (19 September, 
2006) in April 2006, whereas the 2007 WVS conducted in Thailand less than one year 





Percentage of Thai Respondents Who Have Engaged in 
Various Forms of Protest Politics, 2006-2007 
 
Protest Activism Year Percent 
Refused to pay taxes or fees to the government 2006 7.7 
Joined in boycotts 2007 3.1 
Got together with others to raise an issue or signed a 
petition 
2006 4.4 
Signed a petition 2007 8.4 
Used force or violence for a political cause 2006 1.9 
Attended a demonstration, protest, or march 2006 3.2 
Attended lawful/peaceful demonstrations 2007 2.4 
Participated in at least one of the above four protest 
activities 
2006 11.4 
Participated in at least one of the above three protest 
activities 
2007 12.2 
Source: ABS 2006; WVS 2007. 
Note: the table presented percentage of those who have once or more than once done 
each protest action for the 2006 ABS; and of those who have actually done each protest 





At the first glance, this information about protest activism of Thai respondents in 
2006 and 2007 indicates that Thai citizens have engaged in various protest activities other 
than directly participating in demonstration or protest marches. Furthermore, for both 
2006 and 2007, more than 10 percent of Thai citizens said they had been involved in at 
least one of these protest activities during the past three years. These percentages reveal 
that the overall level of Thai citizens’ involvement in protest politics seems to be higher 
than this study’s previous estimation.  
A relatively high differentiation between the proportion of people who engaged in 
at least one of those four activities in 2006, of those three activities in 2007, and of those 
who engaged in each activity also confirms what the aforementioned scholars (e.g., 
Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1971) have argued—that people do not use political activities 
interchangeably; instead, they tend to specialize in activities that match their motivations 
and goals. In other words, Thai citizens had engaged in protest politics by selecting to do 
what they could do, or should do, rather than doing everything.  
Moreover (and related to the prior point), the proportions of people refusing to 
pay taxes (for 2006), joining boycotts (for 2006 and 2007), and signing petitions (for both 
surveys), which were even higher than those of people attending a demonstration or 
protest for each year, were consistent with the political events that occurred during the 
times the surveys were conducted. For example, one of the protest actions the Yellow 
Shirts leaders encouraged protesters, as well as people who supported their movement (in 
2006), to do, in order to express their voice and show that the Thaksin government lacked 
the necessary legitimacy to administer the country was to refuse to pay taxes to the 
government. During their protestation in 2006, the Yellow Shirts also urged their 
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supporters to boycott goods and products that were owned in particular by the Thaksin 
family companies. Additionally, the Yellow Shirts supporters were asked to sign a 
petition submitting to the President of the Senate to pass a resolution under section 307 of 
the 1997 Constitution in order to remove Thaksin from office.43  
This evidence suggests that people may engage in protest politics by showing 
support to the protest, which can be done in several ways, such as donating money to the 
movement, wearing shirts and/or other signs of the protest, posting stickers and/or protest 
messages on cars, and so forth. Beyond the case of Thailand, in order to conclude 
whether the levels of involvement in protests are high or whether the impact of the 
movements is widespread, scholars need to pay more attention to various forms of protest 
behaviors (which tend to appear nowadays in more innovative forms than in the past).  
To sum up, this longitudinal analysis of political participation, as shown above, 
asserts that overall, Thai citizens increasingly have participated in many forms of 
political activities, although decreasing trends of some forms of participation can be 
observed during some periods. During the first half of the past decade, Thai citizens 
tended to participate quite often in electoral activities, in particular by voting, attending 
campaign activities, and showing support for parties or candidates. Also, large numbers 
                                                            
 
43According to the 1997 Constitution, voters of not less than fifty thousand in 
number have the right to lodge with the President of the Senate a complaint in order to 
request  the Senate to pass a resolution removing the person holding a position of Prime 
Minister, Minister, member of the House of Representatives, senator, President of the 
Supreme Court of Justice, President of the Constitutional Court, President of the Supreme 
Administrative Court or Prosecutor General, who is under the circumstance of unusual 
wealth indicative of the commission of corruption, malfeasance in office, malfeasance in 
judicial office or an intentional exercise of power contrary to the provisions of the 
Constitution or law from office (Section 304).   
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of Thai citizens have gotten involved in political contacting. However, the levels of 
participation in these three political actions have tended to decrease since the country 
experienced the crisis in 2006. In contrast, protest activism, which tended to decrease 
between 2002 and 2005, steadily increased from 2005 to 2007. These results suggest that 
people participate in politics differently depending on types of political activity and on 
the political environment.  
This dissertation argues that the development of political activism in Thailand 
relates to the vibrancy of civic engagement and other modes of political involvement that 
also can be observed precisely in the past decade. In order to learn about such 
relationships, the following section discusses party membership and civic engagement 
trends in Thailand since 2001.  
  
Party Membership and Civic Engagement 
Party Membership 
Since the late 1990s, as with participation in political activities, the proportions of 
Thai citizens being members of a political party have been high. However, the ebb and 
flow trend of party membership proportions raises some questions, particularly whether 
Thai citizens tend to intentionally engage in a political party. According to the official 
data on the number of political parties, as reported to the registrar from the year 1998, the 
overall membership to political parties of Thai people has increased rapidly. Figure 4.5 
shows that only 2.8 million people registered as members of political parties in 1998. 
This number increased to more than 25 million in 2002, the peak year, before decreasing 
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number of party memberships increased again to nearly twenty-five million in 2006, and 
remained not very much different until early 2007. It can therefore be said that political 
party membership of Thai people has increased by almost nine fold within only nine 
years (i.e., from 1998 to 2007). 
There are several factors affecting the rapid growth of political-party membership 
since the late 1997 to early 2007. First, this growth resulted from the continuity in the 
operation of the political parties. It is accepted that the military coup by the Peace 
Maintenance Group in 1991 was the first revolution in which political parties were not 
dissolved (McCargo, 2002). Hence, several political parties have been able to maintain 
their status as political institutions up to now. Moreover, the enthusiasm among people’s 
sector also has played an important role in the process of drafting a new constitution, 
hence resulting in the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. 
This Constitution includes the clear stipulation to enhance people’s participation in 
politics. As a result, there has been movement of various groups of people to establish 
several new political parties. 
As for the information on budget allocation to support the operation of political 
parties by the Political Party Development Fund in the year 2006, a total of 24 political 
parties that were currently operating requested funding from the Political Party 
Development Fund (Figure 4.6). Among them, 4 parties comprise over 1 million 
members. These parties are Thai Rak Thai, the Democrats, Chart Thai, and Mahachon. 
Thai Rak Thai has the highest number of 12,081,088 party members (only those that are 
not members of other political parties), or 26.9 percent of eligible voters, followed by 




Source: Political Party Development Fund, the Office of Election Commission 
Figure 4.6: The Number of Party Members for Thai Political Parties with 











members of Mahachon. The total number of other parties’ members is only 1,296,716, 
which is even fewer than the number of members of the fourth largest, Mahachon.  
In addition to the above institutional factors, political parties’ own intentions and 
citizens’ own incentives are potential factors that have aroused the rapid growth of 
political-party membership in Thailand. In their latest article, entitled “Unraveling Intra-
Party Democracy in Thailand,” Aurel Croissant and Paul Chambers (2010) argued that 
the main reason why almost all political parties in Thailand are active in the pursuit of 
members is not because they need support in terms of money, volunteer work for the 
party or candidates, or to broaden their reservoir of potential candidates; rather, Thai 
political parties try to recruit as many as members as they can in order to enhance their 
public image and reputation. This argument is true in the case of “large” political 
parties—those are able to gain financial support from private companies and/or public 
donations. On the other hand, for small or “emerging” political parties, recruiting more 
members means more money for support from the Election Commission’s Political Party 
Development Fund.  
Moreover, it is important to note that according to the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2540 (1997) and the Political Party Act of 1999, the 
establishment of a new party only requires at least fifteen people, but these numbers need 
to be expanded to a minimum of 5,000 members, and new parties have to establish a local 
branch in each of the four national regions. Consequently, in order to achieve these 
requirements, various newly-established parties have used inappropriate methods of 
gaining party members. Croissant and Chambers (2010) discovered that in Thailand, to 
become a political party member, an extensive prior screening is not required.  
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Paying membership contributions also does not matter. Instead, political parties 
and MPs usually pay individuals to join the party and to attend party activities. With 
extremely low opportunity costs, Thai voters are willing to join a political party as a 
member without strong party identification. As a result, the numbers of party members 
are questionable.  
However, party membership has sharply declined since 2007 (Figure 4.6). The 
reasons are at least two fold. First, the dissolution of the TRT and other three small 
parties in May, 2007 caused a sudden loss of more than fourteen million party members. 
Second, in order to guarantee the accuracy of the official membership numbers, the 
Political Party Act of 1999 was revised in August, 2008. According to this revision, party 
membership of citizens that are members of more than one party is invalid. As a result, 
more than 5.6 million party members were disqualified from the ECT’s official record. 
Based on the most recent ECT’s party members records (as of September, 2010), the total 
number of party memberships in Thailand was 4,742,457 (Figure 4.6). However, this 
number is almost two million higher than that in 1998, when party membership was first 
officially recorded by the ECT, approximately 10.5 percent of the total number of Thai 
eligible voters (roughly 45 million). Compared to other democracies in Europe and North 




44Based on the 1997-2001 party membership records, few European countries 
have more than 5 percent of their citizens enrolled as party members (Scarrow and 
Gezgor, 2010: 825). Furthermore, among 27 Western democracies, including Canada, 
only Austria (17.66), Iceland (27.29), and Malta (23.8) have more than 10 percent party 
membership density – percent of party members among the total number of registered 




Thai citizens have gotten increasingly involved in civil society by becoming 
members of civic associations and by joining activities organized by their groups. Figure 
4.7 illustrates data concerning the membership status of Thai people obtained from a 
survey of King Prajadhipok’s Institute between 2002 and 2005. These figures indicate the 
continuing and increasing trend of membership in civic groups of Thai people. Asked 
whether they have been members of any civic groups, approximately one third of the 
people in 2002 said that they were members of at least one group or association. This 
proportion increased to over 40 percent in 2003 and to over 45 percent in 2004, and 
finally rose to over a half of the people in 2005.  
Nevertheless, when considering the data from the 2005 survey in detail, it was 
found that slightly over 60 percent of the respondents held membership status in only one 
group or association, while less than 30 percent were members of two groups or 
associations. Apart from these, less than 10 percent of Thai respondents indicated that 
they were members of three civic groups or associations or more (Table 4.2). Moreover, 
Table 4.3 indicates the frequency in attending the activities of groups or associations of 
which the respondents were members. More than half of the people, or 56 percent, 
participated in the activities of the groups or associations only once in a while (at least 
once a year). Approximately 40 percent of the people participated in those activities quite 
often (at least once a month), and less than 2.5 percent often participated in such 
activities (at least once a week). The proportion of group memberships and frequency of 
participation in civic-group activities among Thai citizens, as obtained from the survey, 




Source: King Prajadhipok’s Institute (2007) 
Figure 4.7: Percent of Thai Citizens Who Are Members of 















Member of Groups/Associations, Classified by the Number of Groups/  
Organizations of Which Thai Respondents Are Members 
 
n = 1,200 
Membership Percentage 
• Membership of groups/ association 52.7 
- Being a member of 1 group/ associations 60.1 
- Being a member of 2 groups/ associations 28.1 
- Being a member of 3 groups/ associations 9.2 
- Being a member of 4 groups/ associations 2.2 
- Being a member of 5 groups/ associations 0.4 
• Nonmembership in any group/ association 47.3 
Total 100.0 







Participation in the Activities of Groups/ Organizations of Which Thai Respondents 
 Are Members, Classified by Frequency of Participation 
 
n = 1,200 
Frequency Percentage 
Often 
(At least once a week) 
2.4 
Quite often 
(At least once a month) 
41.6 
Once in a while  
(At least once a year) 
56.0 
Total 100.00 









1995, 2000; Wuthnow, 2002), Sweden (Rothstien, 2002), and Japan (Park and Shin, 
2005). 
Robert Wuthnow (2002: 68), for instance, shows in the case of the USA that 71 
percent of American citizens in 1994 claimed to be a member of at least one kind of civic 
organization. In Sweden, 92 percent of all Swedish adults in 1992 belonged to at least 
one voluntary organization, and the average membership per person was between 2.9 and 
4 (depending on the measure) (Rothstien, 2002: 299-300). Based on the 2003 
Asianbarometer Survey in Japan,45 approximately two thirds of Japanese adults claimed 
to be a member of civic groups (Park and Shin, 2005: 71), with those surveyed (24.1 
percent) saying that they participated “often” in group meetings or activities, and 32.9 
percent reporting “very often.” Thus, the assembly of Thai citizens conducting public 
activities also requires a great deal of enhancement to be more efficient. 
 
Quality of Political Engagement 
An increase in the number of Thai citizens going to vote, engaging in campaigns 
and nonconventional political activities, and joining parties and voluntary groups alone 
may not be sufficient to conclude that Thailand now has a progressive and meaningful 
political participation. As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, a healthy democracy also 
requires quality political participation, both in individual and institutional terms. More 
specifically, to participate in public affairs, citizens should be actively interested in 
                                                            
 
45The proportion of frequency of participation in group meetings and activities 




politics, have proper participatory knowledge and skills, and believe in their potential to 
bring about change or influence what is going on in politics. This section focuses on 
changing patterns of political interest, knowledge, and efficacy of Thai citizens since 
2001. Data from several national surveys conducted in Thailand during the past decade 
indicate “moderate” levels of political interest, knowledge, and efficacy of Thai citizens. 
More interestingly, most but not all of these levels have changed in a positive direction. 
 
Political Interest 
In this chapter, the political interest of Thai citizens during the past decade is 
observed through two survey questions: (1) how often citizens use news media (i.e., TV, 
radio, and newspapers) to follow what is going on in politics and public affairs; and (2) 
the extent to which citizens are interested in the forthcoming election. Data for the former 
were taken from the national survey reports conducted by Thailand’s National Statistic 
Bureau (NSB) in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2007, while data for the later were obtained from 
CSES 2001, 2005, and 2007.  
For political science scholars, whether the expansion of media use, such as TV 
viewing, is a boon or a curse for public participation is controversial. Robert Putnam 
(1995) claims that the amount of TV viewing was strongly and negatively related to 
social trust, group membership, and voting turnout. In contrast, Pippa Norris (1996; 
2000) argues that it depends. In “Does Television Erode Social Capital? A Reply to 
Putnam,” Norris (1996) found that the relationship between total hours of TV 
consumption and political participation confirmed the thesis that the amount of time 
people spend watching TV was negatively related to all types of participation. In 
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particular, across all of the political participation activities included in her analysis (i.e., 
voting, campaign work, campaign contributions, contacting government officials, 
protesting, being a member of voluntary organizations, and working informally with 
others to solve community problems),  it was found that the more people watched TV, the 
less active they were. Moreover, heavy viewers also proved to be less interested in 
national and local community politics, and were less likely to engage in political 
discussion.  
However, when paying attention to the content of what people were watching, 
Norris found that people who regularly watched the network news were significantly 
more likely to be involved in all types of political activity, and the association between 
watching public affairs programs on TV and civic engagement proved even stronger (p. 
477). Furthermore, in another study conducted by applying campaign panel surveys of 
Britain and America, Norris (2000) asserted that heavily watching TV news caused only 
short-run negative effects on political attitudes (e.g., less interested in politics, mistrust in 
the government, and ill-informed about politics) among British and American citizens. In 
the long run, people who regularly watched TV news in Britain and the US had greater 
than average political interest, knowledge, and efficacy.  
As in most other countries, citizens in Thailand cite TV as their most frequently-
used source of political information, and these number have steadily increased during the 
first half of the last decade before reducing after the political crisis that emerged since 
late 2005. Table 4.4 shows that between 2002 and 2007, more than 60 percent of Thais 

















TV 64.3 82.5 75.5 62.0 
Radio 10.8 13.6 12.3 8.1 
Newspaper 15.3 15.4 16.0 12.7 
     










about one-tenth and one-eighth listen to news on the radio and read newspapers, 
respectively. Moreover, the proportion of the public that regularly watches politics news 
and public affairs programs on TV has increased from 64.7 percent in 2002 to 82.5 in 
2004, before dropping to 75.5 and 62.0 in 2006 and 2007, respectively. Based on Norris’ 
findings, the high proportions of Thai citizens watching political news and public affair 
programs on TV thus does not seem to be harmful to the democratic health of Thai 
society, and may even prove beneficial to its quality of political participation. 
Interest in the election is another indicator that participatory scholars have 
typically used to measure the extent to which citizens are interested in politics (for 
example, on the NES). This section utilizes the CSES’s 10-point scale questions on how 
interested the respondents were in the election, asking respondents to rate their degree of 
interest—ranging from not at all interested (0) to very interested (10). Based on the 2001, 
2005, and 2007 CSES data, the proportions of Thai voters interested in the election were 
relatively high, but in an up-and-down direction.  
Table 4.5 shows that while the rates (mean scores) of those interested in the 
election were approximately 7.5 and higher for all three years, the rate increased from 7.5 
in 2001 to 8.07 in 2005 before dropping to almost the same rate in 2007 (even though the 
voter turnout rate for the 2007 election was higher than that of the previous two; see 
Figure 4.1). The high political interest rates in the 2001 and 2005 elections, for some 
scholars, can be understood as a result of Thailand’s economic crisis in 1997, which 
served as a reminder of the importance of democratic reform and the adoption of good 
governance (Albritton, 2006; Albritton and Thawilwadee, 2005; 2008). The crisis was a 





Interested in the Election 
 
 2001 2005 2007 
Mean 7.50 8.07 7.54 
S.D. 2.39 2.11 1.98 
N (valid) 1,067 1,995 1,628 
    













data, Albritton and Thawilwadee (2006) found, for instance, that 88.9 percent of Thai 
respondents were satisfied with the state of Thai democracy, with those surveyed (54.7 
percent) reporting being “fairly satisfied,” and 34.2 percent reporting being “very 
satisfied.” According to the 2006 ABS data, 93 percent of Thai respondents said that 
“democracy is desirable for our country now,” 88.1 percent agreed that “democracy is 
suitable for our country now,” 89.6 percent viewed that “democracy is effective in 
solving the problems of society,” and 82.6 accepted that “democracy is preferable to all 
other kinds of government” (Chu, Nathan, and Shin, 2008: 21-24). 
Thus, Thai people had placed high interest in the election since they viewed it as a 
way through which they could directly participate in controlling state authorities, as 
Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978) suggest, as well as a way of leading to democracy, as 
Huntington (1991) argues. In contrast, the decline of political interest in the 2007 election 
may be understood as an outcome of the events that had occurred during the 2006-07 
military era and the electoral designation of the 2007 Constitution, which will be 
discussed, together with the level of political knowledge, in the next section. 
 
Political Knowledge 
Political knowledge could indicate the quality of public participation because it 
enhances citizens’ civic capacities—the ability of individuals to see the connections 
between public policy and their own interests, as well as ability to make their voting 
decisions based on sophisticated criteria such as a candidate’s positions on issues (Kahn 
and Kenny, 1999; Bartels, 1996). There are very few survey data that provide information 
regarding Thai citizens’ political knowledge, and question series that regularly ask Thai 
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respondents their knowledge about Thai politics and democracy in general are none. In 
order to evaluate how political knowledge of Thai citizens has changed across 2001 and 
2007, political knowledge in this chapter is measured in terms of knowledge about 
candidates and political parties, ability to name as many as candidates and political 
parties as possible in one’s own electoral district, and to match that candidate to the party 
to which he/she belongs.  
Table 4.6 compares the percentage of citizens who could name at least two 
candidates, two parties, and two correct matches between candidate and party in their 
own district. There is evidence that Thai voters’ ability to name at least two candidates in 
their electoral district in the 2007 election dropped approximately 10 percent compared to 
the 2005 election. At the same time, the ability to name at least two parties and to 
correctly match at least two candidates with one’s party decreased more than 15 percent. 
These findings suggest that although more than half of Thai voters had sufficient 
knowledge about their candidates and/or parties when they went to the polls, there have 
been some institutional obstacles that have made eligible Thais ill-informed.  
As with the decrease in political interest rate, a lower ability to recognize the 
name of the candidate and party of eligible Thais than in the previous two elections can 
be understood as a result of both the political events that occurred during more than a 
year under the military government and the new electoral system set up by the 2007 
Constitution.  
First, the event in which the TRT party of ex-Prime Minister Thaksin was judged 






Knowledge about Electoral Selection Choices (Percent) 
 
 2001 2005 2007 
Name correctly at least 
2 candidates 
74.4 74.5 64.8 
Name correctly at least 
2 parties 
82.9 84.3 67.1 
Match correctly at least 
2 candidates with 
parties 
66.7 69.4 52.6 
N (valid) 1,079 2,000 1,656 
Source: CSES (2001, 2005, 2007) 









appointed by the coup leaders, led 111 big-named politicians to be banned for five years 
from politics. The PPP was established as a proxy of TRT very quickly and shortly before 
the election. About one fourth of PPP’s candidates were rookies who became candidates 
under the great support of those who were banned. 
In addition to changes in the candidates’ and parties’ faces, the new electoral 
system that expanded the size of the electoral district from a one-seat constituency to a 
three-seat maximum, may have led to some problems for eligible voters concerning their 
ability to remember the names of numerous candidates in such a huge district. According 
2007 data, many respondents could identify a given “number” of candidates and/or 
parties, but such identifications have not been counted as knowledge about the candidate 
and/or the party.  
This evidence can also be applied to explaining the high voter turnout rate of the 
2007 election, where what many voters brought to the polls was not the names of 
candidates or parties they wanted to vote for, but the given number, which was the most 
convenient way for all, even those who were seniors or less-educated, to recognize their 
vote choices. For this reason, the decreasing proportions of Thai citizens’ knowledge 
regarding their electoral vote choices in 2007 are not evidence of the low political ability 
of Thai voters. Rather, evidence that approximately two thirds of eligible voters named 
correctly at least two candidates and parties, and more than half of them correctly 
matched at least two candidates with his/her party, can be interpreted as high political 
knowledge given the complicated development of  the political atmosphere and of the 





Political participation through the election process that is a motivation for a good 
political system must be supported by the public’s impression regarding the belief that 
the people must take part in politics and such participation shall lead to change (Nie et al., 
1969). This is because once the people feel that they can achieve what they want through 
the political system, they then have an attitude toward the system. This also leads to 
beliefs, cooperation, acceptance, and expression through the channel opened up by the 
system, including the preservation of the best system ultimately. Therefore, the voting of 
the people should not be carried out just because it is a duty or is enforced by the law—
the people should vote because they feel that they can exert an influence, that they have 
power, or that they have political efficacy to push for the change in the government, 
public policies, or to help the those who they support to be elected and work to represent 
their position. 
 In order to examine the changes in political efficacy of Thai citizens during the 
past decade, this chapter employs four survey questions taken from the 2001, 2005, and 
2007 CSES. As described earlier, in Chapter 1, these questions include both questions 
that reflect internal efficacy, “beliefs about one’s own competence to understand and to 
participate effectively in politics” (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991: 407), and external 
efficacy, the perceived responsiveness of the political system to citizen’s participation 
(see Craig et al., 1990: 289-314; Madsen, 1987: 571-581). Internal efficacy was measured 
by agreement with the statements: (1) “If people like us go to vote, we can change what 
happens in the future;” and (2) “Sometimes I think that I just don’t understand politics.” 
External efficacy was measured by agreement with the statements: (3) “Government 
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officials really do not care what people like you and me think;” and (4) “Common people 
like me don’t have any influence on what goes on in politics.”  
Table 4.7 reports a mixed trend of political efficacy by Thai voters. 
Optimistically, large numbers of Thai citizens expressed relatively high confidence in 
their ability to participate in politics through voting. When asked to evaluate the 
statement, “If people like us go to vote, we can change what happens in the future,” more 
than 70 percent of respondents for all surveys agreed. The percentage of confidence 
extended roughly 9 percent from 72.7 percent in 2001 to slightly more than 80 percent in 
2005 before dropping a little bit by less than 3 percent in 2007. This tendency has tended 
to increases correspondingly with high voter turnout and political interest rates, as 
presented in the above discussions.  
Moreover, even though the confidence of Thai citizens in their ability to 
understand politics has not increased very much, it is high compared to other Asian 
countries. When asked to evaluate the statement, “Sometimes I think that I just don’t 
understand politics,” 62.8 percent of respondents in 2007 agreed. This percentage was 
about the same compared to those in 2001 and 2005: a little more than 3 percent higher 
than those in 2001 and lower than those in 2005 by 2 percent. Conversely, these 
proportions indicate that overall, slightly less than 40 percent of Thai citizens think that 
they can understand politics. These levels of a subjective sense of pride in the power and 
ability of oneself to participate in and understand politics among Thais are relatively 
higher than those of other democracies in the region, such as Japan (16.9 percent), Korea 






Feeling of Political Efficacy (Percent) 
 
 2001 2005 2007 
Internal efficacy    
If people like us go to vote, we 
can change what happens in 







    
Sometimes I think that I just 








    
External efficacy    
Government officials really do 
not care what people like you 







    
Common people like me don’t 
have any influence on what 







Source: CSES (2001, 2005, 2007) 
Note: (  ) = N (valid) 
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Respondents’ attitudes on government officials also tended to improve. When 
asked to evaluate the statement, “Government officials really do not care what people like 
you and me think,” 54.2 percent of respondents in 2001 agreed. This percentage was 
almost the same in 2005 (54.0 percent) but decreased by almost 4 percent in 2007. These 
figures are quite different from those from the established democracies. For example, in 
the US, the proportion of citizens who agree that “most elected officials don’t care what 
people like me think” increased from one-third by the 1960s to nearly two-thirds in 1998 
(Pharr and Putnam, 2000: 9). This pattern of negative assessment can also be found in 
other Western democracies such as Canada and Italy. In Canada, the percentage of 
citizens who said that “the government doesn’t care much what people like me think” 
increased from 45 percent in 1968 to 67 percent in 1993. In Italy, the percentage of 
citizens who agreed that politicians “don’t care what people like me think” swelled from 
68 percent in 1968 to 84 percent in 1997 (Pharr and Putnam, 2000: 9-10). 
Confidence in their ability to influence politics among Thai citizens was low, but 
we can expect an optimistic trend from the responses. When asked to evaluate the 
statement, “Common people like me don’t have any influence on what goes on in 
politics,” slightly less than half of Thai voters in 2001 agreed. This percentage increased 
to roughly 56 percent in 2005 but dropped by almost 9 percent to 47.7 percent in 2007. 
This mixed pattern of Thais’ feeling regarding political efficacy can be understood as a 
consequence of the promulgation of the reformist 1997 Constitution, which increased 
people’s confidence in their ability to participate in politics, particularly through the 
elections that were held frequently during the last decade.  
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A short period of military government after the 2006 coup and a referendum on 
the 2007 drafted constitution are other evidence suggesting that public opinions cannot be 
ignored, even in an authoritarian period. In addition, protest politics, both of the Yellow-
clad and the Red-clad, not only encourages ordinary people to believe in their voices, but 
also makes them better-informed about what is going on in politics through either 
participating in protests (attending protest events or watching such events live on TV)46 
or following news reports about them. As several political knowledge proponents have 
argued, informed persons are better able to discern their own interests and are more likely 
to advocate those interests through political actions (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; 
Popkin and Dimock, 1999; Milner, 2002). Thus, the changing level of Thai citizens’ 
perceived responsiveness of the political system to citizen’s participation (in particular 
between 2005 and 2007) is evidence of gradual improvement rather than backwardness, 
in the quality of public participation in Thailand. 
In summary, this chapter provides evidence of mixed-patterns in the quantity and 
quality of political participation in Thailand during the past decade in several aspects. 
First, Thai citizens have increasingly participated in voting. Moderate numbers of them 
also took part quite often in campaign activities and political contacting, at least for the 
first half of the decade. These patterns accordingly are in line with ebb-and-flow trends of 
party membership and group engagement. Based on results that show large proportions of 
Thai citizens following news on TV and reporting being interested in elections, political 
                                                            
 
46Both the PAD and UDD have their own satellite TV (i.e., PAD’s ASTV and 
UDD’s D Station), have used these channels to communicate with their supporters, and 
have displayed real time protest events when organizing a protest.     
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interest among citizens seems to be relatively high. More than half of Thai voters can 
correctly name at least two candidates and parties as well as match correctly which party 
the candidate belongs to, indicating that Thai electorates have fairly sufficient knowledge 
about their vote choices while showing up at the poll. Together with a moderate level of 
Thai voters’ perceived responsiveness of the political system to citizen’s participation, 
these trends of political interest and knowledge are evidence of gradual increase in the 
quality of citizen participation in Thailand.  
However, changes in the quantity and quality of political participation in Thailand 
during the past decade appeared as ebb and flow trends rather than as constant increases. 
In terms of the country’s democratic development, there are still many areas that require 
considerable attention. Moreover, the quantity and quality of political participation may 
be ineffectual if they produce uneven distribution. In this respect, democracy is better if 
the voices and interests of the people as a whole are concerned. There should be no 
institutional obstacle that undermines political participation among the disadvantaged, 
particularly the young, the poor, the less educated, and many racial and ethnic minorities. 
In the next chapter, the discussion moves forward to an emphasis on equality in political 
participation, seeking to explain changes in the distribution of political participation 
among Thai citizens regarding gender, age, level of income, level of education, and area 






HOW POLITICAL PARTICIPATION HAS CHANGED 
  




Scholars of democratic politics have long focused on political participation, 
aiming to develop and test theories about who participates in politics, with whom, how, 
and why. Much of this work is motivated by a belief that political participation is at the 
heart of democracy (Schlozman, 2002; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995) and that 
participatory inequalities are democratically troublesome (Dalton, 2006; Macedo, et al., 
2005). Influenced by studies in the Western democracies, political behavior research in 
Thailand has been conducted, seeking to find the best answer for the same type of these 
participatory questions. The dominant view claims that females and the young, because 
they have lower participatory resources and skills, are less likely than males or older 
people to participate in politics (Chalermpol, 1996; Thitiyatorn, 1998; Sompis, 2000; 
Suchit and Phonsak, 1979; 1983). Furthermore, people living in rural areas, because they 
are poor and less-educated, are easily mobilized by influential persons and by personal 
benefit, and for this reason they are the most active groups in electoral activities 
(Natpong, 1993; Somchai, 1994; Suchit, 1996; Suchit and Phonsak, 1979; 1983; Wittaya, 
1998). Based on these conventional premises, there should be unequal distribution of 
political participation among Thai citizens with different socioeconomic backgrounds.  
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However, these expectations are confounded by many recent events and 
especially evidence from progress in several political engagement factors—political 
interest, knowledge, and efficacy—as presented in previous chapters of this dissertation. 
In this chapter, I employ the most appropriate and recent survey data (i.e., the ABS 2002 
and 2006) regarding Thai citizens’ political behavior in general and political participation 
in particular to examine specifically whether there is a participatory gap among Thai 
citizens with different gender, age, level of income, level of education, and area of living. 
With constantly collected information about many political activities, including voting, 
campaign activities, political contact, and protesting, the ABS allows us to consider 
political participation and its changing patterns in a broad sense.  
With the help of survey data obtained from the ABS, this chapter tested whether 
(1) females, (2) the young, (3) the poor, (4) the low-educated, and (5) the rural are less 
likely than males, older people, the better-off, the higher-educated, and the urban to 
participate in politics. The survey, conducted two times in Thailand (2002 and 2006), also 
provides us with a great opportunity to examine whether a participatory gap, if it does 
exist, among different demographic groups has smaller since the overall levels of 
participation have increased. In the last section, regression models were utilized to test 
whether these results are strong enough to explain the changing patterns of political 
participation in Thailand during the past decade. Again, as the previous chapter shows an 
ebbs-and-flows trend of political engagement for Thai citizens overall, it was concluded 
that if we need to explain more clearly the changed patterns of political participation 
among different groups in Thailand, a clear understanding about how political 
engagement has changed among these groups is unquestionably required. 
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Socioeconomic Explanations of 
Who Participates in Politics 
Several decades of empirical research have established socioeconomic status 
(SES) as a major determinant of political participation (Leighley, 1995; Schlozman, 
2002). Differences in political resources, such as educational level, income, and 
employment patterns, explain a large part of this gap. The central theme in the developed 
democracies is that higher status individuals, especially the better educated and people 
with higher incomes, are more likely to participate because they have the resources (e.g., 
money and time) and skills (e.g., knowledge and ability to access political information) to 
manipulate their involvement in politics. Thus, the mainstream explanation of the impact 
of socioeconomic status on political participation is that it is not socioeconomic status per 
se that stimulates participation, but socioeconomic status as it relates to skills and 
orientations that directly influence participation (Dalton, 2006).    
However, while the positive association between socioeconomic status and 
political participation seems to obtain across Western democracies, many researchers 
have made clear that political participation in less or young democracies may have a very 
different meaning and, thus, very different demographic contours (Schlozman, 2002: 
442). For example, in some countries such as South Korea during the 1970s (Kim, 
Young-Whan Kihl and Doock-Kyou Chung, 1973), and Estonia during the 1980s (Brady 
and Kaplan 2001), people with higher status (urban residence in the case of South Korea 
and the better educated in the case of Estonia) were less likely than people with lower 
status to participate in elections. Furthermore, recent studies have tended to assert that 
poor citizens in poor countries are not at all less politically active than their richer 
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counterparts: they sometimes participate more and sometimes participate less in some 
political activities.47  
In the case of Thailand, pioneer researchers Suchit Bunbongkarn and Phonsak 
Phongphaew conducted survey research to examine Thai voters’ political behaviors in the 
1979 and 1983 House of Representatives elections. Their findings both confirmed and 
challenged what had been discovered in Western and other developing countries. For 
example, while they expected in line with many American political behavior studies that 
people with higher education are more likely to vote than those with lower education 
(1983), they found, in contrast, that people who have lower income and live in rural area 
are more likely to participate in elections than those who have higher status and live in 
urban areas (1979). The major explanation for this, according to these scholars, goes in 
line with the work of Huntington and Nelson (1976) by concluding that the rural, because 
they are poor and less-educated, are not interested in politics and do not feel efficacious 
politically and are easily mobilized by influenced persons and personal benefits, thereby 
being the most active groups in electoral activities.  
This dominant view, based on several political-behavior studies conducted by 
Suchit and Pornsak, influenced various studies that followed, mainly conducted by their 
graduate students at Chulalongkorn University, which focused on specific electoral 
districts and/or provinces. Examples of those studies include: Natpong Sukvisit (1993), 
who studied the reasons why voters voted in District 1, Nakon Ratchasima province; 
                                                            
 
47See, for example, Booth and Seligson (2008) for the case of eight Latin 
American countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, 
Panama, and Columbia), Krishna (2008) for India, and Moehler (2008) for Uganda. 
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Somchai Tilangkarn (1994), who examined the political behavior and political awareness 
of voters in Hangdong District, Chiangmai province; Wittaya Suwanmas (1998), who 
studied the electoral behaviors of citizens in Manorom District, Chainart province; and 
Chittra Pomchutima (1998), who analyzed the electoral behavior of people in slums. In 
general, all of these studies confirmed the above conclusion made by Suchit and Pornsak.   
Among the demographic and socioeconomic factors used by political behavior 
scholars to explain political participation in Thailand and several democratic contexts, the 
most interesting factors for examination include gender, age, level of income, educational 
level, and rural-urban residence. These variables are used in both bivariate and 
multivariate analyses in order to answer the main research questions of this chapter: Who 
actually participates in Thai politics and how much and why has political participation 
changed among different groups in the past decade? 
 
Participatory Disparities and Changes Among  
Different Groups in Thailand, 2002-2006 
Participatory disparities among different groups are generally observed with no 
exception even for an advanced Western democracy. However, the manner in which such 
disparities have existed is important to be considered. Bivariate analyses of the 2002 and 
2006 ABS data are developed in order to see associations between five demographic or 
socioeconomic factors and political participation, as well as changes in the participatory 
patterns among different groups in Thailand. The measures of political participation rely 
on the respondents’ self-reports of their involvement in a variety of forms of electoral and 
government-directed activities. In each table, the proportion of political activism is the 
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percent of citizens who have been involved in six political activities: (1) voting in 
previous election;48 (2) attending election meetings or rallies; (3) showing support for 
certain political parties or candidates; (4) contacting government officials; (5) contacting 
high level officials; and (6) taking part in demonstrations, marches, or protests. The self-
reported participation rates in each of these six activities for 2002 and 2006, most of 
which have already been discussed in the previous chapter, are shown in Figure 5.1.  
In order to compare the participatory gaps between the least socioeconomically 
disadvantaged and the others, demographic and socioeconomic factors are measured as 
dummy variables for (1) gender (male and female); (2) age (the young, 18-25 year olds 
and the older,  26 year olds and above); (3) level of income (the poor, those who are in 
the lowest income category49— earned $1 per day or lower in 2002 and earned $1.3 per 
day or lower in 2006, and the better-off, those that earned more than $1 a day in 2002 and 
earned more than $1.3 a day in 2006); (4) level of education (the low-educated, those 
who have no formal education or who did not complete primary school, and the higher- 
                                                            
 
48As with all surveys, it should be noted that the percentages for voting in 
previous elections reported in both 2002 and 2006 ABS were greater than the actual 
turnout rates. Asked Thai respondents in 2002, the survey question about voting in 
previous election referred to voting on January 6, 2001, which the actual turnout was 69.8 
percent, approximately twenty-five points lower than reported by the survey. For the 
2006 survey, this question referred to the House of Representatives election on April 2, 
2006, which three major opposition parties boycotted and eventually was declared invalid 
by the Constitutional Court on May 8, 2006. In that invalidated election, 64.77 percent of 
Thai eligible voters showed up at the polling stations. This actual turnout rate was nearly 
23 percent lower than reported by the 2006 survey. 
 
49The 2002 ABS divided the household income of Thai respondents into 5 
quintiles, where the lowest was 0-1,000 Baht or 1 USD per day. As the GDP per capita of 
Thailand increased by approximately 30.3 percent between 2002 and 2006, the lowest 
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educated, those who completed primary school and higher50); and (5) area of living (the 
rural, those who are living in a village or small town, and urban, those who are living in 
the city and a metropolitan area). The proportions of each demographic group are 
summarized and shown in Table 5.1. 
The bivariate analyses of social disparity in participation between these 
dichotomous groups of people are appropriate for examining whether the least 
advantaged Thais can participate in politics equally with the rest of the population. 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier in this dissertation, the period between 2002 and 2006 
in Thailand can be seen as a consolidating time of Thai democracy, beginning when the 
1997 Constitution was promulgated and celebrating the first government elected through 
a new electoral system designed by the Constitution that took power in late February 
2001. If political participation is related to the political context, we should see growing 
trends of political participation among all groups of citizens, and particularly among 
those who usually participate less in the old context, such as females, the young, and the 
urban. As a result, a more equal distribution of political participation between different 
groups should be observed. 
 
Gender Differences in Political Participation 
Gender differences appear in many explanations of political participation. The 
most frequent finding either in established or developing democracies is that men are 
                                                            
 
50Since the six-year primary education in Thailand was compulsory until the end 
of 2002 (after that until now there is nine-year secondary education), people who have 





Thai Respondents in 2002 and 2006 ABS, Divided by Gender, Age, Level of Income, 
Level of Education, and Area of Living (percent) 
 
 2002 
(n = 1,546) 
2006 
(n = 1,546) 
Gender   
Male 48.3 48.3 
Female 51.7 51.7 
Age 
 
Young (18-25 year olds) 15.4 14.0 
Older (26 year olds and above) 84.6 86.0 
Level of income 
 
Poor  




(>$1 per day for 2002, > $1.3 per day in 2006) 
83.8 85.7 
Level of education 
 
Low-educated (< Grade 6) 6.4 4.9 
Higher-educated (> Grade 6 and higher) 93.6 95.1 
Area of living 
 
Rural (village/small town residence) 61.9 63.8 
Urban (city/metropolitan residence) 38.1 36.2 




more politically active than women (Campbell et al., 1960; Christy 1987; Burns, 
Schlozman, and Verba, 2001; Norris, 2002; Desposato and Norrander, 2009). For many 
recent studies, differences in resources, especially education, income, and employment 
patterns, explain a large part of this gap (Miller and J. Merrill, 1996; Burns, Schlozman, 
and Verba, 2001). Nevertheless, with women voting at higher rates than men in the 
developed world, gender differences have faded or even reversed (e.g., Bean, 1991; 
Inglehart, 1990; Inglehard and Norris, 2003).  
Table 5.2 analyzes the political activism proportions of Thai males and females 
during 2002 and 2006. The results indicate that males are a little more active than females 
in participating in political activities, which replicates the patterns we have already seen 
in many recent studies from Thai scholars (see e.g., Chalermpol Mingmuang, 1996, 
Thitiyatorn Pongphan, 1998, and Sompis Klaiwong, 2000). It is evident that females were 
less likely to participate in four of the six political activities than males in 2002.51 Thai 
women were less active than men by almost 9 percent in attending campaign meetings or 
rallies, by more than 10 percent in contacting government officials, by 4.5 percent in 
contacting officials at a higher level, and by nearly 2 percent in taking part in 
demonstrations, marches, or protests. However, the gender difference in participation 
declined, and remained statistically significant, for only one activity—attending 
campaign meetings or rallies in 2006. This finding confirms that while the participatory 




51The proportions of females participating in the other two activities were also 




Differences in Political Activism between Males and Females, 2002-2006 (percent) 
Activities Year Male Female +/- Sig. 
Voting      
Voting in previous election 2002 94.9 94.7 0.2 
2006 87.5 87.4 0.1 
Campaign 
Attending meeting/rally 2002 55.0 46.4 8.6 *** 
2006 25.7 21.8 3.9 * 
Showing support to party/candidate 2002 3.9 2.9 1.0 
2006 5.6 4.6 1.0 
Having participated in at least one 2002 56.1 47.7 8.4 *** 
campaign activity 2006 27.2 23.6 3.6 
Political Contact 
Contacting high level officials 2002 14.8 10.3 4.5 *** 
2006 11.1 9.5 1.6 
Contacting government officials 2002 42.0 31.3 10.7 *** 
2006 61.0 58.9 2.1 
Having had at least one political contact 2002 43.9 31.9 12.0 *** 
2006 61.8 59.6 2.2 
Protesting 
Taking part in protest activity 2002 6.7 4.8 1.9 * 
2006 3.2 3.1 0.1 
Having participated in at least one 2002 73.6 61.0 12.6 *** 
activity (excluding voting) 2006 69.3 66.6 2.7 
Source: ABS 2002; 2006  
 
+/- percent difference between females and males 
*, **, *** difference between females and males is statistically significant at 0.1, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels respectively.  
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gap has appeared to decline. Moreover, while percent of male participating in at least one 
political activity declined, this percent increased for females. 
 
The Young and Political Participation 
Does the young generation participate less in politics than the older generation? 
For some scholars, the trend of a decline in young citizens taking part in campaign 
activities and joining political parties, as has appeared in many countries over the past 
decades (while remaining stable among older people), mirrors the less attention that the 
new generation has paid to politics and is a bad sign for the future of our democracy 
(Putnam, 2000; Niemi and Weisberg, 2001; Blais et al., 2004; Wattenberg, 2008). For 
many others, this trend is not proof that the young citizens are not active or interested in 
politics per se. Instead, there is evidence that young citizens, aided by the Internet, are 
matching their older generations in the public expression of their civic voices (Norris, 
2002; Zukin et al., 2006; Loader, 2007). Recent studies also indicate that while young 
citizens are less likely to participate in traditional forms of political activities, they 
engage heavily in many other forms of civic activities (Vogelgesang and Astin, 2005; 
Shea and Green, 2007), as well as in single issue movements and networks (Della Porta 
and Mosca, 2005; Norris, 2002).  
Participatory differences between the youngest cohort (i.e., 18-25 years old) of 
Thai voters and the rest of the electorate partly explains the more active participation in 
protest activism of the young and the electoral and political contact activities of the 
elderly. Table 5.3 shows that in 2002, while the young Thais were less likely than the 




Differences in Political Activism between the Young and the Older, 2002-2006 (percent) 
Activities Year Young Older +/- Sig. 
Voting      
Voting in previous election 2002 90.3 95.5 -5.2 *** 
2006 86.1 87.7 -1.6 
Campaign 
Attending meeting/rally 2002 46.0 51.5 -5.5 
2006 19.4 24.5 -5.1 
Showing support to party/candidate 2002 3.0 3.4 -0.4 
2006 4.2 5.3 -1.1 
Having participated in at least one 2002 46.8 52.8 -6.0 * 
campaign activity 2006 21.3 26.1 -4.8 
Political Contact 
Contacting high level officials 2002 8.9 13.1 -4.2 * 
2006 10.2 10.1 0.1 
Contacting government officials 2002 35.2 36.9 -1.7 
2006 56.5 60.4 -3.9 
Having had at least one political 2002 36.7 38.0 -1.3 
2006 57.9 61.1 -3.2 
Protesting 
Taking part in protest activity 2002 8.9 5.2 3.7 ** 
2006 3.2 3.1 0.1 
Having participated in at least one 2002 67.5 67.2 0.3 
activity (excluding voting) 2006 65.3 68.3 -3.0 
Source: ABS 2002; 2006  
 
+/- percent difference between the young and the older 
*, **, *** difference between the young and the older is statistically significant at 0.1, 





voting, by 6 percent for engaging in any one of the two electoral activities, and by 4.2 
percent in contacting high level officials), they were more active in protest activism by 
almost 4 percent than their elder counterparts. Based on the 2002 data, as the overall 
political participation rates (measured by percent of having participated in at least one of 
the five political activities) of the young (67.5 percent) and the older (67.2 percent) were 
almost equal, it is evident that the youngest Thais were not participating in politics less 
but in a different way than previous generations. 
 The participatory patterns in which the young are less active than older persons in 
voting, campaigns, and political contacting activities but are more active in protest 
activities could be seen in 2006. However, generation disparities in participation for 
many activities, such as voting, attending campaign meetings/rallies, contacting high 
level officials, and protesting, have reduced, with the proportions of participation by the 
older slightly higher than the young (except protest activism). According to the 2006 
survey, the proportions of the young and the older taking part in demonstrations and 
protests seemed to be equal, with the young participating more often than the older by 
only 0.1 percent. The less diminishing numbers of the older than the young reflect a 
months-long protesting style used by the Thai protesters since early 2006. Such a style of 
protestation provides a great opportunity for various groups of people to join the protest 
events. It is a fact that in the months-long protests, either held by the Yellow Shirts or the 
Red Shirts, during a week day the majority of the protesters during a day time were 
seniors, while their young cohorts and mid-aged working citizens joined the protest in the 
evening. The protests peaked on Friday nights and during the weekends. Moreover, none 
of the participatory gaps between the young and the older for all six activities was 
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statistically significant, which indicates no participatory gap in most political activities 
between the young and the older. 
 
Political Participation of the Poor, the Low-educated, and the Rural 
Previous studies in Thailand indicated that rural voters, most of whom have a low 
level of education and are poor, because they are easily mobilized by local leaders or 
influential government officials or politicians, are more likely to participate in voting and 
campaign activities than the better-off (see for example Suchit Bunbongkarn and Pornsak 
Phongphaew, 1984, Suchit Bunbongkarn, 1996). According to this premise, scholars 
would expect to see in the case of Thailand more politically active particularly in voting 
and campaign activities of those who are poor, have a low level of education, and live in 
rural areas than those who are richer, have a higher degree of education, and live in urban 
areas. Furthermore, as in many other developing countries/regions, such as India (Byres, 
1995; Omvedt, 1993) and in Latin America (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992; Veltmeyer, 
1997), the poor in Thailand since the 1990s have tended to be more engaged in 
unconventional activities such as demonstrations and protests than they were in the past 
(Prapart Pintobtang, 1997; Parinya Nualpian, 2000; Missingham, 2003). According to the 
prior studies, a growing trend of protest activism among the poor would be expected.  
However, many changes have occurred in Thai politics in the past decade, 
particularly the opened political-space provided by the 1997 Constitution, the new style 
of political campaigns, in which practical public policy is the most effective strategy by 
which to attract voters through a variety of uses of media and advertisement, utilized by 
PM Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai Party, and the new roles of high-technology media, 
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especially those that have been used by the protest leaders (e.g., websites and satellite 
TV). These changes of political context, in combination, may affect and change the 
characteristics of individual voters—their perceptions and understanding of democracy, 
their assessments of political systems, and their political behaviors. My examination of 
the differences in political activism between the least socioeconomically advantaged 
groups (the poor, the low-educated, and rural) and their more advantaged counterparts 
(the better-off, the higher-educated, and the urban) provides findings that both support 
and challenge the aforementioned scholars’ expectations.  
Table 5.4 presents information about the participatory disparity in political 
activities between the poor and better-off Thais in 2002 and 2006. It is evident that in 
2002, the poor were more likely to participate in two campaign activities than the 
affluent. As resource-based theorists generally expect more active in political activity of 
people with higher income, the poor also reported less active in engaging with political 
contact activities than the affluent. For 2002, the lower-income Thais were less likely 
than the better-off to contact government officials or high level officials by nearly 6 
percent and little more than 4 percent, respectively. Nevertheless (and surprisingly), the 
turnout rate and proportions of participation in protest activities of the poor were slightly 
lower than those of the better-off in 2002, although neither of those participatory 
differences was statistically significant.  
While the participatory patterns between Thai citizens with different levels of 
income in 2002 seemed not to be much different from what previous Thai scholars have 





Differences in Political Activism between the Poor and the Better-off, 2002-2006 
(percent) 
Activities Year Poor Better-off +/- Sig. 
Voting      
Voting in previous election 2002 93.2 95.2 -2.0 
 2006 79.2 88.8 -9.6 *** 
Campaign      
Attending meeting/rally 2002 58.2 49.1 9.1 *** 
 2006 20.8 24.2 -3.4 
Showing support to party/candidate 2002 6.4 2.7 3.7 *** 
 2006 3.2 5.4 -2.2 
Having participated in at least one 2002 60.2 50.2 10.0 *** 
campaign activity 2006 21.7 26.0 -4.3 
Political Contact      
Contacting high level officials 2002 8.8 13.1 -4.3 * 
 2006 10.9 10.2 0.7 
Contacting government officials 2002 31.7 37.5 -5.8 * 
 2006 62.9 59.4 3.5 
Having had at least one political contact 2002 33.6 38.6 -5.0 
 2006 64.3 60.1 4.2 
Protesting      
Taking part in protest activity 2002 5.6 5.7 -0.1 
 2006 5.0 2.9 2.1 * 
Having participated in at least one 2002 72.4 66.2 6.2 ** 
activity (excluding voting) 2006 71.5 67.3 4.2 
Source: ABS 2002; 2006  
 
+/- percent difference between the poor and the better-off  
*, **, *** difference between the poor and the better-off is statistically significant at 0.1, 




First, it is evident that in 2006, the better-off were more likely than the poor to 
vote in an election: the better-off reported almost a 10 percent higher voting rate than the 
poor in the previous election, with participatory differences statistically significant at 
0.01.  
Secondly, the proportions of better-off reporting participation in campaign 
activities also were higher than those of the poor in terms of both attending campaign 
meetings/rallies and showing support for parties/candidates.  
Thirdly, in 2006, the poor tended to be more active than the richer in terms of 
political contacts and protesting activities; only income differences in protest activism 
were statistically significant.  
Finally, though the poor still were more active in overall political activities than 
the affluent, the income difference in participation was smaller and inconsistent for 
2006—the richer Thais participated in at least one of the five political activities 
(excluding voting) less than the poor by slightly more than 6 percent in 2002, compared 
to around 4.2 percent in 2006. 
The participatory gap between the low-educated and the higher-educated Thais 
confirms many studies in the well-established democracies, especially those that claimed 
the greater politically active of the higher-educated than of the lower educated 
(Schlozman, Verba, and Brady, 1999; Dalton, 2006). Table 5.5 shows that the low-
educated Thais were less likely to vote in the 2006 election than their higher-educated 
counterparts. The proportions of the low-educated participating in almost all campaign 
activities were lower than the higher-educated for both 2002 and 2006. But the 











Voting      
Voting in previous election 2002 93.9 94.9 -1.0 
2006 80.0 87.7 -7.7 * 
Campaign      
Attending meeting/rally 2002 42.4 51.3 -8.9 * 
2006 20.0 23.9 -3.9 
Showing support to party/candidate 2002 4.0 3.3 0.7 
2006 1.3 5.3 -4.0 
Having participated in at least one 2002 44.4 52.5 -8.1 
campaign activity 2006 21.3 25.6 -4.3 
Political Contact      
Contacting high level officials 2002 6.1 12.9 -6.8 * 
2006 5.3 10.5 -5.2 
Contacting government officials 2002 26.3 37.1 -10.8 ** 
2006 48.0 60.5 -12.5 ** 
Having had at least one political contact 2002 26.3 38.4 -12.1 ** 
 2006 48.0 61.3 -13.3 ** 
Protesting      
Taking part in protest activity 2002 6.1 5.7 0.4 
2006 5.3 3.1 2.2 
Having participated in at least one 2002 58.2 67.8 -9.6 ** 
activity (excluding voting) 2006 56.0 68.5 -12.5 ** 
Source: ABS 2002; 2006  
 
+/- percent difference between the low-educated and the higher-educated 
*, **, *** difference between the low-educated and the higher-educated is statistically 
significant at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. 
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for attending campaign meetings/rallies in 2002, tended to be smaller (except for showing 
support for party/candidate). Participatory differences in political contact activities 
between the low-educated and the higher-educated were high and tended to increase. 
Educational disparities in protest activism for both 2002 and 2006 were not statistically 
significant, and unlike other kinds of political activities, the low-educated reported 
slightly higher proportions of experience in demonstrations or protests than the higher-
educated. 
Apart from income and educational differences in political participation, Table 
5.6 presents the differences in political activism between the rural and the urban, both 
confirming and challenging what previous studies in Thailand have suggested about the 
more politically-active rural in voting and campaign activities. It is evident that for 2002, 
not only were the rural more likely to vote in the previous election, attend campaign 
meetings/rallies, and show support for party/candidate, but also they also were more 
active in terms of political contacts and protest activities than were the urban. In total, the 
rural in 2002 participated more in at least one of the five political activities (excluding 
voting) than the urban by more than 13 percent. However, these disparity patterns faded 
or even reversed in some political activities for 2006.  
In 2006, area-of-living differences in voting participation were not statistically 
significant, with the proportions of rural people voting in elections at 0.2 percent higher 
than the urban. Moreover (and most surprisingly), the proportions of the urban 
participating in the two campaign activities were higher than the rural, with the 
differences between these two groups statistically significant at .01 for participation by 




Differences in Political Activism between the Rural and the Urban, 2002-2006 (percent) 
Activities Year Rural Urban +/- Sig. 
Voting      
Voting in previous election 2002 95.5 93.4 2.1 * 
2006 87.5 87.3 0.2 
Campaign      
Attending meeting/rally 2002 57.1 40.2 16.9 *** 
2006 22.8 25.2 -2.4 
Showing support to party/candidate 2002 4.5 1.4 3.1 *** 
2006 3.8 7.5 -3.7 *** 
Having participated in at least one 2002 58.4 41.2 17.2 *** 
campaign activity 2006 24.4 27.0 -2.6 
Political Contact      
Contacting high level officials 2002 13.8 10.0 3.8 ** 
2006 8.2 13.9 -5.7 *** 
Contacting government officials 2002 38.9 32.4 6.5 ** 
2006 60.5 58.8 1.7 
Having had at least one political contact 2002 39.9 33.8 6.1 ** 
 2006 61.4 59.5 1.9 
Protesting      
Taking part in protest activity 2002 7.3 3.1 4.2 *** 
2006 2.8 3.8 -1.0 
Having participated in at least one 2002 72.2 58.7 13.5 *** 
activity (excluding voting) 2006 68.2 67.5 0.7 
Source: ABS 2002; 2006  
 
+/- percent difference between the rural and the urban 
*, **, *** difference between the rural and the urban was statistically significant at 0.1, 





The rural still reported more often contacting government officials than the urban, 
but this gap was not statistically significant. In contrast to the result in 2002, the rural 
were less likely than urban people by more than 5 percent to contact officials at a high 
level. The proportion of the rural taken part in protest activities dropped by 4.5 percent 
compared to 2002, and this percentage was less than the urban group, although this gap 
was not statistically significant.  
According to the above findings, participation gaps between people with different 
geographic and socioeconomic backgrounds still exist. However, those gaps are small 
compared to what previous Thai scholars have argued and tended to be not statistically 
significant for the year 2006. A decline in the demographic and socioeconomic gap in 
participation between the socioeconomically disadvantaged and the rest of the population 
during the past decade is convincing evidence of a more equal distribution of political 
participation among Thais, although the overall participatory gap between the low-
educated and the higher-educated still exists and has enlarged. The growing levels of 
participation among many groups, especially females, also are reasonable results to 
explain why overall levels of participation in the last decade have expanded.  
However, while this is an important result, it leaves many questions untested. For 
example, why have the levels of participation among different groups changed? Do the 
participatory disparities among Thai citizens exist only because they have unequal 
resources and skills stemming from differences in demographic and socioeconomic 
status? What are the factors that have caused the expanding trend of political participation 
in Thailand? And more specifically, and perhaps most importantly, because overall 
political participation and engagement have changed in a consistent trend, are political 
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engagement factors such as political interest and efficacy good explanations for the 
changing patterns of participation among different groups? Aiming to offer some 
preliminary answers to these questions, the next section discusses: (1) what each 
socioeconomic factor can explain about political participation while controlling for the 
other variables; (2) whether the causal relationships between each socioeconomic factor 
and political participation actually exist while controlling for other potentially 
engagement and mobilization factors; and (3) why we need to understand more clearly 
the change patterns of political engagement in order to explain the changes in citizens’ 
participatory patterns. 
   
Multivariate Models of Changes in Political Participation 
Two regression models of political participation were developed for the present 
study using the 2002 ABS data. The first model, the socioeconomic model of political 
participation, was created to test the hypothesis concerning the way in which participation 
is influenced and the extent to which resources and skills from demographic and 
socioeconomic status play a role in this influence. The dependent variable, political 
participation, is now measured as an index variable, created from the same set of six 
political activity questions used in the previous section’s bivariate analyses (voting in 
previous election, attending election meetings or rallies, showing support for certain 
political parties or candidates, contacting government officials, contacting high level 
officials, and taking part in demonstrations, marches, or protests). One point was given 
for each activity in which the respondents reported they had taken part. The political 
participation index runs from 0 to 6, with positive values indicating a higher level of 
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political activism; as a result, the ordinary least squares (OLS) model was more 
appropriate to be applied in the analysis of political activism than the multinomial 
regression, which was used to predict the probabilities of the different possible outcomes 
of a categorically distributed dependent variable. Cronbach alpha for this index was 0.41.  
Based on prior literature investigating the Thai context, five demographic and 
socioeconomic variables that measure individual-level resources were included in this 
model. These variables are: (1) gender, a binary 0-1 variable, which takes the value 1 for 
females and 0 for males; (2) a continuous measure of age; (3) a 5-point scale measure of 
income, which takes the value 4 for the highest income category (earn 1,200 USD per 
month and over) and 0 for the lowest one (earn 30 USD a month), with positive values 
indicating a higher level of monthly income; (4) a 4-point scale of education, which takes 
the value 3 for having a university degree or higher and 0 for incomplete primary school 
and lower, with positive values indicating a higher level of education; and (5) a dummy 
variable for urban residents, which takes the value 1 for city/metropolis residents and 0 
for village/small town residents. Because the year 2002 was only a year after the first 
House of Representatives election under the new electoral system designed by the 1997 
Constitution, results that were not much different for  the conventional premises about 
political participation in Thailand were expected—more politically active among citizens 
who were male, elderly, and rural residents.  
Model 1 in Table 5.7 shows the associations between three of the five 
demographic and socioeconomic status variables and political participation. Education is 
significantly and positively related to political participation, while female and urban 




Multivariate Models of Political Participation Index, 2002 












Female -.120*** .053 -.086*** .052 
Age .020 .002 -.003 .002 
Income .009 .027 .008 .027 
Education .128*** .043 .074** .042 























N 1,516 1,440 
Adjusted R2 .055 .165 
F-value 18.612 27.198 
Model-significance *** .*** 
Source: ABS 2002; 2006  




standardized regression coefficients, among these three demographic and socioeconomic 
status variables, urban residents had the largest impact on political participation, followed 
by education and females. As many aforementioned studies in Thailand have concluded, 
these results suggest that the individuals participating in political activities in Thailand 
are the rural, the higher-educated, and males. However, R2 was only 0.055, indicating that 
a small part of the variation in the political participation index was accounted for by the 
variables considered in this model. Other independent variables thus need to be 
considered. 
 The second multivariate model for the 2002 data was then developed to test 
whether the demographic and socioeconomic status factors had a powerful effect on 
political participation. First, a series of political engagement factors that would induce 
individual citizens to become involved in politics were added into the model, including 
(1) two separate variables for political interest, and (2) two separate variables for 
political efficacy. These variables were measured as follows.  
The first political interest variable was measured in terms of citizens’ self-reports 
on how much they were interested in politics. The variable ranged from 0 to 10, with 
positive values indicating a higher level of interest.  
The second political interest variable, which was labeled following news (about 
politics), was measured by individuals’ response to a 5-points scale question, asking the 
respondents how often they followed news about politics and the government. The 
variable ranged from 0, “practically never,” to 4, “every day,” with positive values 
indicating more frequency of political news consumption.  
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Political interest typically is a strong predictor of most types of political activities 
(Milbrath and Goel 1977; Rahn, 2002; Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1978; Verba, Schlozman, 
and Brady, 1995). Thus, we should expect to see positive coefficients for both of these 
two political-interest factors. 
Two separate political efficacy variables were created using two questions from 
the ABS:52 a question on whether the respondents thought: “I think I have the ability to 
participate in politics,” and another question on whether the respondents believed the 
following: “Sometimes politics and the government seems so complicated that a person 
like me can’t really understand what is going on.” For both questions, respondents were 
asked to place themselves on the following scales: strongly agree (scored 1), agree 
(scored 2), disagree (scored 3), and strongly disagree (scored 4). This scale was inverted 
in the analysis for the first question. Political engagement typically facilitates greater 
participation, so positive coefficients for all of these factors were expected. 
The model also controls for other potentially mobilization factors that have been 
related to political participation—party attachment and group membership. Party 
attachment variable was constructed based on two questions in the survey: a question 
asking the respondents whether they think of themselves as close to any particular party; 
group membership variable was a dummy variable for a question asking the respondents: 
“Are you a member of any organization or formal groups?” A response of “no” to this 
question was coded 0 and a “yes” was coded 1. Since a vibrant political activism usually 
                                                            
 
52 The 2002 ABS did not include any other political efficacy question. Using these 
two questions thus can test only the impact of internal efficacy on political participation 
of Thai citizens.  
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depends on vibrant engagement in political and nonpolitical organizations, positive 
coefficients for both of these two mobilization factors were expected.  
When these psychological and mobilization variables were added within the 
regression analysis, R2 improved. Female, education, and urban resident factors remained 
significant, with females and urban residents negatively associated with political 
participation, while education was positively associated with political participation. 
Based on the standardized coefficients, urban residents lost their largest-positioned 
impact on participation in party attachment. Though they did not have the smallest impact 
on participation, both females and education were in the last three positions. On the other 
hand, all four political engagements and both mobilization factors were significantly 
associated with the higher political participation index.  
In short, although when controlling for these variables did not eliminate the 
significance of all demographic and socioeconomic status variables, these results indicate 
that it was not only the rural-urban dichotomized factor that has a powerful effect on 
political participation in 2002, but it was also political engagement and other mobilization 
factors, especially party attachment and group membership, that mattered. 
It is now fairly clear who participates in Thai politics, at least in the year 2002. 
We also learned that Thai citizens participate differently in politics, not only because they 
have the different resources and skills to do so, but also because they have different 
psychological mobilization for participation and perhaps are mobilized by being members 
of social groups to take part in political activities. Nevertheless, this understanding shows 
very little difference from that found by previous scholars of Thai politics.  
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In order to examine the change patterns of political participation in greater detail, 
two regression models of political participation were developed, now using the 2006 ABS 
data. In doing this, similar types of survey questions were taken from the 2006 ABS to 
construct the dependent and independent variables, which were measured in the same 
way as the multivariate analysis for the 2002 data. Like the analysis of 2002, political 
participation for 2006 was an additive index of six political activities: (1) voting in 
previous election; (2) attending election meetings or rallies; (3) showing support for 
certain political parties or candidates; (4) contacting government officials; (5) contacting 
high level officials; and (6) taking part in demonstrations, marches, or protests. One point 
was given for each act; the scale runs from 0 to 6 (Cronbach alpha = 0.36).  
Five demographic and socioeconomic variables were included in both regression 
models of 2006. These variables are: (1) gender (female = 1); (2) age (years); (3) income 
(5-point scale (4) education (4-point scale); and (5) urban residence (city/metropolis 
residence = 1). Model 2 controls for four political engagements and two mobilization 
factors—interest (a 10-point scale), follow news (5-point scale), efficacy: participation (4-
point scale), efficacy: understand (4-point scale), party attachment (3-point scale), and 
group membership (yes = 1).  
In these multivariate models of participation for the 2006 data, the following was 
expected: (1) no (or at least, less) association (s) between those demographic and 
socioeconomic factors that showed a significant effect on participation in the analysis of 
2002 and political participation; and (2) significant relationships between all political 




Model 1 in Table 5.8 shows that two of the three demographic variables that were 
significantly associated with participation in the analysis of the 2002 data do not matter 
for 2006. Yet education still matters and has a slightly larger impact on political 
participation. This result confirms what myriad studies have reported about the positive 
correlations between education and political participation (Rosenstone and Hansen, 2003; 
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980).53 In contrast to 
Model 1 in the analysis of the 2002 data, associations between demographic and 
socioeconomic status factors and political participation of age and income, both variables 
those were not significantly related to political participation for 2006, instead exist. 
The causal effects of these variables (age and income) on participation remain 
significant and positive and had a larger impact on political participation even after 
controlling for other attitudinal and mobilization factors (Model 2). This result illustrates 
a fairly different picture of political participation from that explained by the 
aforementioned scholars in the Thai context, and also from what was learned from the 
2002 data. However, and interestingly, it shows quite a similar pattern to that of citizens 
in the advanced Western democracies: more politically active citizens who are more 




53For this group of scholars, the positive relationship between education and 
political participation typically is interpreted to mean that education confers participation-
enhancing benefits, rather than having a direct impact on political activism. As 
Rosenstone and Hansen (2003: 77) have concluded, “education promotes participation in 
two ways: by giving people knowledge and skills that facilitate participation and by 
placing people in social networks that inform them about politics and reward political 
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Demographic     
Female -.039 .053 -.002 .054 
Age .056* .002 .087*** .002 
Income .170*** .027 .178*** .028 
Education .134*** .043 .116*** .044 
Urban residence -.035 .061 -.013 .061 
Political Engagement     
Interest   .130*** .045 
Follow News   .061* .033 
Can participate in politics   .112*** .036 
Can understand politics   .046* .042 
Mobilization     
Party Attachment   .055** .037 
Group Membership   .063** .064 
N 1,374 1,240 
Adjusted R2 .054 .121 
F-value 16.581 15.328 
Model-significance *** *** 
Source: ABS 2002; 2006  




In Model 2, all political engagement factors proved significant and in the direction 
as expected, although none of them had a larger impact on political participation than 
income. The standardized regression coefficients for these variables were not very 
different from those in the same analysis of 2002; all variables had a positive impact on 
political participation, indicating that the model of political engagement works very well 
as an explanation of political participation for both contexts. Apart from socioeconomic 
and political engagement factors, party attachment and group membership were 
significantly and positively related to political participation, but each participatory impact 
was smaller compared to the results obtained from the analysis of 2002.  
Overall, the results that showed different impacts of demographic and socio-
economic variables on the political participation index between the multivariate models 
of 2002 and of 2006 could possibly be interpreted to mean that political participation 
among several groups has changed. Placing the years 2002 as the early period of 
democratic consolidation, we have seen that the participatory patterns among different 
demographic groups of people in 2002 were not very much different from those that 
found by prior scholars in the old political contexts of Thailand. The most politically-
active groups were almost the same groups as suggested by conventional wisdom, that is, 
males, the rural, and the higher-educated (according to the socioeconomic model of 
participation, Model 1). As a result of political change in Thai democracy between 2002 
and 2006, we then found, however, that females and the urban do not participate in 
politics any less than their male counterparts. Moreover, the most politically active group 
in 2006 was the affluent. These results indicating greater political activity than in the past 
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of females, the urban, and the affluent challenge what past scholars have concluded about 
political behavior in Thailand. 
While this finding is good evidence that participatory patterns among groups of 
Thai citizens have changed, many interesting and crucial puzzles for understanding the 
participation of different groups have not been answered. For example, is this really 
evidence of increase of participation by females, the urban, and the affluent? Or, is it, 
rather, decrease of participation by males, the rural, and the poor?  
Moreover, since the result was obtained from the multivariate models that 
consider participation as an index (a combination of several kinds of political actions), it 
cannot explain: where did the large increases in participation of urban residents and the 
rich in 2006 (if this is the case) come from? Are most of those changes driven by specific 
activities, such as voting or protesting? Indeed, we should not expect that a predictor that 
is significantly associated with one type of political participation will also be significantly 
related to all, or even other, types of participation (Leighley, 1995: 188; Holzner, 2010: 
186). The examination of the factors that foster each kind of political action is thus 
important and required. 
 
Socioeconomic Status, Political Engagement, Mobilization Factors  
and the Four Types of Political Activities 
As we have seen from the bivariate analyses in the first section of this chapter, 
changes in political participation are not uniform across acts, political participation 
models of the two separate years (2002 and 2006) for voting, campaign activities, 
political contacting, and protesting were thus developed. The major attempts are: (1) to 
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test which factors cause each kind of these four activities; (2) and to examine whether 
(and perhaps how much) such causal relationships are different between the two contexts.  
Using logistic regression analysis for the 2002 data, Table 5.9 presents the results 
of a comparison between socioeconomic, political engagement, and mobilization factors54 
and participation in four different kinds of political acts, each of which is measured as a 
binary 0-1 variable. Voting was measured by voting in the previous election question: 
coded 1 for response “yes” and 0 for “no.” Campaign activities was measured by two 
electoral activism questions, attending election meetings or rallies and showing support 
for certain political parties or candidates: coded 1 for a response of “yes” to either of 
these acts and 0 for a response of “no” to neither. Political contact was measured by two 
contacting questions, contacting government officials and contacting high level officials: 
coded 1 for a response of “yes” to either of these acts and 0 for a response “no” to 
neither. Protesting was measured by the taking part in demonstrations or protests 
question: coded 1 for a response of “yes” and 0 for “no.”   
The findings show that when controlling for political engagement and 
mobilization factors, none of the demographic and socioeconomic factors has an impact 
on voting in 2002 (Table 5.9). Only one political engagement factor (can participate in 
politics) was positively associated with voting. This indicates that Thai citizens who are  
                                                            
 
54These independent variables are the same set of variables used in the regression 
models of the political participation index, including: five demographic and 
socioeconomic variables of gender (female = 1), age (years), income (5-points scale), 
education (4-points scale), and urban residence (city/metropolis residence = 1); four 
political engagement variables of interest (a 10-point scale), follow news (5-point scale), 
efficacy: participation (4-point scale), efficacy: understand (4-point scale); and two 





Political Participation Models for Voting, Campaign Activities, Political Contacting, and Protesting, 2002 
 Voting Campaign activities Political contacting Protesting 
 B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
Demographic             
Female .027 .240  -.219 .114 * -.421 .114 *** -.338 .244  
Age .006 .009  -.004 .004  -.001 .004  -.022 .010 ** 
Income .034 .120  -.124 .059 * .054 .059  .204 .123 * 
Education -.064 .194  -.148 .094  .412 .094 *** -.147 .201 . 
Urban residence -.343 .288  -.348 .138 ** -.353 .143 ** -.739 .331 ** 
Political Engagement             
Interest .112 .186  .309 .091 *** .051 .091  .254 .197  
Follow News .143 .117  .211 .060 *** .049 .061  -.071 .133  
Can participate in politics .454 .136 *** .325 .074 *** .072 .074  .183 .161  
Can understand politics .137 .164  .143 .076 * .145 .075 * .607 .139 *** 
Mobilization             
Party Attachment .068 .167  .321 .075 *** .435 .073 *** .441 .132 *** 
Group Membership .234 .399  .442 .173 ** .351 .164 ** .864 .263 *** 
Constant 1.10 .651 * -1.381 .342 *** -1.581 .340 *** -3.488 .716 *** 
N 1,466 1,466 1,466 1,466 
Nagelkerke R2 0.042 0.164 .112 .142 
Chi-square 21.253 191.917 125.686 75.134 
Model-significance ** *** *** *** 
Source: ABS 2002 





more likely to believe that they have the ability to participate in politics, regardless of 
whatever socioeconomic backgrounds they have, are more likely to vote in a national 
election. Nagelkerke R2 was only 0.04, however, indicating that a small proportion of the 
variance in voting outcome was accounted for by the factors considered in this analysis. 
One reason might be adapted from what the classic work of Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978: 
120) concluded about voting—that it is an “easy” act requiring few resources and 
motivation—anyone can vote, so that it is difficult to tell whether or not socioeconomic 
status, political engagement, or institutional affiliation are necessary conditions for 
voting. Another reason is perhaps the over-reported proportions of voter turnout received 
by the 2002 survey, which was 94.7 percent compared to only 69.8 percent actual turnout 
in the 2001 election. 
Gender, income, and area of residence were significantly and negatively related to 
campaign activities, suggesting that Thai respondents who are male, earn a lower level of 
income, and are rural residents are more likely to participate in at least one campaign 
activity than the rest of the population. All political engagement and mobilization factors 
were significant and had a positive impact on campaign activities, confirming that 
electoral activity depends not only on psychological factors but also on mobilization 
factors. On the one hand, it is evident that political engagement increases the electoral 
participation of Thai voters. Thai citizens who are more interested in politics as well as 
those who feel more efficacious about themselves in terms of participating in and 
understanding politics are more likely than the average to take part in campaign activities. 
On the other hand, people who feel close to any particular party and are members of any 
voluntary groups are more likely to be active in at least one campaign activity than the 
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rest of the population. While the prior provides evidence that is typically found in many 
advanced democracies, the latter might be indirect evidence indicating that clientelism 
continued to structure patterns of electoral participation in Thailand for 2002 (particularly 
if considering this together with the participatory patterns of different demographic 
groups which indicate the greater activism of the rural and the lower-income groups).  
Although the main purpose of people making political contact and protesting is to 
have a direct influence on the government personnel’s decisions, participatory patterns 
among different groups in Thailand are quite different. The results show that males and 
people with a higher level of education are more active than the remainder in political 
contacting activities. In contrast, the young and people earning a higher income are more 
likely to take part in demonstrations or protests. It is only the area of residence that is 
negatively and significantly related to both political contact and protesting, which 
indicates the greater activism of the rural than the urban in conducting these two political 
activities.  
Political engagement variables do not have very much impact on political contact 
or protesting: political efficacy (can understand politics) was the only one among the four 
political engagement factors that was positively and significantly related to these two 
kinds of government-direct activities. Though it does not have a very large impact on 
political contacting, more confidence in one’s ability to understand politics causes Thai 
citizens to participate more often in contacting and protesting activities.  
Party attachment and group membership play a critical role in encouraging people 
to contact government officials or elected representatives about their personal problems 
and to engage in protesting: people who feel close to a political party or are members of 
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at least one social group exhibited more participatory activism than average people who 
do not feel close to a political party or are members of at least one social group.  
In summary, the logistic regression analysis of the 2002 data provides evidence 
that is very much clearer than what previous scholars have concluded about political 
participation in Thailand, especially those who claimed less politically activism for 
females, the young, and for urban residents. It is true, as many of the aforementioned 
scholars have argued, that Thai citizens who are male, older, and living in the rural areas 
are more likely than their socioeconomic counterparts to participate in politics.  
However, such a causal link is true only in many, but not all, types of political 
activity. Controlling for political engagement and motivation factors, the above results 
roughly suggest concerning political participation on the part of different groups in 
Thailand that: (1) rural Thais were more likely than the urban to participate in three of the 
four political activities—campaign activities, political contacting, and protesting, whereas 
there is no participatory difference between them in voting; (2) Thai males were more 
active than Thai females only in campaign and political contacting activities; (3) while 
the lower-income Thais were more likely than the better-off to participate in campaign 
activity, the richer Thais were more active in taking part in protesting; (4) education was 
not a very good predictor of most of the four activities, except political contacting, which 
showed that the higher level of education, the more often political contacting was carried 
out; and (5) whereas younger Thais were more likely than the older to take part in 
protests, there was no participatory difference between younger and older Thais in the 
other three activities.  
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The results that show more political activism of the younger and of people with 
lower incomes in protest politics and campaign activities, respectively, also indicate that 
these groups of Thai people were more likely to engage in some activities than the rest of 
the population, even if they have fewer resources (e.g., money) to do so. This argument is 
debatable, particularly when considering other factors—political engagement and 
mobilization—which also impact campaign activity.  
Based on the results that demonstrate the positive impacts of party attachment and 
group membership on participation, the more active role in campaign activity of the 
lower income group can possibly be interpreted, on the one hand, as indirect evidence of 
the continuing influence of clientelism on political participation. In this sense, people 
with low income may participate more in campaign activities because they are mobilized, 
forced, or even paid by influence persons or groups whom they feel close to or have 
close/personal relations with. However, since all of the political interest and efficacy 
factors have positive impacts on participation, whether the low income group are paid or 
forced to join campaign activities, we should expect that they have enough skills (e.g., 
knowledge and ability to access political information) to manipulate their involvement in 
politics. In this regard, the positive impacts of the mobilization factors on participation 
can be interpreted rather as causes of individuals’ civic orientations—enhancing 
individuals’ attitudes that eventually stimulate participation. 
This study also needs to know whether the participatory patterns of different 
groups in the four key political activities change when the political context changes. As a 
result, Table 5.10 employs a logistic regression analysis to examine the impact of 




Political Participation Models for Voting, Campaign Activities, Political Contacting, and Protesting, 2006 
 Voting Campaign activities Political contacting Protesting 
 B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
Demographic             
Female .072 .191  .020 .137  .003 .121  -.084 .349  
Age .012 .007  .012 .005 ** .003 .005  .017 .013  
Income .222 .105 ** .269 .068 *** .126 .063 ** .288 .157 * 
Education .008 .158  .056 .109  .395 .101 *** -.221 .267  
Urban residence -.036 .219  -.060 .156  -.275 .138 ** .253 .372  
Political Engagement             
Interest -.006 .160  .619 .119 *** .058 .100  .219 .286  
Follow News .223 .109 ** .132 .093  .090 .074  .135 .230  
Can participate in politics .175 .124  .176 .094 * .293 .081 *** .166 .229  
Can understand politics -.341 .146 ** .211 .106 ** .176 .095 * .164 .257  
Mobilization             
Party Attachment .117 .146  .070 .090  -.039 .083  .589 .167 *** 
Group Membership .729 .272 *** .240 .158  .116 .144  -.566 .466  
Constant .227 .600 *** -4.556 .490 *** -1.600 .400 *** -6.270 1.205 *** 
N 1,240 1,240 1,240 1,240 
Nagelkerke R2 .056 .113 .063 .088 
Chi-square 34.627 99.647 58.530 25.953 
Model-significance *** *** *** *** 
Source: ABS 2006 





four kinds of political acts of 2006. The results show many different impacts of the three 
groups of factors on each political action from those of the 2002 models. First of all, 
while ability to participate in politics is significant and had a positive impact on voting in 
2002, such a factor is not significantly related to voting for 2006. The results from the 
2006 models show that income, follow news (about politics), ability to understand 
politics, and group membership, are the four factors that were significantly related to 
voting. It is evident that people who have a higher level of income, who follow political 
news more often, who feel less efficacious about understanding what is going on in 
politics, and who are members of groups/associations were more likely to vote in the 
2006 election than the average person.  
Secondly, whereas nine of the eleven factors in total for 2002 were significantly 
associated with campaign activity, only four of them had a significant impact on 
campaign activism for 2006. Three of those four factors were political engagement 
factors—political interest, ability to participate in politics, and ability to understand 
politics. Another factor was income, which indicated the more political activism of the 
higher income group. Age, which was not significantly related to campaign acts in the 
2002 models, is now positively and significantly associated with participation in 
campaign activity, indicating the more active role of the older generations in 2006. 
Thirdly and most surprisingly, the mobilization factors which played a significant 
role in fostering contacting activism for 2002 had no significant impact on political 
contacting for 2006. The key stimulus factors for political contact in 2006 include three 
demographic factors—income, education, and area of residence—which indicates greater 
energy on the part of people with a higher income, with a higher education, and who live 
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in a rural area; and two political efficacy factors, which suggest the greater politically 
activity of people that feel more efficacious in own ability to participate in and 
understand politics.  
Finally, income and party attachment were the only two factors that were 
significantly related to and had positive impacts on protest activism in 2006. None of the 
political engagement factors was associated with protesting. These results indicate that 
people who actively engaged in protest politics in 2006 were more likely to be those who 
earned a higher income and who felt close to a political party, regardless of how much 
interest in politics they showed or how politically efficacious they felt. These 
participatory figures confirm what actually occurred in Thailand in 2006, where the two 
large groups of citizens, whose majority of one (the PAD) felt relatively close to the 
opposition party (Democrat Party) and the majority of the other (Thaksin’s supporters) 
felt strongly close to the ruling party (Thai Rak Thai), actively joined the protests. 
Furthermore, one study about these groups of protesters reveals that while the average 
income of the Yellow Shirts ($1,000 on average per month) was higher than the Red 
Shirts ($600 on average per month), those two amounts are much higher than the average 
income of the Thai population that claimed to be neither Yellow nor Red ($330 on 
average per month) (Abhichart Sthitniramai, 2010). 
In short, what the 2006 political participation models for the four individual 
activities can tell us clearly about where the large increases in participation of urban 
residents and the rich in 2006 exactly come from is that people with higher levels of 
income are more likely than the rest of the population to participate in three of the four 
political activities—voting, political contacting, and protesting. In addition, even though 
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there was no result that showed more significant political activity on the part of people 
who live in more urbanized areas, people who are living in less urbanized communities 
are more likely than the average to engage in only one type of political activity—political 
contacting. Area of residence had no impact on participation for voting, campaign 
activity, or protesting, indicating a more equal distribution of participation between the 
rural and the urban compared to 2002. Most importantly, various pictures of political 
participation among groups of Thai citizens between 2002 and 2006, as well as the loss of 
impact of several political engagement and mobilization factors on individual types of 
political actions, indicate that the impacts of socioeconomic, engagement and 
mobilization factors on political participation vary over time: they may impact 
participation in one context but not necessarily in others. Therefore, those changes in 
degree or direction of such impacts are influenced by political contexts. 
 
Experiences with Regime Matter 
Criticisms of socioeconomic status, political engagement, and motivation models 
encourage us to pay more attention to institutional and contextual factors, considering 
participation more broadly as a response to contextual cues and political environment 
(Holzner, 2010; Kenny, 1992; Leighley, 1990). Table 5.11 modifies the political 
participation models of 2006 (Table 5.10) by adding two other attitudinal factors that 
reflect citizens’ experiences/satisfaction with the regime—attitude towards the past 
election and satisfaction with the government (i.e., Thaksin’s government). Attitude 
towards the past election, fair election, was measured by the 4-scales question, asking the 




Political Participation Models for Voting, Campaign Activities, Political Contacting, and Protesting, 2006 (Experiences Impacts) 
 Voting Campaign activities Political contacting Protesting 
 B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
Demographic             
Female .197 .227  -.002 .148  .066 .134  -.093 .373  
Age .009 .009  .012 .006 ** .005 .005  .014 .014  
Income .207 .123 * .345 .074 *** .085 .068  .296 .165 * 
Education -.113 .183  .098 .118  .449 .112 *** -.275 .284  
Urban residence -.082 .258  -.313 .171  -.262 .153 * .407 .404  
Political Engagement             
Interest -.031 .192  .636 .130 *** .023 .112  .102 .299  
Follow News .251 .132 * .038 .099  .069 .083  .259 .255  
Can participate in politics .116 .146  .160 .100  .292 .088 *** .268 .246  
Can understand politics -.239 .171  .216 .113 * .130 .103  .150 .267  
Mobilization             
Party Attachment .119 .164  .086 .096  -.051 .089  .566 .176 *** 
Group Membership .593 .313 * .154 .170  .138 .158  -.610 .510  
Experiences with             
Fair election .443 .121 *** .177 .088 ** .144 .076 * .281 .217  
Government satisfaction -.212 .152  .235 .102 ** -.246 .091 *** -.354 .221  
Constant .286 .786  -5.199 .587 *** -1.320 .483 .006 -6.364 1.386 *** 
N 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 
Nagelkerke R2 .070 .129 .071 .114 
Chi-square 33.896 99.369 56.592 30.211 
Model-significance *** *** *** *** 
Source: ABS 2006 





= completely free and fair; 2 = free and fair, but with minor problems; 1 = free and fair, 
but with major problems; 0 = not free or fair. Satisfaction with government was measured 
by the 4-scales question, asking the respondents how satisfied or dissatisfied they were 
with the Thaksin Shinawatra government: 3 = very satisfied; 2 = somewhat satisfied; 1 = 
somewhat dissatisfied; 0 = very dissatisfied.  
As discussed earlier, the 2006 House of Representatives election held a couple of 
months before the survey was conducted was an extraordinary event. It was established 
as the government of Thaksin’s response to the pressure forced by the Yellow Shirts’ 
month-long movement, but major opposition parties boycotted. Hence, we might expect 
that people who tended to rate the election as free and fair should be more likely than 
those who rated it as not free or fair to participate in voting and campaign activities.  
In contrast, opposite patterns would be expected for participation in political 
contacting and protesting. That is, people who disagree with an election that contains 
only candidates from the government party and other small (and no name) parties should 
rate the election as not free or fair, then decline to participate in the election and 
eventually tend to take part in other forms of political activities, such as political 
contacting or protest. Like fair election, one should expect satisfaction with government 
to have a positive impact on participation in voting and campaign activities. However, 
because during the 2006 political crisis there were not only the anti-Thaksin protesters 
but also the movement of his supporters, we would expected that either those who were 
satisfied or dissatisfied with Thaksin’s government should have been more likely to take 
part in protest activities. 
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According to Table 5.11, when the two experience with regime variables were 
also included within in the analysis, Nagelkerke R2 improved considerably for all four 
models. As expected, fair election had a positive impact on voting and campaign 
activities. However, for the voting model, the ability to understand politics lost its earlier 
significance, while income, follow news, and group membership retained their 
significance (but at a .1 level rather than .05. as they were before adding experience with 
regime variables into the model). Satisfied with the government was positively and 
significantly associated with campaign activities, as expected, but was not significantly 
related to voting. This result indicates that people who were dissatisfied with Thaksin’s 
government were less likely to join campaign activities than those that were satisfied with 
the government, but they still went to the polls (possibly to vote against them since the 
coefficient was minus). This finding confirms what actually occurred in the House of 
Representatives election on April 2, 2006,55 in which roughly 65 percent of eligible Thai 
voters cast ballots: among these voters, approximately 53.3 percent voted for Thaksin’s 
TRT party, less than 1 percent voted for other parties, 12.8 percent cast invalid ballots, 
and 33 percent cast a “no vote.56”  
Political contacting is driven by fair election and government satisfaction, but not 
in the same direction. That is, while people with more positive experience with elections 
were more likely than those who had worse experience in contacting officials or 
                                                            
 
55This election was finally declared invalid by Thailand's Constitutional Court, 
which found that the positioning of the voting booths violated voter privacy.   
 
56In Thailand, if voters do not find a suitable candidate from those who have stood 
for election, there is a “no vote” box in the ballot for voters to cast their vote as a vote for 
none or a no vote. 
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politicians, people who were satisfied with the government were less active in political 
contacting than those who were dissatisfied. This result can be understood simply: if 
citizens view the election as free and fair, they will expect that their voices will be heard 
by their representatives or officials. At the same time, if the government cannot make 
people satisfied, the people will contact politicians or officials about their problems quite 
often until those problems are addressed or solved.  
As expected, the protest was not displaced by either fair election or government 
satisfaction. The results thus confirm that people who took part in the protests during the 
late 2005 to early 2006 were on the one hand, those who supported Thaksin—were 
satisfied with his government and viewed the election that was held without participation 
by any opposition parties free and fair, and on the other, those who opposed him were 
dissatisfied with his government and saw the 2006 election as not free or unfair. 
In conclusion, even though participation gaps between people with different 
geographic and socioeconomic backgrounds in Thailand still exist, those gaps according 
to many findings in this chapter are smaller compared to what has been suggested 
previously by Thai scholars. Moreover, a trend of a decline in such gaps can be clearly 
observed during the past decade in Thailand (at least between 2002 and 2006), suggesting 
a more equal distribution of political participation among some groups of Thai 
participants—in particular between males and females. As shown in earlier explanations 
in this chapter, the more equal distribution of political participation among Thai citizens 
is a consequence of changes in participatory patterns among different groups of Thai 
citizens, especially of those who are female, affluent, and urban. It was evident that in 
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2006, gender did not matter for all types of political actions, while rural-urban divided 
matter only for political contacting.   
More precisely, various pictures of political participation among groups of Thai 
citizens between 2002 and 2006, as well as the loss of impact of several political 
engagement and mobilization factors on individual types of political actions, indicate that 
the impacts of socioeconomic, engagement and mobilization factors on political 
participation vary over time: these factors may impact participation in one context but not 
necessarily in others. Such changes are driven by several activities (i.e., the more 
politically active in voting, political contacting, and protesting among people with higher 
level of income than the rest of population). Such changes also are fostered by various 
factors, such as socioeconomic status, political engagement, and mobilization, each of 
which has an impact on political participation, depending in part upon the individual’s 






POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: 
 




Differential rates of participation for any subgroup deserve attention, but rural-
urban differences are particularly worthy of attention in the case of Thailand. The 
dominant view is called “a tale of two democracies,” which was first introduced by a 
famous Thai political scientist, the former Democrat Party’s House of Representatives 
member and Mahachon Party’s leader for the 2005 election, Anek Laothamatas. 
According to Anek (1995), the reason democracy failed to be firmly established in 
Thailand over the past several decades is to be found in the differing views and 
expectations of the urban middle class (mostly the Bangkok-based citizens) and the poor 
in the country over democracy, elections, and politicians. That is, for the rural 
electorate,57 democracy is valued not as an ideal but as a mechanism to draw greater 
benefits from the political elite to themselves and their communities. Elections, in rural 
voters’ view, are therefore very much local, not national affairs, dealing with the 
exchange of votes for benefits of a nonpolicy type. In this respect, the rural electorate 
does not expect abstract rewards such as laws, policies, or public interest from
                                                            
 
57Anek defines rural electorate simply as Thai populations who reside in villages 
(in the 1980s almost 70 percent of the workforce were farmers or peasants). 
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participation in elections.  
In contrast, for the educated middle class, democracy is a form of legitimate rule 
adopted by most civilized nations. For this reason, elections are mechanisms of recruiting 
honest and capable persons to serve as lawmakers and political executives rather than a 
process through which voters get parochial and personal benefits. For urban middle-class 
voters, voting decisions should be made independently of social, cultural, and especially 
financial obligations. Anek argued that these conflicting perceptions of elections have 
existed in society and lead instability to democracy in Thailand, in which the rural 
majority votes to set up a government while the less in number, but louder voice, middle 
class criticizes and weakens the cabinet, which finally be ended by either its own internal 
conflict or external military coup. 
Many studies, especially before the 1997 Constitution in Thailand was 
promulgated, provide evidence that asserts Anek’s thesis. For example, in his survey 
research regarding attitudes toward democracy among Bangkok and rural northern Thais, 
Jim LoGerfo (1996) finds that Bangkokians have more democratic attitudes than their 
rural northern counterparts: rural northern respondents tended to support a restricted 
model of democracy such as limited participation for societal groups, restrictions on press 
freedom, and weak local government, while Bangkok respondents firmly supported 
provincial governors, favored participatory rights for organized groups, and stood 
overwhelmingly behind a free press.  
Concentrating on participation in elections, Suchit Bunbongkarn (1996) observes 
that while many expected that people with more education, higher income, and white-
collar workers should be more likely to vote than people of lower socioeconomic status 
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because they tend to be more aware of politics, to know what to do to influence the 
government, and to have a sense of political efficacy,58 what had happened in Thailand 
between the late 1960s and 1990s is that the rate of voter turnout in Bangkok, the most 
modern and highly-developed city in the country, was the lowest compared to the rest of 
the country for six of the eight national elections held during that period (Table 6.1).  
Based on his previous studies with Pornsak Phongphaew (1984), Suchit argues 
that voter turnout in the less-developed rural provinces is always high because of the two 
major “voter mobilization methods” used in rural constituencies by politicians: 
motivation by establishing a network of canvassers, and vote buying. These methods of 
voter mobilization are facilitated by the local leaders through a patronage system that is 
deeply rooted throughout many rural areas. However, these motivation methods, for 
Suchit, are not effective for the Bangkok voters, who tend to be very independent and 
view vote-selling as undemocratic behavior. The reason for the low voter turnout rates in 
Bangkok, for Suchit, is not because Bangkok voters are not at all interested in or aware of 
politics, but that they are not satisfied with the ways in which democracy works in the 
nation; for example, they think that politicians are always corrupt but that nothing can be 
done about this even by participating in elections, which in their opinion, are the 
instruments by which the ruling elite maintain power that cannot improve anything.  
Based on this conventional wisdom, we may conclude that the participatory 





























1970s – 1990s 
1/26/75 269 47.17 Phuket 67.88 Pechboon 32.18 33.65 
4/4/76 279 43.99 Nakornpanom 63.53 Pechboon 26.64 29.05 
4/22/79 301 43.90 Yasotorn 77.11 Bangkok 22.56 22.56 
4/18/83 324 50.76 Yasotorn 79.62 Bangkok 32.57 32.57 
7/27/86 349 61.43 Chayaphum 85.15 Bangkok 38.13 38.13 
7/24/88 359 63.56 Yasotorn 90.42 Samutsongkran 35.92 37.50 
3/22/92 360 59.24 Mukdaharn 81.11 Bangkok 42.01 42.01 
9/13/92 360 61.59 Mukdaharn 90.43 Bangkok 47.40 47.40 
7/2/95 391 62.04 Mukdaharn 83.80 Bangkok 49.82 49.82 
11/17/96 393 62.42 Srakaew 87.71 Bangkok 48.97 48.97 
Since 1997 
1/6/01 500 69.94 Lumpoon 83.78 Nontaburi 56.09 66.70 
2/6/05 500 72.56 Lumpoon 86.56 Nongkai 62.55 72.37 
12/23/07 480 74.50 Lumpoon 88.90 Sakonakorn 66.73 69.10 
        








different attitudes toward politics and democracy. Further, these political attitudinal 
differences can mostly be explained by differences in the socioeconomic backgrounds 
among the groups, in particular between the poor and less-educated rural and the higher 
socioeconomic status urban. On the one hand, these conclusions are confirmed by more 
recent survey research (e.g., Albritton and Thawilwadee, 2005; 2008). On the other, the 
changes in the patterns of political behavior among Thai citizens during the past decade 
indicate evidence that challenges this premise. 
Using 2002 ABS data, Albritton and Thawilwadee (2005) confirmed that 
respondents from Bangkok and rural areas were found to differ significantly in a variety 
of measures, such as support for democracy, criteria for choosing candidates in elections, 
and tolerance of corruption. More specifically, residents of Bangkok exhibited the lowest 
level of democratic support, while rural residents registered the highest. Moreover, 
according to their analysis, socioeconomic status was negatively associated with both 
democratic support and participation. Indeed, Bangkok residents were significantly less 
supportive of democracy than their rural counterparts, even when controlling for level of 
education and income. This finding, for Albritton and Thawilwadee (2008), confirms 
what Suchit concluded about the electoral behavior of Thai voters—that people with 
higher levels of education are more cynical about politics and therefore less likely to 
participate in the democratic process. It also can be applied to explain the appearance of 
the 2006 coup as a result of the persistent conflict between the metropole and rural 
hinterland, which asserts that “Thailand at the turn of the century was truly a tale of two 
democracies” (p. 136).  
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From the other point of view, we have learned from the previous chapters that 
political participation between different groups of Thai citizens, including the rural and 
the urban, has changed, and many of these changes are driven by political engagement 
(such as political interest and political efficacy) and other attitudinal and mobilization 
(such as group/party engagement) rather than solely socioeconomic status factors. In this 
regard, we would expect to see that even if the Thai rural were poorer and had lower 
education than the urban Thai, their political interest, knowledge, and efficacy would not 
be very low and not very much lower than their urban counterparts. Additionally, if these 
engagement patterns were proven correct, then the conventional explanations that view 
rural voters as parochial, dealing with the exchange of votes for personal benefits, and 
easily motivated by patron-client relations and vote buying to participate in political 
activities must be questioned. That is, if rural Thais did not exhibit a relatively low level 
of interest in politics, knowledge about their electoral candidates and parties, or political 
efficacy, their political participation would not solely be a result of motivation by 
patronage-system agencies (such as local leaders and electoral canvassers) and vote 
buying as generally described by the literature. Or at least, if beholden to patron-client, 
they enter relationships for strategic reasons, not as blind actors easily duped and 
manipulated by patrons. 
In addition, information about voter turnout rates in the past decade’s three 
national elections (i.e., 2001, 2005, and 2007) shows that Bangkok voters were not any 
longer the least participatory groups in the country (Table 6.1). Since 2001, the voter 
turnout rates in Bangkok increased by more than 10 percent on average compared to 
those in the 1990s. Moreover, in each year’s election, the rate of voter turnout in 
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Bangkok was less than 3 percent, less than 0.5 percent, and almost 5 percent lower than 
the voter turnout rate of the whole country in 2001, 2005, and 2007, respectively. These 
improvements in voter turnout rates in Bangkok eliminated previous arguments 
suggesting that Bangkok residents were less likely to participate in the electoral process 
based upon their substantially lower voter turnouts.  
Furthermore, if participation in elections by Bangkok voters depends largely on 
their attitude towards democracy and politics, as the aforementioned scholars have 
argued, the higher voter turnout rates in Bangkok should be a result of a more positive 
attitude on the part of Bangkok citizens regarding elections. In terms of political 
engagement, we would expect to see that urban Thai voters in general, or Bangkok 
residents in particular, would be highly interested in an election, be well-informed about 
candidates and political parties, and be politically efficacious in terms of their 
engagement in politics. 
Moreover, as the divide between Red and Yellow supporters in Thai society has 
existed and much of this divide is rooted in regional (the northern and northeastern Reds 
versus the southern and Bangkok-based Yellows) and class (the rural Reds versus the 
urban middle-class Yellows) differences (Ockey, 2009: 316), one might claim that the 
“tale of two democracies” thesis is the best to explain what is going on in today’s Thai 
politics (Albritton and Thawilwadee, 2005: 136). However, as many studies (e.g., 
Abhichart Sthitniramai, 2010; Ammar Siamwalla and Somchai Jitsuchon, 2011) have 
asserted, people who identify themselves being close to either Red or Yellow are 
socioeconomically mixed. There are many Red supporters who are middle-class, earn a 
high income, and have a great opportunity for education (many Yellow supporters are 
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working-class, earn a low income, are less-educated, and come from provincial areas), 
even though the majority of the Red-shirts are rural residents who have less income and a 
lower level of education than the majority of the Yellow Shirts, who tend to come from 
big cities. As a result, what creates the rural-urban difference in political participation is 
more complicated than simply differences in socioeconomic status (lower-higher levels 
of education or lower-higher income) or in areas of living (Bangkok-province).  
Emerging as anti-Thaksin on the one side and as pro-Thaksin on the other, either 
Red Shirts or Yellow Shirts have identified themselves with one specific party over the 
other party—i.e., the Red Shirts with the PPP and the Yellow Shirts with the DP (in the 
2007 elections). It would be interesting to examine how attachment to any particular 
camp (i.e., Red or Yellow) has impacted individuals’ participation, including 
participatory differences between rural and urban residents. 
In this chapter, bivariate analysis and multivariate regression were developed to 
reexamine the dominant premise regarding political attitudes and behaviors of rural and 
urban Thai voters. First rural-urban differences in political engagement were 
considered—the set of orientations toward political life that foster activity, including 
political interest, knowledge, and efficacy—between the Bangkok and provincial Thai 
electorates.  
As shown in Table 6.1, the improvement in voter turnout rates in Bangkok during 
the past three national elections, considering political engagement differences between 
rural and urban in a narrow sense (defining urban as Bangkok and rural as provincial 
residents) presented a good opportunity for this study to compare and discuss the results 
with what previous scholars have argued concerning attitudes toward politics among 
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voters in the most developed and modern areas of Bangkok and those in less-developed 
provinces. By creating bivariate tables from CSES data for all three national election 
years (2001, 2005, and 2007), the results can explain not only how political engagement 
is different between provincial and Bangkok citizens but also how political engagement 
disparity between the two groups has changed across time.  
The second part of this chapter’s analysis then turns to an explanation of how the 
changing pictures of rural-urban differences regarding political interest, knowledge, and 
efficacy can explain patterns of political activism between the rural and urban voters. To 
explain these patterns, “rural” and “urban” in the broader sense were considered by 
measuring rural as people who live in small towns or villages, and the urban as those who 
live in large cities and Bangkok. Focus was also placed on explaining participatory 
differences between these two groups in three major kinds of political activities (voting, 
political contacting, and protesting). We have learned much about these participatory 
patterns from the empirical analyses in previous chapters, but most of those results 
derived from multivariate models that were developed based on survey data conducted 
before the 2007 election. In this chapter, multivariate analyses were developed for voting, 
political contacting, and protesting by rural and urban residents using the 2007 CSES.  
This CSES was the best source for this study because it is the only survey 
conducted in Thailand after the 2006 military coup and the promulgation of the 2007 
Constitution; it collected a rich set of information about political participation (voting, 
political contacting, and protesting activities) and political engagement (interest, 
knowledge, and efficacy). Several demographic, attitudinal, and mobilization factors that 
could be used as independent variables in the models were also available. Moreover, the 
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2007 CSES contains questions that could be applied to constructing Red- and Yellow-
supporter variables to be tested in the multivariate models. With these advantages 
provided by the 2007 CSES,59 we will learn at the end of this chapter the impacts of not 
only political engagement factors but also other demographic, attitudinal, mobilization, 
institutional, and the most interestingly, Red/Yellow attachment factors on each political 
action between the rural and urban Thai electorates. 
 
Rural-Urban Differences in Political Engagement 
Bivariate analyses of CSES data were developed in order to examine rural-urban 
differences regarding a number of aspects of political engagement (i.e., political interest, 
knowledge, and efficacy) obtained from Thai respondents in 2001, 2005, and 2007. As 
mentioned earlier, rural-urban in this bivariate analysis was defined in a narrow sense for 
comparison purposes. The rural were measured as people living in provincial areas, while 
the urban were those living in Bangkok. As with what previous studies (Suchit, 1996; 
Suchit and Pornsak, 1984; LoGerfo, 1996) have explained about their differences in 
socioeconomic status, these two groups, according to the CSES data, were largely 
                                                            
 
59It should be noted here why this dissertation did not used CSES in the previous 
chapter to explain changes in political participation among different groups of Thai 
citizens if it was great for explaining participatory differences between rural and urban 
Thais in 2007. The CSES was conducted three times in Thailand (2001, 2005, and 2007) 
but collected different information about political participation. In 2001, the survey asked 
whether the respondents had (1) attended campaign meetings or rallies and (2) showed 
support to parties and candidates, but did not collect any political contact or protest 
activism information. For 2005 and 2007, several questions about political contacting and 
protest activism were added, but electoral activity questions were taken out; the survey in 
2005 asked only the question about showing support to parties and candidates, while this 
question and attending campaign meetings or rallies were both excluded from the 2007 
survey.   
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different in terms of income and levels of education. Indeed, approximately two-thirds of 
provincial respondents were those earning less than $300 per month, and less than 10 
percent of them had some college education. In contrast, roughly three-fourths of 
Bangkok residents earned $300 a month or more, and nearly one-fourth of them were 
educated at the university level (Table 6.2). In this sense, when we consider political 
engagement differences between these groups of people, we should keep in mind that 
differences between them are rooted not only in the areas where they live but also in the 
socioeconomic status (i.e., income and education) to which they belong or come with.  
The measures of political interest rely on the CSES’s 11-point scale questions on 
how interested the respondents were in the election, asking respondents to rate their 
degree of interest, ranging from not at all interested (0) to very interested (10). Political 
knowledge is measured in terms of knowledge about candidates and political parties. In 
the survey, the respondents were asked: (1) to name as many candidates in their 
constituency as possible; (2) to name political parties in their own electoral district; and 
(3) to match the candidate they named to the party that he/she belonged to. Based on this 
information, six separate variables were constructed to measure political knowledge: (1) 
ability to name correctly one candidate; (2) ability to name correctly a second candidate; 
(3) ability to name correctly one party; (4) ability to name correctly a second party; (5) 
ability to match correctly a candidate and party; and (6) ability to match correctly a 
second candidate and party.  
Political efficacy is measured by agreement with the statements: (1) “If people 
like us go to vote, we can change what happens in the future;” (2) “Sometimes I think 





Socioeconomic Differences between Bangkok and Provincial Residents, 2001-2007 
 










Gender       
Male (%) 48.3 53.3 48.6 46.2 47.3 48.0 
Female (%) 51.7 46.7 51.4 53.8 52.7 52.0 
       
Age  
(Average year) 
40.4 37.8 46.7 45.2 47.2 42.8 
       
Income        
Less than $300 a 
month (%) 
73.0 21.9 64.8 24.2 64.1 29.5 
$300 a month and 
over (%)  
27.0 78.1 35.2 75.8 35.9 70.5 
       
Education       
Without a degree 
(%) 
94.1 78.1 93.6 82.1 91.4 75.0 
With a degree (%) 5.9 21.9 6.4 17.9 8.6 25.0 
        




people like you and me think;” and (4) “Common people like me don’t have any 
influence on what goes on in politics.” The scale for each question ranged from 1 to 10. 
As the voter turnout rates in Bangkok for the 2001, 2005, and 2007 House of 
Representatives election were higher than in the past and not very much different from 
the overall voter turnout rates of the whole country, there should be little difference in 
political engagement between provincial and Bangkok residents. 
Table 6.3 presents data about rural-urban differences in political interest, 
knowledge, and efficacy, as well as the changes of these political engagement patterns 
among provincial and Bangkok residents across time (2001-2007). A majority of these 
data partly confirms (but largely challenges) conventional wisdom about rural and urban 
voters in Thailand in several aspects. First of all, while the aforementioned behavior 
scholars claimed a lack of attention to politics on the part of the urban Thais because the 
voter turnout in Bangkok was the lowest in the country for almost elections since the late 
1970s (Suchit, 1996), in terms of political interest, the data show the rural to have been 
somewhat more likely than the urban to report being interested in the forthcoming 
election only for 2001. However, there was no rural-urban difference with respect to 
being interested in the election for 2005 and 2007 data. This evidence suggests that for 
the urban, elections do matter. The urban tend to care more than in the past, and not much 
different to the rural, about elections. In this regard, being interested in elections might be 
one of the factors that explain the increase in voter turnout rates in Bangkok for the 2001, 
2005, and 2007 elections.  
Second, with respect to political knowledge, the 2001 data replicate some patterns 





Rural-urban Differences in Political Interest, Knowledge, and Efficacy 
 
 2001 2005 2007 
 Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
Political Interest       
Mean for interest in election scale  7.61 6.63 8.06 8.15 7.56 7.40 
Political Knowledge       
- Name of one candidate (%) 92.2 90.2 97.5 95.7 83.5 60.7 
- Name of second candidate (%) 75.7 64.8 73.3 85.4 67.3 40.7 
- Name of one party (%) 94.1 98.4 99.2 99.5 87.3 73.2 
- Name of second party (%) 81.2 95.9 83.2 94.6 69.0 47.2 
- Match one candidate and party (%) 88.0 89.3 96.1 94.6 71.0 60.8 
- Match second candidate and party (%) 67.3 63.1 68.3 80.5 53.6 32.4 
Mean number of correct answers  4.98 5.02 5.18 5.50 4.33 3.20 
Political Efficacy       
- Can change what happens in the future 
if going to vote (mean) 
7.39 6.27 7.36 8.18 7.19 7.05 
- Government officials care what people 
like us think (mean) 
5.00 3.74 5.29 4.16 5.32 5.44 
- Can understand politics (mean) 4.51 5.04 4.63 3.95 4.69 4.77 
- Can have an influence on what goes on 
in politics (mean) 
5.33 5.01 5.23 3.80 5.74 5.57 
Mean for efficacy scale 5.55 5.02 5.63 5.05 5.73 5.69 
Source: CSES (2001, 2005, 2007) 
 
Note:    difference between the rural (i.e., those who are living outside Bangkok) and the 
urban (i.e., those who are living in Bangkok) is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
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those that viewed that urban voters tended to vote by paying more attention to a political 
party than to individuals, whereas the rural do not regard their vote to party policies and 
national interests (Anek, 1995; 1996; Suchit, 1996). As shown in the table, the rural were 
more likely than the urban to know the name of a second candidate, while the urban were 
more likely than the rural to recognize the name of a second party for 2001. 
However, such a premise was questioned by the findings of 2005, in which the 
urban were more likely than the rural to know the name of both a second candidate and 
party. These results could be interpreted as a result of the changes in the ways in which 
political parties seek support from urban citizens. The success of Thaksin’s Thai Rak 
Thai party in introducing candidates with a new face but with a high profile and that were 
well known in other segments of business or civil society into the politics after the 2001 
election encouraged other parties to pay more attention to the “quality” of their 
candidates—in terms of good educational background, having successful experience in 
their past career, and being well-known. It was a fact that in the 2005 election, Bangkok 
was a battlefield among celebrities who may have wanted to test their popularity in 
politics, because all parties believed that Bangkok was a nonpartisan area, so the chance 
to win the election was considered to be wide open for all. With several well-known 
persons running for elections in Bangkok, it seemed to be easy for Bangkok voters to 
recognize who was running for election in their district.  
Nevertheless, compared to those of the 2001 and 2005, the 2007 data provide a 
sharp contrasting picture of the rural-urban disparity in political knowledge. As shown in 
Table 6.3, for 2007, the rural were more likely to provide a correct answer to all six items 
than the urban, indicating that the rural were not generally unsophisticated—instead they 
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did know pretty well (and better than the urban in many instances) what their vote 
choices were. One reason that can be applied to explaining this result was the dissolution 
of the Thai Rak Thai party eight months after the military coup in September 2006, which 
led to the five-year ban from the politics of 111 Thai Rak Thai leading politicians. 
Without those “big name” politicians who typically were candidates on the party list 
elections and in Bangkok-based districts, Thaksin’s new party, the PPP, had to nominate 
many “no name” candidates to the 2007 elections, especially in Bangkok.  
The political conflicts that appeared since 2006 were another reason that 
discouraged high-profile people from becoming involved in politics as a candidate. 
Without candidates running who are thought to be of high quality, the attitudes toward 
elections among Bangkok voters might return to what the aforementioned scholars 
concluded concerning the perception of urban citizens—politicians are always corrupt 
and elections are a mechanism that they use to gain power that will be used to protect 
their personal benefits (Suchit, 1996; Suchit and Pornsak, 1984). This also was the reason 
why Bangkok respondents tended to offer less support for democracy, which has led 
some recent studies to conclude that what has been going on in Thai politics after the 
2006 coup has confirmed what Anek (1996) explained in his tale of two democracies 
thesis (Albritton and Thawilwadee 2008). However, these conclusions about attitudes 
toward democracy and elections among Bangkok voters might not be exactly true if we 
consider them together with citizens’ political efficacy.  
 Table 6.3 also presents a relatively small rural-urban difference in political 
efficacy, with the rural having higher average political efficacy scores (although the gap 
constantly narrows and is not statistically significant in 2007). However, when the four 
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items in the scale are considered separately, the rural-urban disparity pictures are 
complex. Using the 2001 efficacy rate as the baseline, two interesting patterns are 
evident. First, the data show a positive trend of rural citizens’ beliefs about their own 
competence to understand politics, whereas the differences between the rural and the 
urban in this measure are statistically significant only in 2001, with the rural having a 
lower average score, and in 2005, in the opposite direction. These findings support recent 
studies that tend to provide an optimistic portrayal of the rural populace (see, for 
example, Albritton 2006; Albritton and Thawilwadee, 2008; Chairat 2010; Walker, 
2008), and again, contrast with conventional wisdom that usually views the Thai rural as 
parochial, unsophisticated, and money-focused voters. In addition, the higher levels of 
beliefs about one’s own competence to understand and participate in politics reported by 
both Bangkok and provincial residents can also be understood as a result of the wide 
spread of citizen participation in both electoral and non-electoral (i.e., protesting) 
activities during the past ten years, which encouraged Thai citizens regardless of where 
they were living to learn more about politics and take more part in political activities thus 
increasing confidence in their own ability to deal with politics.       
Secondly, while previous studies, in particular those conducted before the 1997 
constitution reform, such as that of LoGerfo (1996), found that Thai citizens, especially 
the urban, were not satisfied with political system and government performance, the data 
presented in this dissertation indicate a growing trend of the perceived responsiveness of 
the political system to citizens’ participation among both the rural and urban populace. 
And, more specifically, in 2001 and 2005, the rural were more likely than the urban to 
report believing that government officials do care what ordinary people think. However, 
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this gap continued to decrease and is not statistically significant in 2007. The higher 
feeling that government officials do care what ordinary people think among rural voters 
than among Bangkok residents in 2001 can be understood as a result of Thailand’s 
electoral politics, in which the needs and desires of the majority rural voters have long 
been of concern by the political elite in order to gain support from them in elections.  
Even though conventional, and idealist, scholars might view this relationship as 
an obstacle for democracy to be developed because it relates to undemocratic behaviors 
(such as vote buying), exchanging benefits between politicians and rural voters arouses 
many rural citizens to believe that their voices are heard, at least, through elections. This 
argument seems to be clearer when considering the high score that the rural reported in 
believing that people can change what happens in the future if they vote, and this was 
obviously confirmed by a growing trend of agreements with the statement that 
government officials do care what ordinary people think among the provincial electorate 
for 2005 and 2007.  
In addition, while a gap between Bangkok and provincial respondents in reporting 
on the perceived responsiveness of the political system in 2005 still existed, this gap 
decreased, with a higher increase in the average score reported by Bangkok respondents. 
This finding can possibly be interpreted as a result of the success of Thaksin’s first four-
year term (2001-2005) as Prime Minister in establishing a large popular support both 
nationally and in Bangkok through his populist policies and administrative style (Phasuk 
and Baker, 2002). It was, perhaps, the first time for the urban middle class to perceive 
that an elected government can do something beneficial for the country. The landslide 
victory of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party in the 2005 election in Bangkok (and 
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throughout the country, except in the south, where the Democrat Party has a  strong 
foundation) was good enough to influence the perception of Bangkok voters (and other 
citizens living in large and modern cities) regarding the responsiveness of the government 
at that moment.  
Also, this positively-perceived responsiveness of the political system among 
Bangkok respondents in 2005 was expressed through another political efficacy question, 
the question about the efficacy of individual citizens in changing what happens in future 
politics if going to vote, which Bangkok respondents were more likely than provincial 
electorates to agree with. For this reason, it would be naïve to conclude that urban middle 
class Thais always view elections negatively. In fact, their attitudes depend on what is 
going on in politics and what the elected representatives actually do for them and the 
nation. The reverse trend of responses to the same statement in 2007 CSES among 
Bangkok respondents after Thaksin’s era was overthrown by the undemocratic power of 
the military provided evidence for this argument. 
Overall, the above examination has presented a partly similar but largely 
contrasting picture of rural-urban differences in political attitudes toward politics 
compared to what has been suggested by previous studies in Thailand. On the one hand, 
the findings about rural voters’ political engagement revealed that even though the 
provincial Thais are poorer and have a lower level of education than Bangkok residents, 
they are not less interested in, less informed about, or politically less efficacious about 
politics than their urban counterparts. Rather, in many cases they reported greater 
engagement attitudes than the residents of Bangkok. This political engagement figure of 
provincial voters strongly challenges conventional wisdom, especially that which has 
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labeled rural voters as ill informed, uninterested, and easily deceived. On the other hand, 
as other scholars have indicated, the richer and higher-educated Bangkokians have 
relatively strong awareness of politics: they reported high levels of interest in the 
elections, especially in 2005, and had great knowledge about political parties and 
candidates in the 2001 and 2005 elections. However, the ebb and flow of their political 
engagement indicated that urban Thai citizens’ attitudes towards politics are not 
constantly negative, as preceding scholars have suggested, but depend on various factors, 
such as political contexts and their experiences with the political system as well.  
These changes in political engagement among rural and urban Thais during the 
past decade lead to many puzzles, in particular, about the changes in political 
participatory patterns between these two groups of Thai citizens. First, how strong an 
influence do these three political engagement factors—political interest, knowledge, and 
efficacy—have on political participation among these two groups when controlling for 
other potentially demographic, attitudinal, mobilization, and contextual factors. Secondly, 
because rural Thais exhibited a relatively high level of interest in politics, great 
knowledge about their electoral candidates and parties, as well as moderate political 
efficacy, it would be interesting to reexamine whether their political participation is still 
influenced by motivations of patronage-system agencies (such as local leaders and 
electoral canvassers) and vote buying, as much previous research has observed.  
Thirdly, and related to the second, it would also be worthwhile investigating, in 
the case of urban Thai citizens, whether patron-client relations and vote-buying factors 
had no impact on the political behaviors of urban-middle class citizens, as previous 
scholars obviously believed. Finally, because political engagement among rural and 
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urban residents varied according to what was going on in politics, and because one 
critical context that has shaped what Thai people think about and act in politics is the 
divide of the Red and Yellow in Thai society, we would understand more clearly the 
political activism patterns of recent rural and urban Thai voters if the factors regarding 
the division of Red versus Yellow were constructed and taken into account. Indeed, we 
need to investigate whether political participation among rural and urban Thais is 
influenced by the political positions they stand for or are attached to. In order to explain 
these puzzles, the next section develops multivariate regression models of three political 
activities—voting, political contacting, and protesting—using the 2007 CSES and with a 
focus on rural-urban differences. 
 
Rural-Urban Differences in Voting, Political Contact, and Protest 
This section deals intensively with rural-urban differences in voting, political 
contact, and protest,60 aiming at explaining how the changing pictures of rural-urban 
differences in political interest, knowledge, and efficacy observed in the previous section 
can explain patterns of political activism between the present rural and urban Thai voters. 
To explain these patterns, multivariate regression models of voting, political contacting, 
and protesting for the entire respondents (with rural-urban areas of living included as one 
of the independent variables) were constructed using 2007 CSES. Then regression 
models for only rural and urban respondents for each three political action were 
                                                            
 
60We might learn more clearly about rural-urban differences in political activity if 
participating in campaign activities were included. Unfortunately, there is no campaign 
activities question asked in 2007 CSES.  
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separately developed in order to examine whether the same factors have a different effect 
on the political participation of these two groups.  
In each model, rural and urban residents were considered in a broad sense, where 
the rural were measured as people living in small towns or villages, while the urban were 
those living in large cities and Bangkok. According to this measure, the regression 
models of only rural respondents containing approximately two-thirds of the total 
respondents were categorized as rural and the rest (roughly one-third) were categorized as 
urban. In socioeconomic status terms, the urban were those earning almost double the 
monthly income (i.e., $523.6 per month) of the rural (i.e., $273.8 per month), and nearly 
20 percent of the urban were those having some degree of education, while slightly more 
than half of the rural had completed primary school or lower. 
Voting was measured by a survey question asking the respondents whether they had cast 
a ballot in the election on December 23, 2007: coded 1 for a response of “yes” and 0 for 
“no.” Political contact was measured as the sum of the four contacting questions: (1) 
contacting government officials; (2) contacting high-level officials; (3) contacting a 
member of parliament; and (4) contacting local officials, where 1 was given to a response 
of “yes” to each of these acts and 0 for a response of “no.” The scale ranges from 0 to 4 
(low to high). Protesting was measured by the question asking respondents whether they 
had taken part in demonstrations or protests during the past three years: coded 1 for a 
response of “yes” and 0 for “no.” Based on these measurement methods, the models for 
voting and protesting in 2007 were analyzed using logistic regression, and political 
contacting was analyzed using OLS regression. Table 6.4 presents the participatory 





Participatory Differences between the Rural and the Urban, 2007 
 
 
Rural Urban Significance 
Voting 95.0 91.9 ** 
    
Contacting:    
Government officials 55.3 54.7  
High-ranking officials 10.4 16.7 *** 
Members of Parliament 11.1 12.5 *** 
Local officials 57.1 40.9 *** 
    
Protesting 3.3 6.1 *** 
    
Source: CSES 2007 
Note: *P < 0.1 ** P < 0.05 *** P < 0.01 
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results suggest that the rural were more likely than the urban to vote in the 2007 election. 
The urban, in contrast, were more active than the rural in protest activities. For political 
contacting activities, while the rural were more likely than the urban to express their 
problems and concerns to local officials, the urban contacted high-ranking officials and 
members of Parliament more frequently than the rural. These results thus confirmed that 
political participation between the rural and urban Thais is different. 
In each regression model, the three major political engagement factors (political 
interest, knowledge, and efficacy) were used as independent variables. The measure of 
political interest relies on the same CSES 11-point scale question used in the bivariate 
analysis of rural-urban differences in political engagement. The scale for the political 
interest question ranges from 0 (not at all interested) to 10 (very interested).  
Political knowledge was measured as a total score of the six electoral knowledge 
questions, where 1 was given to each correct answer and 0 to each incorrect response. 
The score for political knowledge ranges from 0 to 6. Using the four CSES 10-point scale 
political efficacy questions, political efficacy was now measured as a mean score of 
agreement with the statement, (1) “If people like us go to vote, we can change what 
happens in the future,” and disagreement with the statements: (2) “Sometimes I think that 
I just don’t understand politics;” (3) “Government officials really do not care what people 
like you and me think;” and (4) “Common people like me don’t have any influence on 
what goes on in politics.” Each component has a value that ranges from 1 to 10 (disagree 
to agree). This value was rescaled to range from 0 (least efficacious) to 9 (most 
efficacious) before calculating the mean score for the regression analysis. Political 
engagement typically facilitates greater participation, so positive coefficients for all of 
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these factors were expected from both the overall respondents and the separate group 
models. 
Despite these political engagement factors, the models controlled for several 
demographic, attitudinal, mobilization, and contextual variables. Based on prior literature 
investigating the Thai context, five demographic and socioeconomic variables that 
measured individual-level resources were included in this model. These variables are: (1) 
gender, a binary 0-1 variable, which takes the value of 1 for females and 0 for males; (2) 
a continuous measure of age; (3) a 5-point scale measure of income, which takes the 
value of 4 for the highest income category (earning 1,300 USD per month and over) and 
0 for the lowest one (earning 170 USD a month), with positive values indicating a higher 
level of monthly income; (4) a 4-point scale of education, which takes the value of 3 for 
having a university degree or higher and 0 for incomplete primary school and lower, with 
positive values indicating a higher level of education; and (5) a 4-point scale of urban 
residents, which takes the value of 3 for Bangkok residents, 2 for large provincial city 
residents, 1 for midsized provincial city residents, and 0 for village/small town residents. 
As with the findings in Chapter 5, these resource-based variables would have only a small 
effect on voting, an “easy” act requiring few resources and motivation (Verba, Nie, and 
Kim, 1978: 120), but some of these, such as income and education, should have some 
impact on political contacting and protesting.   
Two other attitudinal factors that reflect citizens’ experiences/satisfaction with the 
regime were also considered. The first factor, satisfaction with democracy, measured 
whether the respondents were very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at 
all satisfied with the way democracy works in Thailand. The scale was inverted in the 
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analysis so that 0 = “not at all satisfied,” 3 = “very satisfied.” The second variable is 
government performance, which was constructed as an average score using the eight 
government performance questions from the CSES survey: How good or bad a job do 
you think the government [Surayut Chulanon’s government] has done over the past 12 
months: (1) economics; (2) education; (3) employment; (4) poverty reduction; (5) 
healthcare; (6) crime; (7) accidents; and (8) environment. Each component has a value 
that ranges from 1 (very bad) to 4 (very good). This value was rescaled to range from 0 to 
3 in the analysis, so the mean score for government performance runs from 0.00 to 3.00.  
Because the 2007 House of Representatives election was held after the fourteen-
month long military government of Prime Minister Surayut Chulanon, we might have 
expected to see that people who felt hopeful about democracy would be more active in 
politics than those who felt hopeless. We would also expect to see similar patterns for the 
relationship between government performance and political participation, especially 
voting and political contacting. However, for protesting, the direction of its association 
with government performance should be reversed. That is, people who rated the 
government as having done a bad job should engage more in protest activities than those 
who were satisfied with the government’s performance in solving the country’s problems. 
More specifically, since the Red Shirts, whose majority are rural residents, organized 
several protests against the government during the period of the 2006-7 military regimes, 
a negative relationship between government performance and protest would more 
possibly be found among rural respondents rather than among the urban. 
Previous scholars have claimed that rural Thai voters feel obligated to use their 
votes as repayment to those that have been friendly, helpful or generous in helping them 
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to cope with daily difficulties while bringing progress and prosperity to their community 
(Anek, 1995; Suchit 1996). In this regard, the factors that drove rural voters into elections 
and politics depended largely on the opportunity for them to obtain assistance with their 
personal problems. However, empirical analysis that asserts this argument is still rare.  
Data obtained from the 2007 CSES provide us with an opportunity to test such a 
premise in at least two aspects: (1) whether the rural Thais—those who view the ability of 
candidates to solve their personal problems and vote buying as important factors in 
deciding their vote choices—are more likely to participate in politics than those who do 
not; and (2) whether that kind of clientelism has no effect on political participation 
among the urban Thais. In doing this, two clientelism factors were separately created 
from the survey questions asking Thai respondents: (1) whether “having an ability to 
solve your personal problems” is very important, important, not very important, or not at 
all important for you as factors in choosing a candidate; and (2) whether “giving you 
money or gifts” is very important, important, not very important, or not at all important 
for you as factors in choosing a candidate. The scale was inverted in the analysis so that 0 
was given to “not at all important and” 3 was given to “very important.” 
Finally, the 2007 CSES was the greatest source for this study because it contains 
questions that could be applied to constructing several kinds of group mobilization 
variables, such as membership in civic groups, and Red and Yellow attachments. Civic 
membership was constructed as the sum of the number of civic organizations that people 
are members of. Those that were available in 2007 CSES include: (1) membership in 
unions; (2) membership in business or employer associations; (3) membership in farmers 
associations; and (4) membership in professional associations. The membership in civic 
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organization index runs from 0 to 4. Questions that helped to categorize voters into Red 
and Yellow groups were questions that asked:  Is there a political party that represents 
your views well? If yes, another question asked of the respondents was: What is that 
party? Concerning the political positions that the Red or Yellow supporters take, we can 
roughly define those identified as PPP as Red-voters, PPP attachment, and those 
identified as DP as Yellow-voters, DP attachment. Group engagement typically 
facilitates greater participation, so positive coefficients for all of these factors were 
expected, especially for PPP attachment, in voting and protesting activities among the 
rural. 
The findings for the joint regression model for voting showed that when 
controlling for demographic, experiences with regime, clientelism, and mobilization 
factors, none of the political engagement factors had an impact on voting (Table 6.5). 
Among all sixteen factors included in the model, it was only PPP attachment that had a 
positive impact on voting. This indicates that people who identified PPP as the political 
party that represented their view well were more likely than the average population to 
vote in the 2007 election. However, this factor was the best explanation of greater voting 
activism only for the rural residents when it was examined in the separating models for 
rural respondents only and urban respondents only. 
The findings in the models of voting for rural respondents only and urban 
respondents only provided many challenging explanations of voting activism between 
rural and urban Thais, although these findings confirmed what previous scholars have 
suggested about a sharp contrasting reason for the rural versus urban to participate in an  




Factors Affecting Voting, by Rural-Urban Area of Residence (Logit) 
 Voting Rural respondents only Urban respondents only 
 B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
Political Engagement          
Interest -.118 .077 -.194 .105 * .055 .106
Knowledge -.190 .438 .325 .533 -1.457 .770 *
Efficacy .149 .104 .287 .124 ** -.106 .166
Demographic          
Female .044 .287 .157 .352 .288 .439
Age -.009 .011 -.002 .014 -.041 .015 ***
Income -.115 .122 -.122 .157 -.068 .178
Education -.111 .096 -.184 .125 -.032 .124
Rural residence .218 .422  
BKK residence .789 .681  
Experiences with regime   
Satisfaction with democracy  .093 .179 .110 .213 .428 .272
Government performance -.221 .266 -.300 .343 .075 .384
Clientelism  
Personal help -.037 .164 -.009 .200 -.026 .252
Vote buying -.233 .171 -.246 .225 -.230 .228
Group mobilization  
Group membership .124 .235 .163 .294 .083 .388
PPP attachment 1.124 .399 *** 1.548 .483 *** .715 .676
DP attachment -.116 .326 .118 .409 -.408 .481
Constant 4.116 1.345 *** 3.470 1.573 ** 5.602 1.964 ***
N 1,380 799 581 
Nagelkerke R2 .082 .140 .123 
Chi-square 30.862 36.494 21.754 
Model-significance *** ***  





election by going to vote. First of all, unlike the claim of conventional wisdom, neither of 
the two clientelism variables was significantly related to voting activism among the rural. 
Secondly, even though the negative effect of political interest on voting indicated 
support for the dominant claim that tends to view higher voter turnout rates of the rural as 
a result of voting among those that lack attention to politics, positive outcomes from rural 
residents’ participation in voting should not be totally ignored since political efficacy 
tended to increase their voter turnout rates. That is, rural voters who feel more efficacious 
about engaging in politics are more likely to vote than those who feel less efficacious. 
Moreover, it was evident that PPP attachment was positively associated with voting 
activism among rural residents, indicating more feeling PPP as representative to their 
view, more energetic the rural tend to be in the election. As a result, it is not exactly true 
that the rural are easily mobilized by simply patron-client relations and vote buying in 
terms of participating in voting. Rather, they are mobilized by the party/group that most 
represents their views and perhaps those that enhance their feeling of political efficacy, 
regardless whether such a party encourage them to be more interested in the election.        
In contrast, for the urban, these three factors (i.e., PPP attachment, political 
interest, and efficacy) have no significant impact on their voting activism. What tended to 
decrease voter turnout rates of the urban were age and political knowledge. Indeed, urban 
residents who are young and who know less about parties and candidates are more likely 
to vote in the election than those who are older and who know more about parties and/or 
candidates. As a result, these findings relatively confirm what conventional research 
explains about urban voters’ voting behaviors—that a lack of attention to politics among 
the urban is mainly a result of their negative attitudes toward political parties and 
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politicians. That is, because knowing more about parties and candidates may lead to 
negative perceptions of political parties and politicians, the urban with greater 
information about parties and candidates were less likely to cast ballots than those who 
were less informed. Another result showing that age decreased electoral turnout of the 
urban also supports these interpretations since the younger generation may know less 
about parties and candidates, and thus are more likely to show up at the polls than the 
elderly. 
While political engagement had a systematic effect on voting only for the rural 
respondents, it played a crucial role in fostering the political contacting for citizens 
overall and especially for the rural. The joint regression model in Table 6.6 shows that all 
three political engagement factors (political interest, knowledge, and efficacy) had a 
positive impact on political contacting, with political knowledge having the largest effect 
compared to all other factors in the model. These results indicated a more active 
participation in political contacting of the Thai citizens that were more interested in 
politics (i.e., elections), knew more about their vote choices, and felt firmly efficacious 
about engaging in politics. These patterns were also replicated in the case of the rural 
Thais. However, it was only political knowledge that was systematically and positively 
related to political contacting of the urban.  
Demographic factors were also important to explaining the political contact 
between the rural and the urban. For the overall respondents, it was evident that males, 
people with higher levels of education, and non-Bangkok residents were more likely than 
females, those with lower levels of education, and Bangkok residents to contact their 




Factors Affecting Political Contacting, by Rural-Urban Area of Residence (OLS) 
 Political Contacting Rural respondents only Urban respondents only 
 B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
Political Engagement          
Interest .051 .017 *** .061 .022 *** .010 .021
Knowledge .919 .096 *** .855 .117 *** .816 .136 ***
Efficacy .055 .024 .** .070 .027 ** .020 .035
Demographic      
Female -.144 .065 ** -.080 .076 -.208 .094 **
Age .002 .002 .000 .003 .004 .003
Income .020 .029 .000 .036 .073 .040 *
Education .120 .024 *** .151 .030 *** .042 .029
Urban residence -.166 .039 *** -.904 .245 *** -.354 .056 ***
Experiences with regime 
Satisfaction with Democracy  .030 .044 .007 .052 .213 .066 ***
Government performance .043 .060 .101 .072 -.044 .080
Clientelism 
Personal help -.109 .037 *** -.155 .043 *** -.015 .052
Vote buying .041 .043 .063 .054 -.101 .054 *
Group mobilization 
Group membership .000 .045 -.005 .050 .003 .074
PPP attachment .033 .073 .064 .086 .039 .110
DP attachment .050 .089 .124 .110 -.027 .123
Constant -.182 .274 -.281 .327 .578 .390
N 1,380 799 581 
Adjusted R2 .168 .204 .141 
F-value 16.604 14.631 7.365 
Model-significance *** *** *** 





However, these three factors affected the political contacting of the rural and the 
urban differently. That is, gender was significantly related to political contacting only for 
the urban residents, with a more active role played by urban males than urban females, 
whereas education increased the political contacting of the rural but had no systematic 
effect on this activity of the urban. When considering them together with the effect of 
political engagement, these findings relatively confirmed the general explanations of 
other democracies concerning a higher level of political activism among people with 
more resources (e.g., money and time) and skills (e.g., knowledge and ability to access 
political information). Nevertheless, we should carefully apply these explanations to the 
case of Thailand, where people living in less-developed areas tend to be more active in 
political contacting than those living in more modern cities.  
As mentioned earlier, the results found in the joint regression model of political 
contacting indicated that Thai citizens living outside Bangkok are more likely than those 
living in Bangkok to contact their elected representatives and government officials. 
Conventional wisdom might explain this finding as a result of the greater engagement in 
patron-client relations of the less-developed area residents than of those living in more 
modern areas. However, another finding in this analysis showed that the clientelism 
factor (i.e., personal help) has a negative rather than positive impact on political 
contacting for the average population, and particularly for the rural only group, 
suggesting that people who assign less importance to the patron-client relationship tend to 
express their daily life problems to elected representatives or government officials. 
Indeed for the rural, expecting less personal assistance from the candidate they elected 
increased their political contacting. This makes sense because if people think that they 
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should not expect personal help from anyone, they should ask a person in the formal 
political system to help solve their problems.    
Finally, the results confirmed what this dissertation found in Chapter 5—that 
group mobilization has no statistical impact on political contacting, but different pictures 
from previous chapter’s findings appeared in the case of the experiences with the regime 
factors. More specifically, while political contacting, according to the 2006 model (see 
Table 5.11 in this dissertation), was influenced by the two experiences with regime 
factors (i.e., fair election and satisfaction with the government), another set of 
experiences with regime factors (i.e., satisfaction with democracy and government 
performance) used in the analysis of this chapter had no systematic effect on the political 
contact of the overall respondents. Furthermore, the result concerning the impact of the 
government performance factor in comparison with the effect of government satisfaction 
in the 2006 model suggested that whether this kind of factor affected political contacting 
depended upon the people that were in office, i.e., experiences with the Thaksin 
government among the Thai respondents in 2006 had a negative effect on their political 
contact, while their experiences with the military government of Surayud had no effect.    
However, experiences with regime factors have disparate effects on rural versus 
urban residents. It was evident that satisfaction with democracy had a positive impact on 
the political contacting only of the urban residents. In contrast, political contacting of 
rural residents was driven by government performance. This result suggested that the 
urban would be more likely to contact politicians and government officers regarding their 
daily life problems if they were satisfied with the way democracy worked in the country, 
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while the rural Thais considered more how efficacious the government can respond to 
their problems.  
The factors stimulating Thai citizens to take part in protest activities in 2007 
varied. The joint regression model for protesting in Table 6.7 illustrates that political 
knowledge, income, vote buying, and group membership were the four independent 
variables having a positive impact on protesting, whereas government performance had a 
negative effect. These results indicate that people that actively engaged in protest politics 
in 2007 were more likely to be those that were better-informed about parties and 
politicians, earned a higher income, viewed vote buying as an important factor in making 
their voting decision, were members of civic groups, and gave the government a poor 
performance rating.  
Among these factors, only political knowledge was significantly related to and 
had positive impacts on the protest activism of both the rural and the urban. For other 
factors, if they were associated with the protesting of one group they were not related to 
the protesting of the other. This result suggests that the factors facilitating the greater 
protesting of the rural were sharply different from those that encouraged the urban to join 
the protests. For the rural, apart from political knowledge, age, satisfaction with 
democracy, and government performance were three other factors having an effect on 
their protest activism, with government performance having the largest and negative 
effect. In contrast, the urban residents who actively engaged in protest politics in 2007 
were more likely to be those who were male, earned a higher income, viewed vote buying 
as an important factor in making their vote choice, and were members of civic groups. 




Factors Affecting Protesting, by Rural-Urban Area of Residence (Logit) 
 Protesting Rural respondents only Urban respondents only 
 B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
Political Engagement          
Interest .017 .085 .020 .124 .071 .116
Knowledge 1.784 .656 *** 2.159 1.012 ** 2.299 .825 ***
Efficacy -.142 .119 -.048 .164 -.258 .179
Demographic          
Female -.091 .328 .535 .469 -.746 .465
Age -.021 .014 -.038 .020 * .007 .016
Income .268 .134 ** .247 .173 .509 .176 ***
Education -.049 .110 -.022 .147 -.132 .130
Urban residence -.084 .193 -2.183 1.642 -.522 .264 **
Experiences with regime 
Satisfaction with Democracy .339 .220 .852 .348 ** .343 .310
Government performance -1.043 .298 *** -2.088 .460 *** .026 .385
Clientelism 
Personal help .277 .199 .206 .249 .024 .275
Vote buying .587 .187 *** .059 .301 .816 .226 ***
Group mobilization 
Group membership .332 .198 * .074 .284 .588 .268 **
PPP attachment .052 .407 -.114 .511 .358 .552
DP attachment .464 .412 .045 .622 .500 .551
Constant -7.685 1.613 *** -11.365 2.472 *** -5.549 2.138 ***
N 1,380 799 581 
Nagelkerke R2 .179 .241 .257 
Chi-square 58.393 48.183 48.788 
Model-significance *** *** *** 





Shirts, whose majority were the rural, emerged to oppose the 2006 military coup; and 
then the main reason for these groups of people actively join the protests was their bad 
experiences with the government. 
 
Conclusion 
As we have learned from Chapter 4—that political engagement has changed in 
Thailand during the past decade—this chapter tells us more about this by arguing that 
changes in political engagement have appeared for both rural and urban Thai citizens in a 
different pattern. Focusing on the three political engagement variables (political interest, 
knowledge, and efficacy), this chapter presents mixed patterns of these factors between 
the two groups. It is evident that political interest and knowledge for both provincial and 
Bangkok residents have changed in ebb and flow trends, with slightly more provincial 
than Bangkok residents interested in the elections of 2001 and 2007, and a slightly higher 
score of knowledge for Bangkok voters in 2001 and 2005. Moreover, even though both 
Bangkok and provincial electorates reported moderate levels of political efficacy, 
growing trends in this attitude for both groups were clearly observed. Based on these 
findings, we may optimistically conclude that attitudes towards politics among rural and 
urban Thai citizens had changed in a hopeful direction.  
The second part of this chapter then focuses on explaining the effects of these 
changing patterns on political activism (i.e., voting, political contacting, and protesting 
activities) between rural and urban Thai voters. The findings in this chapter confirm that 
the factors facilitating greater political participation were relatively different between 
rural and urban residents, and those differentiations depended on several factors and 
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varied according to different kinds of activities. Among those factors, political interest 
and political efficacy played an important role in fostering voting, in particular of the 
rural. Political knowledge increased political contacting and protesting of both rural and 
urban residents although it discouraged urban citizens to vote in an election. There was 
no backward effect of the clientelism factors on rural residents’ political actions.  
Furthermore, despite other resource-based and mobilization factors, democracy 
satisfaction tended to increase the political contacting of the urban. In this regard, we 
might conclude, based on what we have learned from the analyses in this chapter, that 
political changes in Thailand during the past decade have created new and (more) 
positive attitudes toward politics and democracy on the part of Thai citizens, regardless 
whether they are people living in less-developed rural or more modern urban areas. It is 
hard to conclude as generally described by the literature that rural Thais are less 
sophisticated and their political actions depend mostly on patron-client ties. Evidence of 
the greater participation in several modes of political activities among Thai citizens in the 
past ten years that we have observed in the previous chapters of this dissertation is 
therefore a sign of democratic progress in Thailand, although many challenges due to 










Political participation is at the heart of democracy. As many scholars have 
mentioned, democracy is unthinkable without the ability of citizens to participate freely 
in the governing process (Dahl 1971; 1989; Verba, Brady, and Schlozman, 1995; Macedo 
et al., 2005; Dalton, 2006). Yet, not all citizens have participated in politics. In fact, while 
many citizens are active—they vote or engage in more demanding forms of 
participation—others are not. Moreover, citizens’ political participatory patterns are not 
constant. They may vary on modes of action, space, and across time.  
In countries where democracy has long been established, the erosion of traditional 
forms of involvement, such as voting and membership in political parties, was 
accompanied by an expansion of action repertoires, the rise of protest politics, and more 
individualized forms of action. However, for many countries where democracy is new 
and unstable, such as Thailand, an opposite trend can be seen in several modes of 
political activity: more people go to vote and an increasing number of them join political 
parties and various civic organizations, while protest politics and individualized forms of 
participation are, at the same time, more common in Thai citizens’ lives.  
The previous chapters examine changing in patterns of political participation and 
engagement in Thailand during the past decade (2001-2010). The empirical evidence
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indicates that political participation among different groups of Thai citizens has changed 
toward a mixed trend—increasing or decreasing depended on types of activities and 
contexts. This chapter summarized the central argument developed throughout the 
dissertation, highlighted the key findings, and considered the implications for future 
research of democratic participation in Thailand and perhaps in other developing 
countries.   
The period between 2001 and 2010 was characterized by several changes in Thai 
politics. This period began with a celebration of political reform under the 1997 
Constitution and the emergence of the most popular political leader, Thaksin Shinawatra, 
and his party, Thai Rak Thai, during the first half of the decade. However, the political 
conflicts between a group of middle-class protesters and Thaksin’s landslide victory 
elected government occurred in late 2005 and led to the military coup in September 2006. 
The military government was established with great support of middle class citizens at 
the beginning, but not Thaksin’s supporters, those who formed the United Front for 
Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), or known later as the Red Shirts, to oppose the 
military rule.  
The new Constitution was drafted with some degree of public participation—the 
national referendum for eligible voters to vote in favor of or to reject the draft. The draft 
constitution was accepted by the majority of voters (58 percent) in the national 
referendum, and promulgated as the 18th Constitution of Thailand since August 20, 2007. 
Since the new constitution was used, the election was held in December 2007, then the 
civilian government was established after the election results were approved by the 
Election Commission, and eventually the military stepped aside. The political conflict 
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continued to exist because Thaksin’s popularity remains still even though he has been in 
exile. Thai politics during the second half of the decade was in crisis under political 
contestations between groups of people—the Yellow Shirts, the Red Shirts, and the 
political elite. In order to understand the changing in patterns of citizen activism in such a 
momentous decade, this dissertation evaluated the quantity, quality, and equality of 
political participation and engagement in Thailand, and then explained how and why 
political participation has changed among groups of Thai citizens, in various modes of 
political action, and across time during the past decade. 
 
Changing in Quantity, Quality, and Equality of Political 
Participation and Engagement in Thailand 
Advocates of political participation and democratic development claimed that 
democracy is better if participation is widespread; more people go to vote, get involved 
with political parties or electoral activities, as well as participate more frequently in an 
organization or group (Marcedo et al., 2005: 8-10). The longitudinal analysis of political 
participation in this study showed that changes in quantity of political participation 
among Thai citizens during the past decade are quite mixed. While overall Thai citizens 
increasingly have participated in voting, decreasing trends of participation in 
campaigning and political contacting activities can be observed during some periods—
especially when the country faced crisis or undemocratic power intervened in politics. 
Further, large numbers of them have contacted with government officials quite often in 
order to express their problems and concerns.  
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However, the levels of participation in campaigning and contacting actions have 
tended to decrease since the country experienced the political crisis in 2006. In addition, 
very few still reported using political parties, NGOs, and mass media as channels of 
political contacting. In contrast to other forms of political participation, and as a result of 
the 2006 political crisis, protest activism, which tended to decrease between 2002 and 
2005, steadily increased since then. Moreover and importantly, an increasing trend of 
protest activism since 2006 is questionable whether this is an evidence of democratic 
progression in Thailand. 
Thus, the overall results obtained from this study’s longitudinal analysis of 
political participation do not provide evidence of constant progress in the quantity of 
political participation in Thailand but instead, suggest that people participate in politics 
differently depending on types of political activity and on the political environment. In 
addition, because these changing patterns of political participation accordingly are in line 
with up-and-down trends of party membership and group engagement, it can possibly 
conclude that political participation is strongly related to civic engagement and other 
modes of political involvement (e.g., party and group membership).  
However, an increase in the number of Thai citizens going to vote, along with a 
mixed nature of people engaging in campaigns and nonconventional political activities 
and joining parties and voluntary groups, alone may not be adequate to conclude that 
Thailand now has progressive and meaningful political participation. That is, a healthy 
democracy also needs quality of participation, both in individual and institutional terms. 
More specifically, to participate in public affairs, citizens should be actively interested in 
politics, have proper participatory knowledge and skills, and believe in their potential to 
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bring about change or influence what is going on in politics. This dissertation clearly 
observed that changing in citizens’ level of political interest, knowledge, and efficacy in 
Thailand during the past decade appears as ebb and flow trends rather than as constant 
increases. However, there also was evidence indicating that the quality of political 
participation in Thailand has changed in an optimistic direction.  
First, based on results that show large proportions of Thai citizens following news 
on TV and reporting being interested in elections, political interest among citizens seems 
to be relatively high. In addition, more than half of Thai voters can correctly name at least 
two candidates and parties as well as match correctly which party the candidate belongs 
to, suggesting that Thai voters were not totally thoughtless about their electoral choices 
while showing up at the poll. Along with a moderate number of Thai citizens who believe 
in their own competence to understand and participate effectively in politics, 
improvement, rather than backwardness, in the quality of citizen participation in Thailand 
could be expected, at least, in the long run, if not in the near future.   
The quantity and quality of political participation may be ineffectual if they 
produce uneven distribution. In this respect, democracy is better if the voices and 
interests of the people as a whole are concerned. There should be no institutional obstacle 
that undermines political participation among the disadvantaged, particularly the young, 
the poor, the less educated, and many racial and ethnic minorities. Influenced by studies 
in the Western democracies, has been conducted, seeking to find the best answer for the 
same type of these participatory questions. The dominant view in Thailand’s political 
behavior research has claimed that females and the young, because they have lower 
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participatory resources and skills, are less likely than males or older people to participate 
in politics.  
Furthermore, people living in rural areas, because they are poor and less-educated, 
are easily mobilized by influential persons and by personal benefit, and for this reason 
they are the most active groups in electoral activities. Based on this conventional 
wisdom, there should be unequal distribution of political participation among Thai 
citizens with different socioeconomic backgrounds. The examinations on changing in the 
equality of political participation in this dissertation confirmed that participation gaps 
between people with different geographic and socioeconomic backgrounds still exist.  
However, a trend of a decline in such gaps can be clearly observed during the past 
decade in Thailand (at least, among some social groups such as between male and female 
and between in 2002 and in 2006). This decrease in the demographic and socioeconomic 
gap in participation between the socioeconomically disadvantaged and the rest of the 
population during the past decade is convincing evidence of a more equal distribution of 
political participation among Thais, although the overall participatory gap between the 
low-educated and the higher-educated still exists and has enlarged. The growing levels of 
participation among many groups, especially females, also are reasonable results to 
explain why overall levels of participation in the last decade have expanded. 
The key findings that suggested optimistic trends of changing in the quantity, 
quality, and equality of political participation in Thailand’s past ten years are important 
results but leave many questions untested. For example, why have the levels of 
participation among different groups changed? Do the participatory disparities among 
Thai citizens exist only because they have unequal resources and skills stemming from 
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differences in demographic and socioeconomic status? What are the factors that have 
caused the expanding trend of political participation in Thailand? And more specifically, 
and perhaps most importantly, because overall political participation and engagement 
have changed in a consistent trend, are political engagement factors such as political 
interest and efficacy good explanations for the changing patterns of participation among 
different groups? Chapter 5 and 6 offered some preliminary answers to these questions. 
Those answers help to explain how and why political participation and engagement has 
changed in Thailand during the past decade. 
  
Factors Explaining Changing in Patterns of Political Participation 
Research on the factors that may affect people’s political participation has been 
widely conducted by American political scientists, and those studies’ models and theories 
have long been applied and modified by Thai scholars. We could not reject that the 
previous studies in the case of Thailand have done a very good job in explaining how and 
why Thai people become involved in politics. Nevertheless, those studies cannot tell us 
much about how and why participation among Thai citizens has changed across time and 
context. The main reason is that too much focus was placed on the factors of 
socioeconomic status and mobilization (which mostly means the influence of clientelism 
and vote buying). This study does not completely ignore the impacts of such factors on 
political participation in Thailand but views previous explanations as incomplete.  
This study recognizes that political participation is fostered by a variety of 
characteristics that predispose an individual to becoming politically involved. These 
political predispositions have changed over time and might be shaped by political 
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contexts. This dissertation thus proposed a participatory model that included not only 
socioeconomic status but also various attitudinal and mobilization factors to be tested in 
several contexts (years) as a more proper way to explain changes in the patterns of 
political participation in Thailand during the past ten years.  
By using improved methods, this study clearly shows that participatory 
differences among groups of Thai citizens were not solely a consequence of differences 
in socioeconomic status backgrounds. Rather, there are various psychological, 
motivational, and contextual factors affecting participatory disparities among social 
groups. More specifically, this study provided evidence indicating that Thai citizens with 
more positive attitudes toward politics (being more interested in politics, knowing better 
about politics, and feeling more efficacious about engaging in politics) were more 
politically active in various democratic activities than those with more negative attitudes. 
Further, individual Thais who have close relationships with specific groups/parties tended 
to participate more in political activities than those who have fewer such relationships or 
none. The levels of political participation of Thai voters who have had a positive 
experience with political institutions were systematically greater than those of individuals 
who have had negative experiences.  
Moreover, using time-series data with several controls and considering the 
impacts of many potential factors on various modes of political actions, this study 
concluded that socioeconomic, engagement and mobilization factors impact on political 
participation depending on modes of political activism—voting, campaign activities, 
political contacting, and protests. According to this study’s logistic regression analysis of 
the 2002 ABS data, it is true, as many of the aforementioned scholars have argued, that 
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Thai citizens who are male, older, and living in the rural areas are more likely than their 
socioeconomic counterparts to participate in politics.  
However, such a causal link is true only in many, but not all, types of political 
activity, especially when controlling for political engagement and motivation factors. For 
example, Thai males are more active than Thai females only in campaign and political 
contacting activities. Secondly, there is no participatory difference between younger and 
older Thais in the other three activities, whereas younger Thais are more likely than the 
older to take part in protests. Thirdly, while the lower-income Thais are more likely than 
the better-off to participate in campaign activity, the richer Thais are more active in 
taking part in protesting. Fourthly, education is not a very good predictor of most of the 
four activities, except political contacting, which shows that the higher level of education, 
the more often political contacting is carried out. Finally, rural Thais are more likely than 
the urban to participate in three of the four political activities—campaign activities, 
political contacting, and protesting, whereas there is no participatory difference between 
them in voting. 
The results that show more politically activism of Thai people having fewer 
resources (e.g., skill or money) such as the younger and the lower income group can 
possibly be interpreted as indirect evidence of the continuing influence of clientelism on 
political participation if we consider them together with the results that demonstrate the 
positive impacts of party attachment and group membership on participation. That is, 
Thai citizens having fewer resources to manipulate participation may participate more in 
political activities because they are mobilized, forced, or even paid by influence persons 
or groups whom they feel close to or have close/personal relations with.  
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However, because all of the political interest and efficacy factors have positive 
impacts on participation in the same analysis, the positive impacts of the mobilization 
factors on participation can be interpreted rather as causes of individuals’ civic 
orientations—enhancing individuals’ attitudes that eventually stimulate participation. 
Indeed, whether the younger or the low income group are paid or forced to join political 
activities, at least, they have enough skills (e.g., knowledge and ability to access political 
information) to manipulate their political participation effective. 
In addition, these participatory patterns of different groups in the four key 
political activities do not constant but change when the political context changes. The 
results from the logistic regression analysis of the 2006 ABS data showed, for example, 
that while ability to participate in politics is significant and had a positive impact on 
voting in 2002, such a factor is not significantly related to voting for 2006. Instead, it is 
evident that people that have a higher level of income, that follow political news more 
often, that feel less efficacious about understanding what is going on in politics, and that 
are members of groups/associations were more likely to vote in the 2006 election than the 
average person.  
Additionally and most surprisingly, the mobilization factors which played a 
significant role in fostering contacting activism for 2002 had no significant impact on 
political contacting for 2006. Another interesting finding is that none of the political 
engagement factors was associated with protesting. Rather, this study’s analysis 
presented that people that actively engaged in protest politics in 2006 were more likely to 
be those that earned a higher income and that felt close to a political party, regardless as 
how much interest in politics they showed or how politically efficacious they felt. In 
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short, various pictures of political participation among groups of Thai citizens between 
2002 and 2006, as well as the loss of impact of several political engagement and 
mobilization factors on individual types of political actions, indicate that the impacts of 
socioeconomic, engagement and mobilization factors on political participation vary over 
time: these factors may impact participation in one context but not necessarily in others.  
The differential rates of participation for any subgroup deserve attention, but 
rural-urban differences are particularly worthy of attention in the case of Thailand. This 
study investigates rural-urban differences with respect to the diverse set of 
predispositions that shape individual’s motivation and propensity to take part in politics. 
It finds that the attitudes toward politics between rural and urban Thai citizens were 
neither constantly negative nor positive, and were not easy to explain solely based on 
each group’s differences in socioeconomic status or area of living, as preceding scholars 
have suggested.  
This study obviously show that even though the provincial Thais were poorer and 
had lower level of education than Bangkok residents, they were not less interested in, less 
informed about, and politically less efficacious to engage in politics than their Bangkok 
counterparts. Moreover, in many cases they reported greater engagement attitudes than 
the metropolis citizens. This political engagement figure of provincial voters firmly 
challenges conventional wisdoms especially those that has labeled rural voters as ill 
informed, uninterested, and easily deceived.  
On the other hand, as with what other scholars indicated, the richer and higher-
educated Bangkokians have relatively strong awareness of politics: they reported high 
levels of interested in the elections, especially in 2005, and had great knowledge about 
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political parties and candidates in 2001 and 2005 elections. However, the ebb and flow of 
their political engagement indicated that urban Thai citizens’ attitudes towards politics 
are not constantly negative as preceding scholars had suggested but depend on various 
factors such as political contexts and their experiences with the political system as well. 
These findings are convincingly enough for this dissertation to conclude that attitudes 
towards politics among rural and urban Thai citizens have changed in a favorable 
direction, although many challenges due to undemocratic powers (i.e., military) and 
political conflicts between groups of Thai citizens continue to exist. 
 
Implications for Understanding the Political Activism of Citizens 
in the Transitional Democracy of Thailand  
Although the literature regarding political participation in Thailand has been 
growing and has become diversified during the past twenty years, there are still many 
areas which require considerable attention. As this study discussed earlier, the 
conceptualization of political participation has developed from a very narrow sense of 
electoral participation (e.g., voting and participating in campaign activities) to a broader 
view that includes several forms of nonelectoral participation, such as contacting public 
officials and working with others to solve community problems. Several studies in 
American and comparative politics also have incorporated unconventional 
participation—protests, demonstrations, and political violence—into their inquiry.  
However, most Thai literature has defined political participation as participation 
in electoral activities, especially voting and campaign activities. There are few empirical 
studies on political contacting and protests. Defining political participation in a broad 
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sense by including four key activities—voting, campaigning, political contacting, and 
protesting, this study demonstrated a clearer picture than previous research on political 
participation in Thai democracy. In order to explain more precisely political participation 
of Thai citizens, this dissertation suggests future research to deal more intensively with 
both conventional and unconventional activities. This dissertation also suggests Thai 
democratic reformists consider a variety of political actions before enacting any 
citizenship empowerment program to Thai citizens.   
This dissertation provided answers not only to questions about the extent to which 
Thai citizens participate in a set of political activities, but also questions relating to what 
particular type of political acts they engage in more often, with whom, how much, and 
why. However, because the modes of political participation are dynamic—in the sense 
that outdated action may not match citizens’ way of life any more while new forms of 
political action emerge every day—it is worthwhile studying other modes of political 
action that have existed and will tend to be widespread in the near future; empirical data 
concerning such actions, however, are rare or unavailable, such as participation by using 
social media to influence the decisions of government personnel.  
Thus, future research in the Thai case needs to collect more data regarding these 
kinds of activity. At the same time, democratic reformists should take such new forms of 
political action into account, by providing political spaces for citizens to express their 
needs and opinions. Because this dissertation indicated the development of political 
activism is closely related to a vibrancy of civic engagement and party attachment, 
empowering robust and pluralistic civil society and designing a responsive political party 
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are possible ways to help political participation of citizens in transitional society like 
Thailand more meaningful and progress. 
In addition, even though this study uncovered a number of important and 
interesting connections between political participation and a variety of potential factors, 
especially political engagement (i.e., political interest, knowledge, and efficacy), 
socioeconomic status, clientelism, group mobilization, and experience with regime 
factors, one could expand this study’s explanations by constructing alternative empirical 
indicators based on the Thai political context, especially indicators relating to patron-
client relations and vote-buying. Indeed, further research may benefit from collecting 
new data that are more proper than those that were used in this dissertation to invent 
patron-client relations and vote-buying factors as truly institutional factors rather than as 
kinds of attitudinal factors (opinions toward patron-client relations and vote-buying), as 
this dissertation has done under the limitation of data availability. Future study might also 
collect more data and redefine this study’s measurement of Red- and Yellow-supporters 
(i.e., feeling close to one particular party that was supported by Red Shirt or Yellow Shirt 
movements) by emphasizing Thai voters based on a differentiation of their political 
positions/ideologies (e.g., Red-shirts/Yellow-shirts, Liberalist/Royalist, and so on).  
Furthermore, the empirical analyses in this dissertation may benefit from getting 
empirical data for more years, even though this study’s theoretical arguments and 
findings ought not to be sample-dependent. For example, one might apply the 
participatory models developed in this study to examinations that employ more recent 
survey data, especially those that will be released after the 2011 House of Representatives 
election in Thailand (i.e., July 3, 2011).  
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Last but not least, though the answers derived from the Thai case, according to 
this study, provided a clearer understanding of the relationships among individual-level 
factors (particularly socioeconomic and psychological factors), motivation (group 
engagement), political contexts, and various forms of political participation across time, 
future study could produce interesting and useful insights for both academics and 
policymakers by adopting improved approaches of those used in this dissertation to other 
developing countries, where political changes and reforms have dramatically occurred 
during the past decades as well. 
 
Final Words 
Thailand went through a near-death experience last May 2010. The period since 
then has not been consolidated, as political conflicts among several groups of political 
leaders have continued, even though many situations have changed, in particular the split 
into several groups within Yellow-Shirt supporters due to disagreements on the Thai-
Cambodian border problems and the direction for their future movement, while the Red 
Shirts are growing and moving beyond the issues of Thaksin to issues of political equality 
and justice. Many roadmaps (or blueprints) for new political reform have been proposed 
by several groups of reformists and scholars, but wide concern about the return of the 
military still exist—even in a period when a new election is coming (July 3, 2011). This 
dissertation presented evidence confirming that these on-going phenomena are not simply 
political conflicts among people at the top of the pyramid, but are a result of the political 
awakening of Thai citizens, both rural and urban.  
232 
 
In order to make democracy in Thailand healthier, this dissertation encourages the 
political elite and future reformers to recognize that Thai citizens, whether they are poor 
and living in less-developed areas, are more politically sophisticated and active than they 
thought or understood. Thai citizens are well-informed, politically interested, and not 
easily deceived. As a result, investments in political reform by emphasizing only 
initiating laws and regulations aimed at preventing the bad effects of patron-client 
relations and vote-buying are useless. Using nondemocratic tools (e.g., military coups) to 
solve political problems is out-of-date, unacceptable, and rather leads to worse situations. 
Instead, with a great number of wakeful Thai citizens, this is the time for designing and 
building efficiency and responsive democratic institutions by listening more carefully and 


















SURVEY DATA AND SAMPLE DESIGNS
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About the Surveys 
Survey data analyzed in this dissertation were collected by the Asian Barometer 
Project—ABS (2005-2008) and the Comparative Study of Electoral System—CSES 
MODULE 1, 2, and 3. The Asian Barometer Project was co-directed by Professors Fu Hu 
and Yun-han Chu and received major funding support from Taiwan’s Ministry of 
Education, Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University. CSES MODULE 1, 2, and 
3 are based on work supported by the National Science Foundation (www.nsf.gov), the 
University of Michigan, and the many organizations that fund election studies by CSES 
collaborators. All of these surveys conducted in Thailand with a great coordination of 
King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI), a leading national academic institute that aims to 
develop consolidated and peaceful democracy in the country. The author appreciates the 
assistance in providing data by the institutes and individuals aforementioned.  
The views expressed herein are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the funding organizations. This appendix describes sample designs and methods 
used in the field surveys of the ABS and CSES in Thailand. 
 
ABS Surveys in Thailand 
Each year survey (i.e., 2002, 2006) conducted in Thailand by ABS is designed as 
below. 
 
Asian Barometer: Thailand 2002 
The sampling plan for the study consisted of two-stage cluster sampling, plus 
systematic sampling of the final populations. The stages are: 
235 
 
1) Systematic random sampling of 50 legislative constituencies from the 
400 in the nation. This produces the following distribution of constituencies by 
region: 
Central and Eastern Regions (including Bangkok)—16 
constituencies 
Northern Region—10 constituencies 
Northeastern Region—17 constituencies 
Southern Region—7 constituencies 
2) Systematic random sampling of 100 voting units across the clusters of 
legislative constituencies produces the following distribution by region: 
Central and Eastern Regions (including Bangkok)—28 voting units  
Northern Region—22 voting units  
Northeastern Region—38 voting units  
Southern Region—12 voting units 
3) Systematic random sampling of respondents from across these voting 
units produces an N of 1,546 and the following distribution by region: 
Central and Eastern Regions (including Bangkok)—538 
respondents  
Northern Region—297 respondents   
Northeastern Region—514 respondents  
Southern Region—197 respondents 
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If selected respondents are unavailable, substitutes of the same gender were 
obtained from names on either side of the chosen respondent on the voting list. This 
procedure yield an N of 1,546 respondents. 
 After translating the questionnaire into Thai, teams of interviewers visited each of 
the selected respondents who completed the questionnaire provided by the coordinators 
of the project. Each survey team coordinates with a regional supervisor and other 
assistants from the particular region.  
 
Asian Barometer: Thailand 2006 
 The sampling process for the survey consisted of a two-stage cluster sampling, 
plus a systematic sampling of the final population. The stages included: 
1) A systematic sample of 50 legislative districts drawn from the 400 





Central and East—12 constituencies 
Bangkok—5 constituencies 
2) The second stage of clusters consisted of 100 voting units (precincts) 
obtained by a systematic sample from across the fifty legislative districts. Region 
Voting units include: 
North—19 voting units 
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Northeast—40 voting units 
South—11 voting units 
Central and East—22 voting units 
Bangkok—8 voting units 
3) The third stage consists of systematically sampling roughly 1,500 




Central and East—403 respondents 
Bangkok—184 respondents 
Roughly 1,500 respondents were drawn from a population of 43,261. Because the 
“skip interval” exceeded 28.84, a more conservative approach using 28 as the interval 
yielded 1,546 respondents. If a selected respondent was unavailable, a substitute of the 
same gender and age was obtained by selecting a name from either side of the chosen 
respondent on the voting list. This procedure yielded an n-value of 1,546 respondents. 
 After translating the questionnaire into Thai, teams of interviewers visited each of 
the selected respondents who completed the questionnaire provided by the coordinators 
of the project. Each survey team coordinates with a regional supervisor and other 
assistants from the particular region. According to the schedule plan, the researchers 
simultaneously began to interview the respondents on April 3, 2006, and data collection 




CSES Surveys in Thailand 
Each year survey (i.e., 2001, 2005, 2007) conducted in Thailand by CSES is 
designed as below. 
 
2001 Thai Election Study 
The sample for the 2001 Thai election study is composed of 1,081 respondents 
from a sample of 1,250. Respondents were interviewed as a panel both pre-election and 
post-election (House of Representatives elections, January 6, 2001). Questions were 
asked verbally, in the language or dialect spoken in the home. The sample was drawn in 
the following manner: 
1) Stratification by region. This included: a. North - 4 provinces; b. 
Northeast - 3 provinces; c. Central - 3 provinces; d. Bangkok; e. South - 5 
provinces. Each region was to produce 250 respondents. 
2) Cluster sampling within regions by systematic sampling of polling 
units. Each region sampled 50 polling units. 
3) Systematic sampling of eligible voters across the polling units in each 
region. 
4) These data allow statistical analysis comparing regions. However, in 
order to generalize across all respondents, the data may be weighted by 
populations of the province to reflect the relative populations of the provinces. 





2005 Thai Election Study 
The sample for the 2005 Thai election study is composed of 2,000 respondents. 
The sample was drawn relying on a three-stage probability sample. This sampling method 
based upon clusters of legislative districts, then of voting units (precincts), followed by a 
systematic sampling of voters in the selected voting units. The sample included 50 of 400 
legislative districts, 100 voting units from across the 50 legislative districts, and 
systematic sampling of respondents across the 100 voting units. Respondents were 
interviewed as a panel both pre-election and post-election (House of Representatives 
elections, February 6, 2005). Questions were asked verbally, in the language or dialect 
spoken in the home.  
 
2007 Thai Election Study 
The sample selection procedures for the 2007 Thai election survey rely on a three-
stage probability sample. This sampling method based upon clusters of legislative 
districts, then of voting units (precincts), followed by a systematic sampling of voters in 
the selected voting units. The sample included 50 of 145 legislative districts, 100 voting 
units from across the 50 legislative districts, and systematic sampling of respondents 
across the 100 voting units. Roughly 2,000 respondents were drawn, because the “skip 
interval”. Therefore, the sample for the 2007 Thai election study is composed of 2,006 
respondents  (included an over-sample of roughly 500 respondents from Bangkok).61 
Respondents were interviewed as a panel both pre-election and post-election (House of 
                                                            
 
61 These over-sample respondents were weighted as a corrected proportion of the 
Thai sample; so that the total number of sample in the analysis is 1,683.  
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Representatives elections, December 23, 2007). Questions were asked verbally, in the 



























Variables Used in Quantity of Political Participation Study 
 
Indicators Measure Type Source Method 
Voting     













rally, and  
% of “yes” respond to survey 
question: Do you attend 






















% of “yes” respond to survey 
question: Did you do anything 
else to help or show your 
support for a party or 

















Political contacting    
- Contacting 
officials 
% of “yes” respond to survey 
question: In the past three (3) 
years, have you NEVER, 
ONCE, or MORE THAN 
ONCE done the following 
because of personal, family, 
or neighborhood problems, or 
problems with government 
officials and policies?  










 % of “yes” respond to survey 
question: For each one I read, 
please just tell me whether 
you have done it in the last 12 
months, or not?  











Table B.1 (continued) 
 





% of “yes” respond to survey 
question: In the past three (3) 
years, have you NEVER, 
ONCE, or MORE THAN 
ONCE done the following 
because of personal, family, 
or neighborhood problems, or 
problems with government 
officials and policies? – 











 % of “yes” respond to survey 
question: For each one I read, 
please just tell me whether 
you have done it in the last 12 
months, or not? —elected 











Protest activism    
- Protesting % of “yes” respond to survey 
question: If you had contacts 
in the past three (3) years, 
because of personal, family, 
or neighborhood problems, or 
problems with government 
officials and policies, Did you 











analysis   
 % of “yes” respond to survey 
question: For each one I read, 
please just tell me whether 
you have done it in the last 12 
months, or not? —taken part 

















Variables Used in Quality of Political Participation Study 
 
Indicators Measure Type Source Method 
Political interest     
- Interested in the 
election 
Mean of political 
interest scale (out of 
10): How interested 










analysis   
- Attention to the 
news media (TV) 
% of “3-5 a week” or 
“every day” respond 
to survey question: 
how often you have 
watched news report 











analysis   
- Attention to the 
news media 
(radio) 
% of “3-5 a week” or 
“every day” respond 
to survey question: 
how often you have 
listened news report 
on radio during the 











- Attention to the 
news media 
(newspaper) 
% of “3-5 a week” or 
“every day” respond 
to survey question: 
how often you have 
read newspaper during 










analysis   
Political knowledge    
- Name of 
candidate 
% of respondents who 
can identify at least 
two names of 

















Table B.2 (continued) 
 
Indicators Measure Type Source Method 
- Name of 
political party 
% of respondents who 
can identify at least 2 
parties sending 










analysis   
- Match candidate 
and party 
% of respondents who 
can match correctly 
candidate and party 










Political efficacy     
- Internal Efficacy % of “6-10” rate for 
the 10-points scale 
question: Do you 
agree with the 
following statement—
If people like us go to 
vote, we can change 











 % of “6-10” rate for 
the 10-points scale 
question: Do you 
agree with the 
following statement—
Sometimes I think that 

























Table B.2 (continued) 
 
Indicators Measure Type Source Method 
- External 
Efficacy 
% of “6-10” rate for 
the 10-points scale 
question: Do you 
agree with the 
following statement—
Government officials 
really do not care 
what people like you 










analysis   
 % of “6-10” rate for 
the 10-points scale 
question: Do you 
agree with the 
following statement—
Common people like 
me don’t have any 
influence on what go 



































Variables Used in Equality of Political Participation Study 
 
Indicators Measure/ description Coding 
   
1. Dependent 
Variables:  
Political participation  
   
Voting   
- Voting Responses to survey question: Did 
you cast a ballot in the election? 
0 = no 
1 = yes 
Campaign activities    
- Attending election 
meeting or rally, and  
Responses to survey question: Do 
you attend election meeting or rally?  
 
0 = no 
1 = yes 
- Showing support to 
certain political 
parties or candidates  
Responses to survey question: Did 
you do anything else to help or show 
your support for a party or candidate 
running in the election? 
 
0 = no 
1 = yes 
Political contacting   
- Contacting officials Responses to survey question: In the 
past three 3 years, have you done the 
following because of personal, 
family, or neighborhood problems, or 
problems with government officials 
and policies?—Any government 
official 
 
0 = no 




Responses to survey question: In the 
past three 3 years, have you done the 
following because of personal, 
family, or neighborhood problems, or 
problems with government officials 
and policies?—National elected  
representatives  
0 = no 












Table B.3 (continued) 
 
Indicators Measure/ description Coding 
   
Protest activism   
- Protesting Responses to survey question: If you 
had contacts in the past three (3) 
years, because of personal, family, or 
neighborhood problems, or problems 
with government officials and 
policies, Did you do this alone or 
with others?—demonstration,  strike, 
sit-in 
0 = no 




Gender  Respondent’s gender  0 = Male  
1 = Female 
Age Respondent’s age  0 = 18-25 years old  
1 = 26 years old and 
over 
Income  Average household’s earn during the 
last 6 months:  
0 =  the poor ($1 per day 
or lower in 2002 and 
earn $1.3 per day or 
lower in 2006)  
1 = the better-off 
 
Education  Respondent’s educational level 0 = no formal education 
and incomplete primary 
education 
1 = Completed primary 
education and higher 
 
Urban / rural resident  Respondent’s area of living 0 = village/small town 
1 = large 
city/metropolitan 
   
Source: ABS (2002; 2006) 













Variables Used in Multivariate Models of Political Participation Index 
 
Indicators Measure/ description Coding 






Sum of six political activities: 0-6 




Demographic   
Gender  Respondent’s gender  0-1: 0 = Male; 1 = 
Female 
Age Respondent’s age  18-highest 
 
Income  Average household’s earn during the 
last 6 months 
0-4: 0 = the lowest 
income category (earn 
30 USD a month); 4 =  
the highest income 
category (earn 1,200 
USD per month and 
over)  
 
Education  Respondent’s educational level 0-3: 0 = incomplete 
primary school and 
lower; 3 = having some 
university degree and 
higher 
 
Urban / rural resident  Respondent’s area of living 0-1: 0 = village/small 
town; 
1 = large 
city/metropolitan 
Political Engagement   
Interest Responses to survey question: How 
much interested you are in the 
politics.  
 
0-10: 0 = not at all 
interested; 10 = very 








Table B.4 (continued) 
 
Indicators Measure/ description Coding 
   
Efficacy: participation Responses to survey question: Do 
you strongly agree, agree, disagree, 
and strongly disagree with the 
following statement - “I think I have 
the ability to participate in politics” 
0-3: 0 = strongly 
disagree; 3 = strongly 
agree 
 [Note: Original question 
used 1-4 scales: 1 = 
strongly agree; 2 = 
agree; 3 = disagree; 4 = 
strongly disagree. The 
scale was convert and 
coded as above in the 
analysis] 
 
Efficacy: understand Responses to survey question: Do 
you strongly agree, agree, disagree, 
and strongly disagree with the 
following statement - “Sometimes 
politics and government seems so 
complicated that a person like me 
can't really understand what is going 
on” 
0-3: 0 = strongly agree; 
3 = strongly disagree 
 
[Note: Original question 
used 1-4 scales: 1 = 
strongly agree; 2 = 
agree; 3 = disagree; 4 = 
strongly disagree. The 
scale was coded as 
above in the analysis] 
Mobilization   
Party Attachment Responses to survey question: Do 
you usually think of yourself as close 
to any particular party? If yes, 
another question asked the 
respondents how much close they 
feel.  
0-3: 0 = feel not close to 
any party; 3 = feel very 
much close to some 
party 
Group Membership Responses to survey question: “Are 
you a member of any organization or 
formal groups?” 
0-1: 0 = no; 1 = yes 
Source: ABS (2002; 2006) 













Variables Used in Multivariate Models of Voting, Campaign Activities, 
Political Contacting, and Protesting 
 
Indicators Measure/ description Coding 
   
1. Dependent 
Variables  
(for each model):  
  
   
1.1 Voting   
- Voting Responses to survey question: Did 
you cast a ballot in the election? 
 




- Attending election 
meeting or rally 
Responses to survey question: Do 
you attend election meeting or rally?  
 
0-1: 0 = no for both; 1 = 
yes for either one 
- Showing support to 
certain political 
parties or candidates  
Responses to survey question: Did 
you do anything else to help or show 
your support for a party or candidate 






- Contacting officials 
- Contacting officials 
at higher level 
 
Responses to survey question: In the 
past three 3 years, have you done the 
following because of personal, 
family, or neighborhood problems, or 
problems with government officials 
and policies?  
– Any government official 
– Officials at higher level 
 
0-1: 0 = no for both; 1 = 












Table B.5 (continued)  
 
Indicators Measure/ description Coding 
   
1.4 Protest activism   
- Protesting Responses to survey question: If 
you had contacts in the past three 
(3) years, because of personal, 
family, or neighborhood problems, 
or problems with government 
officials and policies, Did you do 
this alone or with others?—
demonstration,  strike, sit-in 




Demographic   
Gender (Female)  Respondent’s gender  0-1: 0 = Male; 1 = 
Female 
Age Respondent’s age  18-highest 
 
Income  Average household’s earn during 
the last 6 months 
0-4: 0 = the lowest 
income category (earn 30 
USD a month); 4 =  the 
highest income category 
(earn 1,200 USD per 
month and over)  
 
Education  Respondent’s educational level 0-3: 0 = incomplete 
primary school and 
lower; 3 = having some 
university degree and 
higher 
 
Urban / rural resident  Respondent’s area of living 0-1: 0 = village/small 
town; 
1 = large 
city/metropolitan 
Political Engagement   
Interest Responses to survey question: How 
much interested you are in the 
politics. 
0-10: 0 = not at all 








Table B.5 (continued)  
 
Indicators Measure/ description Coding 
   
Follow news Responses to survey question: how 
often they follow news about politics 
and government  
0-4: 0 = never; 4 = 
always 
Efficacy: participation Responses to survey question: Do 
you strongly agree, agree, disagree, 
and strongly disagree with the 
following statement - “I think I have 
the ability to participate in politics” 
0-3: 0 = strongly 
disagree; 3 = strongly 
agree 
  
[Note: Original question 
used 1-4 scales: 1 = 
strongly agree; 2 = 
agree; 3 = disagree; 4 = 
strongly disagree. The 
scale was convert and 
coded as above in the 
analysis] 
 
Efficacy: understand Responses to survey question: Do 
you strongly agree, agree, disagree, 
and strongly disagree with the 
following statement - “Sometimes 
politics and government seems so 
complicated that a person like me 
can't really understand what is going 
on” 
0-3: 0 = strongly agree; 
3 = strongly disagree 
 
[Note: Original question 
used 1-4 scales: 1 = 
strongly agree; 2 = 
agree; 3 = disagree; 4 = 
strongly disagree. The 
scale was coded as 
above in the analysis] 
 
Mobilization   
Party Attachment Responses to survey question: Do 
you usually think of yourself as close 
to any particular party? If yes, 
another question asked the 
respondents how much close they 
feel.  
0-3: 0 = feel not close to 
any party; 3 = feel very 












Table B.5 (continued)  
 
Indicators Measure/ description Coding 
Group Membership Responses to survey question: “Are 
you a member of any organization or 
formal groups?” 




Fair election Responses to survey question: 0-3: 0 = not free or fair; 





Responses to survey question: 0-3: 0 = very 
dissatisfied; 3 = very 
satisfied 
   
Source: ABS (2002; 2006) 






Variables Used in Multivariate Models of Voting, Political Contacting, and  
Protesting by Area of Residence (Rural-Urban) 
 
Indicators Measure/ description Coding 
   
1. Dependent 
Variables 
(for each model):  
  
   
1.1 Voting Responses to survey question: Did 
you cast a ballot in the current 
election (December 23, 2007)? 
0-1: 0 = no; 1 = yes 
   
1.2 Political 
contacting 
Responses to survey question: During 
the past 12 months, have you done the 
following because of personal, family, 
or neighborhood problems, or 
problems with government officials 
and policies?  
– Any government official 
– Officials at higher level 
– Member of parliament  
– Local officials 
0-4: 0 = contacted to 
none; 1 = contacted to 1; 
contacted to 2; 3 = 
contacted to 3; and 4 = 
contacted to 4. 
   
1.4 Protest activism Responses to survey question: Did 
you do this alone or with others? —
demonstration,  strike, sit-in 




   
Political Engagement   
Interest Responses to survey question: How 
much interested you are in the 
forthcoming election (December 23, 
2007).  
0-10: 0 = not at all 
interested; 10 = very 











Table B.6 (continued)  
 
Indicators Measure/ description Coding 
Knowledge Knowledge score: 
(1) ability to name correctly of one 
candidate  
(2) ability to name correctly of second 
candidate;  
(3) ability to name correctly of one 
party;  
(4) ability to name correctly of second 
party;  
(5) ability to match correctly one 
candidate and party; and  
(6) ability to match correctly second 




[Note: 0 = incorrect, 1 = 
correct for each 
component] 
Efficacy Mean score of agreement with the 
statements:  
(1) “If people like us go to vote, we 
can change what happens in the 
future;”  
(2) “Sometimes I think that I just don’t 
understand politics;”  
(3) “Government officials really do 
not care what people like you and me 
think;” and  
(4) “Common people like me don’t 
have any influence on what go on in 
politics.”  
0-9: 0 = strongly 




[Note: Original question 
used 1-10 scales: 1 = 
strongly disagree, 10 = 
strongly agree. This 
scale was recoded to 
range from 0 (least 
efficacious) to 9 


















Table B.6 (continued)  
 
Indicators Measure/ description Coding 
Demographic   
Gender (Female)  Respondent’s gender  0-1: 0 = Male; 1 = 
Female 
Age Respondent’s age  18-highest 
 
Income  Average household’s earn during the 
last 6 months 
0-4: 0 = the lowest 
income category (earn 
170 USD a month); 4 =  
the highest income 
category (earn 1,300 
USD per month and 
over)  
 
Education  Respondent’s educational level 0-3: 0 = incomplete 
primary school and 
lower; 3 = having some 
university degree and 
higher 
 
Urban residence Respondent’s area of living 0-4: 0 = village/small 
town; 1 = midsized 
provincial city residents; 
2 = large provincial city 








Responses to a question asking 
whether the respondent is very 
satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very 
satisfied, or not at all satisfied with 
the way democracy works in 
Thailand 
 
0-3: 0 = not at all 
satisfied, 3 = very 
satisfied 
[Note: Original question 
used 1-4 scales: 1 = very 
satisfied, 4 = not at all 
satisfied. This scale was 
converted to range as 









Table B.6 (continued) 
 
Indicators Measure/ description Coding 
Government 
performance 
Mean score of responses to following 
questions:  
How good or bad a job do you think 
the government has done over the 
past: (1) economy; (2) education;  
(3) employment; (4) poverty 
reduction; (5) health care; (6) crime; 
(7) accidents; and (8) environment 
0-3 
 
[Note: 0 = very bad, 3 = 
very good for each 
component]  
Clientelism   
Personal benefit Factors use in deciding candidate: 
having an ability to solve your 
personal problems 
 
0-3: 0 = not at all 
important, 1 = very 
important 
Vote-buying Factors use in deciding candidate: 
giving you a money 
0-3: 0 = not at all 
important, 1 = very 
important 
Mobilization   
Group Membership Civic organization index: 
(1) union membership 
(2) business or employer's 
association membership 
(3) farmer's association membership 





[Note: 0 = no, 1 = yes 
for each component] 
PPP attachment Responses to survey question:  
Is there a political party that 
represents your view? 
If yes, another question asked the 
respondents: what is that party? 
[PPP] 
 
0-1: 0 = none or others, 
1 = PPP 
DP attachment Responses to survey question:  
Is there a political party that 
represents your view? 
If yes, another question asked the 
respondents: what is that party? [DP] 
 
0-1: 0 = none or others, 
1 = DP 
Source: CSES (2007) 
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